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ABSTRACT
This thesis provides a review and empirical analysis of the determination of
executive compensation components, long-term incentive pay ratios and the implication of
tournament pay structures. The sample of 1,137 executive-year observations of
comprehensive executive compensation packages from FTSE350 companies areexploited to
advance our understanding of executive paydetermination.
The meta-analysis in chapter three provides a systematic review of prior literature on
the pay-performance relationship and indicates that the true association between executive
pay and firm performance is positive. The economic significance of the relationship,
however, is low with less than one percent of executive pay rise is directly attributable to the
improvement in firm performance.
Chapter six examines the determinants of executive pay components and incentive
pay ratios. The empirical results suggest that main determinants of executive pay
components and incentive pay ratios are firm performance, firm size, executive tenure and
the CEO position. The empirical results are sensitive to performance measures used in
analysis.
Chapter seven provides some evidence supporting a tournament pay structure in the
UK companies with strongconnection between executive pay and organizational hierarchy.
The convexity of the pay-position relationship implies that extra compensation weight is
placed on the most seniorexecutive compensation and the pay-gap is increasing over time.
No evidence of the effect of the number of contestants on the tournament prize suggests the
growing trendof hiringexternal CEOcandidates rather than internal promotion.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.0 Introduction
Given the number of conferences and amount of column inches devoted to the
subject of executive compensation, there is no doubt that executive pay is one of major
topics of public concern in the late twentieth century and early 2000s. Public disquiet over
the level of executive pay, which appears to have outstripped the rises in firm performance
as well as average employees' remuneration, has risen considerably over the last decades.
The concern over seemingly unjustified increases in executive pay has played an important
part in the introduction of corporate governance reforms to the public policy agenda
(Thompson, 2005). In the UK, the publication of The Cadbury Report (1992) and The
Greenbury Report (1995) on directors' remuneration has led to attention being paid to the
governance practices and pay-setting processes of UK companies. However, govemance
reforms have been less concerned with either the level of executive payor the rate of
executive-pay rise, but rather with the apparently weak relationship between executive pay
and firm performance and a perceived lack of transparency about the pay-setting process.
The efforts to establish standards and transparent pay-setting procedures that are
independent of the beneficiaries appear to have had little impact on changing pay-
performance sensitivities (Buck, et aI., 2003; Girma, et aI., 2007; Thompson, 2005).
Accordingly, executive compensation, its components, rate of pay rise, and the
association with firm financial performance are still open for academic research. This thesis
will provide a review and an empirical analysis of the determination of executive
compensation components, long-term incentive pay ratios and the implication oftoumament
pay structures. Firstly, a meta-analysis of 43 prior empirical studies on pay-performance
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relationship provides a systematical review of the true relationship between executive
compensation and firm performance. The results of the meta-analysis indicate a positive
association between the level of executive compensation and firm performance, despite the
fact that the economic significance of the relationship is low. Secondly, comprehensive data
on UK companies' executive remuneration allow thorough analyses of the determinants of
executive pay components and determinants of incentive pay ratios with a number of firm
performance measures. The determination of pay components and incentive pay ratios is
analyzed from perspectives of both employer (cost of executive pay to company) and
executives/employees (value of pay to executives). The distinguish between cost of pay and
pay value to executive is expected to provide further understanding of the relationship
between executive pay and firm performance. Finally, the thesis also explores alternative
justification for the pay rise, i.e. tournament theory on executive compensation.
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the research background; to clarify the
objective and research questions of the thesis; and to briefly describe the expected
contribution of the thesis. This chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.1 discusses the
research background and motivation. Section 1.2 presents the objectives and research
questions of this thesis. The expected contributions of this research are presented in section
1.3. Finally, section 1.4 outlines the structure of this thesis and summary of each chapter.
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1.1 The Research Background
Corporate governance has received a great deal of attention from the academics and
the public, especially following recentgiant-corporate failures such as BCCI (1991), Barings
Bank (1995), Enron (200I), WorldCom (2002) and Pannalat (2003). Given the potentially
conflicting interests between managers and shareholders in modem corporations (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976), mostof the inquiries have focused on identifying governance mechanisms
that may be employed to mitigate these conflicts. Corporate governance research has
identified a variety of mechanisms to ensure that managers act in the best interest of
shareholders. Board of directors is one of the mechanism that is viewed as 'essential
monitoring device' to ensure that any problems arising from principal-agent relationships
and opportunism are minimized. However, the "first-best"option is the "optimal contracting
approach" that offers the manager an incentive compensation contract connected to finn
performance, Under imperfect information, incentive compensation contracts based on
outcomes can help to improve agency problems and align the interests of managers with
those of shareholders (Holmstrom, 1979).
Bebchuk, Fried & Walker (2002) challenge the optimal contracting view from
agency theory and suggest that executive-pay-setting process in publicly traded companies
has strayed far from ann's-Iength model', which is a condition for optimal contract. Indeed,
behaviors of directors and the board are also subject to agency problem, which undermine
their ability to address effectively the conflict of interests between managers' and
shareholders'. Directors generally wish to be re-appointed to the board, for attractive salary,
prestige and valuable business and social connections; whilst executives (CEO) play an
important role in re-nominating directors to the board. Directors, hence, have an incentive to
I Arm's-length bargaining model assumed that pay arrangements are the product of arm's-length
bargaining. It is the bargaining between executives attempting to getthe possible deal for themselves
and boards seeking to getthe best possible deal for shareholders.
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favor the CEO and/or other executives in term of their pay arrangements. In addition, market
forces are not sufficiently strong and fine-tuned to assure optimal contracting outcomes. For
these reasons, Bebchuk & Fried (2004) suggest that executives have substantial influence
over pay-setting process and their own pay that the greater is managers' power, the greater is
their ability to extract 'rents' (arrangements that are substantially more favorable than those
they could obtainable under effective arm's-length bargaining).
A survey by Murphy (1999) suggests that the evolving executive compensation
literature has been truly interdisciplinary, spanning accounting, economics, industrial
relations, law, organizational behavior, and strategy. Accountants, like Healy (1985), have
studied the association between accounting based compensation incentives and earnings
manipulation. Baiman and Verrecchia (1995) explore the relative effectiveness of
accounting-based versus market-based performance measures. Financial economists have
studied the relationship between executive compensation and company performance
(Abowd, 1990; Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Leonard, 1990;
Murphy, 1985; 1986; etc.). Financial economists have also investigated the effect of
investment decisions, capital structure, dividend policies, mergers and diversification on
executive compensation. Industrial economists have documented the effects of regulation
and deregulation on executive compensation (Carroll and Ciscel, 1982). Furthermore,
organizational behaviorists have examined social comparisons and the behavioral effects of
wage dispersion (O'Reilly, et al., 1988; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989; 1994). Within this
exploding interdisciplinary literature, the main concentration of prior research is
determination of the level of executive compensation. However, despite a huge number of
studies devoted to explaining the determination of executive compensation, there is
continuing debate over the determinants of executive pay (Murphy, 1999), particularly
surrounding underlying theory.
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Within the theoretical debate over the determination of executive compensation, the
dominant approach is agency theory, which, as discussed in preceding paragraph, argues for
an optimal incentive contract linking executive pay to performance of the firm. Accordingly,
the optimal incentive contract under agency theory suggests firm performance as the main
determinant of executive compensation. However, agency research, while conceptually
important, has produced weak or even statistically insignificant results on the relationship
between executive pay and performance (Conyon and Leech, 1994; Gibbons and Murphy,
1990; Gregg, et aI., 1993; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Murphy,
1999). In contrast, managerial power perspective argues that executives use their power to
extract rents and influence their own pay to the detriment of shareholders (Bebchuk and
Fried, 2004). Tournament theory perspective (by Lazear and Rosen, 1981a), however,
suggests that relative performance and rank-order in the organizational hierarchy are the
most important determinants of executive compensation. The agency perspective, despite
theoretical importance, might not fully explain the determination of executive compensation
due to low economic significance of the pay-performance relationship from empirical
research. Hence, it is likely that research examining alternative models from different
perspectives may be more fruitful in explaining the level and the disparity of executive
remuneration.
Moreover, although the number of published studies on executive compensation in
the UK is far less than the number of research papers in the US, it is clear that the UK has
been a pioneer in corporate governance reforms that seeks to address concerns over
executive compensation. Thompson (2005) comments that many countries with emergent
industrial systems have self-consciously adopted many of the principles and practices of the
UK reports. The issue of executive pay determination has been a major element in UK
governance reforms. The Cadbury Committee was set up in the UK in 1991 in response to
the rapid increase in executive pay and supposed failure of pay to be linked to performance
and also in response to a series of scandals involving Maxwell Communications, BCCI,
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Polly Peck, etc. The publication of the Cadbury Report (1992), the Greenbury Report
(1995), the Hampel Report (1998), the Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations (2002),
the Higgs Report (2003) and the Combined Code (2003, 2006 & 2010) are important
milestones in the process of ensuring greater transparency in the pay-setting process and
improved accountability of UK boards of directors to their shareholders. Despite numerous
changes in corporate governance, investors remain concerned that executives continue to be
rewarded substantially even when company performance is poor. Specifically, Thompson
(2005) and Girma et al (2007) documented little impact of a more standard and transparent
pay-setting procedure on pay-performance sensitivities since the reforms. Hence, the pay-
performance relationship still needs further investigation and research.
Among those studies on the pay-performance relationship, Devers et al (2007) have
summarized and organized the relationships between executive pay and performance into
two main categories: (1) the influence of performance on executive pay and (2) the influence
of executive pay on performance. Researchers examining the influence of performance on
executive pay generally depict compensation as a reward for prior performance, or as a
means of ex post settling up (Fama, 1980). Scholars often refer this relationship as the
sensitivity of pay to performance. Hall and Liebman (1998) concluded that the sensitivity of
CEO compensation to firm performance has been increasing over time largely because of the
explosion of stock options. On the other hand, scholars examining the influence of pay on
performance conceptualize compensation as a motivational tool. However, considerable
literature suggests that firm performance is not simply a function of managerial decisions
and raised questions concerning the efficacy of executive compensation to adequately align
the interest of managers and shareholders (Yermack, 1997; Devers et al, 2007).
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1.2 Objectives of the thesis
Given the research background and research gaps presented in preceding
paragraphs, this thesis seeks to examine the determination of executive compensation (pay
components, pay ratios and the rate of pay rise) from alternative theoretical perspectives
using comprehensive data from large UK companies. Although there have been vast
numbers of prior studies concentrated on the determination of pay level, there have been
relatively few investigations on the determinants of pay components and executive pay
structure (except for Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Lewellen, et al., 1987; Veliyath and Cordeiro,
2001). However, all these studies are on US data, there is virtually no study in the UK that
examines the determination of executive pay elements and incentive pay ratio. To address
the gap, this study provides an empirical analysis of the determination of executive pay
components and incentive pay ratio (pay structure) in the UK.
Within the theoretical debate over the determination of executive compensation,
agency theory suggests firm performance as the main determinant of executive
compensation. This study concentrates on the influence of firm performance on executive
pay, specifically on pay components and structure of executive pay. In contrast, the
managerial power theory argues that executives use their power to extract rents and
influence their own pay, which is not subject to firm performance. Alternatively, tournament
theory suggests that the relative performance and the rank order in the organizational
hierarchy are the main determinants of executive pay. The models that underpin the
empirical analysis of this thesis will follow the arguments from these three perspectives.
Although this set of theories is not exhaustive, the models based on these perspectives are
prominent in their respective fields and each perspective has been the subject of extensive
prior empirical work.
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In sum, the main objective of this thesis is to undertake an empirical analysis of the
determination of executive pay components and incentive pay ratio in the UK by contrasting
agency theory perspective and the managerial power perspective; and by testing tournament
theory in the context of executive compensation. The primary research questions for this
study are:
1. What are the main determinants of components of executive compensation and
incentive pay ratio in the UK?
2. Are the predictions of tournament theory held in the context of executive
compensation in the UK?
1.3 Expected Contributions
This thesis seeks to improve knowledge of executive compensation by making the
following contributions. The first major contribution is a detail empirical analysis of the
determinants of components of executive compensation and ratios of pay components over
total pay, mainly ratios of incentive pay components. To date, there is virtually no study in
the UK that examines the determinants of executive pay components and incentive pay
ratios. The conflicting empirical evidence of the relationship between executive
compensation and firm performance may partly due to the inconsistent approach adopted by
the extent literature regarding the definition of the pay variable. At first sight, research
appears to define compensation in a fairly consistent manner; broadly defined as cash
compensation. long-term incentives and total compensation. However. apart from
precedence. the literature does not provide guidance for a precise measurement specification
and subsequently studies use a wide variety of definitions that may influence the results.
Most studies use one measure of compensation in the analysis and very few studies attempt
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to measure more than just total compensation. More typically, there are no UK studies that
examine the determination of incentive pay ratios, to date. Hence, this study examines the
determination of the following measures of executive compensation: cash pay, long-term
incentives, total pay, and the ratio of long-term incentives in total executive compensation.
Second, this study provides comprehensive measures of the executive compensation
variables. The complication in measuring executive remuneration mainly relates to long-
term incentive components, which are difficult to be calculated accurately at the grant date
due to contingent performance conditions. Except for Buck et al (2003), most other UK
studies use very simple estimation of the value of long-term incentives; say 20% of the face
value of long-term incentive plans (hereby "LTIPs") (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Conyon,
et aI., 2001). In this study, long-term incentives are estimated for each incentive at the grant
date controlling for contingent performance conditions attached to the plans. Specifically,
options and LTIPs are first evaluated their cost to company using the Black-Scholes
valuation models. The actual values of options and LTIPs are then controlling for
performance conditions attached to the incentives and subsequent vesting of such incentives.
Third, the thesis empirically tests the predictions of the tournament theory
perspective in the context of executive compensation. Conyon et al (2001) conducted an
empirical analysis testing the propositions of tournament theory in the UK using cross-
sectional data with a simple estimation of long-term incentive pay. Conyon's et al (2001)
study partly supported the propositions suggested by tournament theory. This study further
tests the propositions of tournament theory using panel data and more comprehensive
measures of long-term incentive pay to examine the validity of tournament theory in the
context of executive compensation in the UK.
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Fourth, this study controls for the possible effect on the valuation of executive
compensation by differentiating the cost of compensation to the company and its value to the
executives. Hall and Murphy (2000; 2002) argue that undiversified and risk-averse
executives will generally place a much lower value on company stock options than would
outside investors. In addition, the value of LTIPs is also much lower than its cost to the
company due to the 'challenging performance criteria' (Greenbury, 1995) attached to the
plans (i.e. LTIPs). The divergence between the cost and value of long-term incentives has
implications for evaluating the incentives provided by executives' long-term incentive pay
(Hall and Murphy, 2002). Hence, the relationship between executive pay and firm
performance is likely to be affected by the use of the cost of long-term incentive pay to the
company and its value to executive directors.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
In order to address the research questions and make the contributions listed above,
the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the framework on corporate
governance and executive compensation in the UK. The chapter discusses the importance of
corporate governance in modern corporations and the recent developments of corporate
governance in the UK. As part of the corporate governance reforms, the current framework
on executive compensation in the UK is described next in the chapter. The purpose of this
chapter is to address the provisions of corporate governance reforms on pay-setting process
and the limitations in altering corporate behavior and performance. This chapter also
provides a framework and justification for data collection in Chapter S.
Chapter 3 reviews the theoretical arguments and empirical findings surrounding the
determination of executive compensation. The chapter reviews alternative theoretical
perspectives on the determinants of executive pay. In order to examine executive pay
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components, Chapter 3 describes the structure of an executive compensation package with
main components. Chapter 3 also reviews the determinants of each components of executive
compensation package. The review of literature on the relationship between executive pay
and firm performance, as suggested by agency theory, then follows. The review of the pay-
performance relationship includes a narrative review of prior research and a meta-analysis.
The meta-analysis contains 43 prior studies that report a correlation coefficient between
executive compensation and firm performance. The meta-analysis provides a systematic
review of the literature and allows researchers to correct for various statistical artifacts and
to aggregate results across studies to obtain an estimate of the true relationship between
variables.
In Chapter 4, alternative theoretical perspectives discussed in chapter 3 are utilized
to derive a range of hypotheses. Specifically, agency theory and the managerial power
theory are two main perspectives in deriving hypotheses on the determinants of executive
pay components and incentive pay ratios. The tournament theory perspective is used to
derive hypotheses on tournament pay structure in the context of executive compensation.
Chapter 5 describes the methodology utilized to test the presented research questions
and derived hypotheses. The panel data analysis is described with both static panel data
method (the fixed and random effects estimators) and dynamic panel data method (Arellano-
Bond GMM estimator). The selection of the sample and description of the data set are
presented next. This is followed by a description and justification of the variables used in the
empirical analysis. The chapter also presents a descriptive analysis of variables, especially
the description of executive compensation of the sample companies.
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 present the results and analyses of the empirical tests
examining the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. In Chapter 6, the hypotheses relating to
the determinants of executive pay components and incentive pay ratios are tested. The
II
results of the empirical analysis are presented for different components of executive pay:
cash compensation, long-term incentives and total compensation. The results examining the
determinants of incentive pay ratios are presented next. The comparison between the use of
cost of pay to company and its value to executive is presented in each empirical result.
Chapter 7 presents the results of the empirical analysis examining the tournament
theory in the context of executive compensation. The empirical results of the most important
prediction of the tournament theory about the convex relationship between executive pay
and organizational level are presented first. Other predictions of the tournament theory are
tested next and the results are presented consequently.
In the final chapter (Chapter 8), the findings presented in the result chapters
(Chapter 6 and Chapter 7) are summarized and reflected upon. The chapter also highlights
the implications of the findings for policy makers and managers of public corporations. It
also identifies weakness and shortcomings of this thesis and consequently avenues for future
research.
12
Chapter 2
FRAMEWORK ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN THE UK
2.0 Introduction
Corporate governance has received a great deal of attention from academics, the
media and the public at large in recent decades following recent giant-corporate failures, the
spread of creative accounting and the pressures on increasing firm value in stock markets.
Given the potentially conflicting interests of managers and shareholders in modern
corporations (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), most of the inquiries have focused on identifying
corporate governance mechanisms that may be employed by a firm to mitigate these
conflicts. Accordingly, corporate governance research has identified a number of
mechanisms to ensure management's action in the best interest of shareholders. This chapter
provides an overview of corporate governance, executive compensation, its importance in
modern corporations, and the current framework in the UK. The next section will describe
the nature of the modern public corporation and the need for a good governance system.
Section 2.3 describes governance framework in the UK with current legislations, regulations
and practice adopted by companies. This section provides a summary of the development in
corporate governance in the UK with details of influential reports such as the Cadbury
Report, the Greenbury Report, the Hampel Report, the Higgs Report and the Combined
Code. Section 2.4 centers on the regulations and framework on executive remuneration with
more details of the Greenbury Report and the Directors' Remuneration Report Regulation.
Section 2.5 will conclude the chapter and its contribution and implication for the thesis as a
whole.
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2.1 The Nature of Public Corporation and Importance of Corporate Governance
A central feature of the public corporation is the separation of ownership and
control, which was first described by Berle and Means (1932). Shareholders are the owners
of the public corporation; however, the effective control of the firm belongs to the managers,
who are not normally the owners. The shareholders invest their money and get a chance to
participate in the profits of the corporation without taking responsibility for the operations.
The management gets a chance to run the company without taking responsibility for
personally providing the funds. The four characteristics essential to the vitality and appeal of
the corporation are: limited liability for shareholders; free transferability of shareholders'
interests; legal personality; and centralized management. (I) A limited liability means that
the corporation is separate from its owners and employees. What is owed to the corporation
is not owed to the individuals who made up the corporation; and what the corporation owes
is not owed by the shareholders. Hence, if a corporation goes bankrupt and is sued by its
creditors, the shareholders and individual members of the corporation are not individually
liable. (2) Transferability is the ability to transfer one's shareholding freely, which is jus as
important as limited liability in achieving an acceptable level of risk. (3) Legalpersonality
means that a corporation is a legal entity having legal rights and obligations that are distinct
from those of its owners. Corporation lives on for as long as it has capital, i.e. perpetual
existence. (4) Centralized management is another aspect of the limited authority given to
shareholders. In order to allow the company to operate with maximum efficiency, the
shareholders give up the right to make decisions on all but the most general issues facing the
company. In a corporation, the power to determine the company's overall direction is given
to the board of directors and the power to control its day-to-day operations is given to the
managers.
That corporate form with the central feature of separation between ownership and
control is the source of agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Meckling
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suggest that managers (agent) have a chance to consume corporate resources and to act
opportunistically for their own benefit to the detriment of shareholders (principal). Agency
theory also asserts that firms can employ various mechanisms to align the interest of agents
and principals, and to monitor the behavior of agents. In the context of corporations and
issues of corporate control, agency theory views corporate governance mechanisms,
especially the board of directors, as being an 'essential monitoring device' to ensure that any
problems arising from principal-agent relationships and opportunism are minimized (Mallin,
2004). Corporate governance is defined by the Cadbury Report (1992) as 'the system by
which corporations are directed and controlled' (para 2.5) to ensure the maximization of
shareholders' wealth.
The topic of corporate governance has also attained enormous practical importance
for at least the following reasons. First, the efficiency of the existing governance
mechanisms in advanced economies has been the subject of debate, especially following
giant-corporate failures of BCCI (1991), Barings Bank (1995), Enron (2001), WorldCom
(2002); Parmalat (2003), etc. Corporate governance is a major topic of public concern with
the allegation that the internal mechanisms of corporate governance have not performed their
job. The level of executive remuneration has also been the subject of public concerns,
particularly over its efficiency and appropriateness. Second, there is an ongoing debate on
the relative efficacy of the corporate governance systems in the US and UK (typified by
dispersed shareholding and a prominent role of the secondary market of shares) and the
corporate governance systems in Japan and Germany (typified by more concentrated
shareholdings and a prominent role for banks). With the new and emerging market
economies seeking to implement the 'right' corporate governance system, this debate has
attracted serious attention from finance and legal scholars. Third, there is an apparent
departure of the current practice of corporate governance from the legal provisions which
accord the board control over management. The basic principle of corporate governance is
that the shareholders elect the board of directors who in tum select top management.
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However, the common practice is for the board to be elected by the shareholders from the
slate approved by the top management.
2.2 Corporate Governance Practice in the UK
Corporations in the UK work within a governance framework, which is set by (1)
legislation particularly the Companies Acts; (2) regulations emanating from the regulatory
bodies to which they are subjects (such as the listing rules for listed companies); and (3) the
Combined Code, which contains general principles and more details provisions and
recommendations relating to the governance of listed companies (Chambers, 2003). The
Company Acts are the UK law regarding the responsibilities, operations and governance of
companies. The legislation is enacted by the Companies Act 1985 (with amendments by the
Companies Act 1989), which consolidates various pieces of company legislation in the UK.
The company law in the UK was reformed by the Companies Act 2006, which amended
almost all of the Companies Act 1985 and introduced many reforms with various new
provisions for private and public companies; but most of its provisions are not yet in force'.
Under the UK company law, shareholders have comparatively extensive voting rights,
including the rights to appoint and dismiss individual directors and, in certain circumstances,
to call an Extraordinary General Meeting of the company. Certain requirements relating to
the Annual General Meeting and requirements for information to be disclosed in the annual
reports and accounts are also set out in company law. This framework is reinforced by the
Listing Rules, the regulations that must be followed by companies listed on the Main Market
of the London Stock Exchange. The Listing Rules provide further rights to shareholders and
require certain information to be disclosed to the market. The legislation and regulations are
straightforward and carry known penalties if companies contravene them. The Combined
Code, however, operates on the basis of 'comply or explain'. The Combined Code
2 It was intended that all partsof the Actwouldbe in effect from October2008,but thishas now
beendelayed untilOctober 2009
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indentifies good governance practices relating to, for example, the role and compositions of
the board and its committees and the development of a sound system of internal control, but
companies can choose to adopt a different approach if that is more appropriate to their
circumstances. Where they do so, however, they are required to explain the reason to their
shareholders. In sum, the UK has developed a market-based approach to corporate
governance that enables the board to retain flexibility in the way in which it organizes itself
and exercises its responsibilities, while ensuring that it is properly accountable to its
shareholders.
• The Development
The development of corporate governance in the UK has its roots in a series of
corporate collapses and scandals in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including the collapse of
the BCCI bank and the Robert Maxwell pension funds scandal in 1991. The UK business
community recognized the need to put its house in order. And this led to the setting up in
1991 of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, chaired by Sir
Adrian Cadbury, which issued a series of recommendations - known as the Cadbury Report-
in 1992. A requirement was added to the Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange that
companies should report whether they had followed the recommendations or, if not, explain
why they had not done so. In 1995, the Greenbury Report set out recommendations on the
remuneration of directors. In 1998, recommendations of the Cadbury and the Greenbury
reports were re-examined by the Hampel review and all brought together in the Combined
Code (1998). In 1999, the Turnbull report was issued to provide directors with guidance on
how to develop a sound system of internal control. Following the Enron (2001) and
WorldCom (2002) scandals in the US, the Combined Code was updated in 2003 to
incorporate the Higgs Report's recommendations on the role and independence of non-
executive directors and the Smith Report's recommendations on the role of audit committee.
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC), who has responsibility for publishing and
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maintaining the Code, made further limited changes to the Combined Code in 2006.
Throughout all of these changes, the 'comply or explain' approach first set out in the
Cadbury Report has been retained. Summary of the Reports and the Code follows.
• The Cadbury Report (1992) and the Code of Best Practice
The Cadbury Report, formally entitled 'The Report of the Committee on the
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance', was published in December 1992 following the
recommendations of the Cadbury Committee. The Committee was set up in May 1991 by
the Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange, and the accountancy
profession to address the financial aspects of corporate governance. As such the Committee
addressed the financial aspects of corporate governance and subsequently produced a Code
of Best Practice, the provisions of which, in their belief, all boards of UK listed companies
should comply with. The Committee has made clear that the Code is to be followed by
boards in light of their own particular circumstances. They are responsible for ensuring that
their actions meet the spirit of the Code and in interpreting it they should give precedence to
substance over fonn. The Committee, specifically, recommended that listed companies
should incorporate a formal statement into their Report and Accounts outlining whether or
not they complied with each of the Code's provisions. Further to this, the Report
recommended that the compliance statements made by the companies should be reviewed by
auditors prior to release of the Annual Report.
The key focus of the provisions of the Report is primarily related to the composition
of the board of directors, the appointment and independence of non-executive directors, the
service contracts and remuneration of executive directors, and company's financial reporting
and controls. Regarding (1) the board of directors, the Code recommends that the board
should meet regularly to retain full and effective control over the company and monitor the
executive management. The Report recommends a clearly accepted division of
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responsibilities at the head of the company to ensure the balance of power and authority,
specifically the separate role of chairman and chief executive officer. The board should also
include non-executive directors of sufficient calibre and number, i.e. a balance in the board
of directors, for their views to carry significant weight in the board's decisions. (2) Non-
executive directors should bring an independent judgment to bear on issues of strategy,
performance, resources, key appointments, and standard of conduct. The majority of non-
executive directors should be independent of management and free from any business or
other relationships which could materially affect their independent judgment. Non-executive
directors should be appointed for specific terms and the reappointment should not be
automatic. (3) There should be full and clear disclosure of directors' remuneration and those
of the chairman and highest-paid UK director, including pension contributions and stock
options. Separate figure should be given for salary and performance-related elements and the
basis on which performance is measured should be explained. Executive remuneration
should be subject to the recommendations of a Remuneration Committee made up entirely or
mainly of non-executive directors. And service contract for directors should not exceed three
years without shareholders' approval. (4) For reporting and control, the board should
establish an Audit Committee of at least three non-executive directors with written terms of
reference which deal clearly with its authority and duties. The board should ensure that an
objective and professional relationship is maintained with the auditors. The directors are
responsible for reporting on the effectiveness of the company's system of internal control
and the going concern of the business.
Although the Cadbury Code ofBest Practice was formally voluntary, it is endorsed
by the London Stock Exchange to ensure high levels of compliance by introducing
requirements into the Listing Rules requesting all companies to include a statement of
compliance, or non-compliance, with the provisions in their Annual Report and Accounts.
Furthermore, institutional investors and investment banks urged those listed companies for
which they provided sponsorship and advice to adopt the provisions. As a result, many
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companies changed their governance procedures and conduct accordingly. A survey by
Conyon (I 997b) suggests that majority of large UK companies have implemented the
Code's proposals very rapidly.
• The Greenbury Report (1995)
The Greenbury Committee was set up in 1995 in response to the issue of director's
remuneration, which was becoming a primary concern for investors and public at large
during 1990s. It was recognized that corporate governance issues relating to director's
remuneration needed to be addressed in a more rigorous manner. And the Committee's terms
of reference is to identify good practice in determining director remuneration and prepare a
Code of such practice for use by UK PLCs. The Committee's findings were then
documented in the Greenbury Report, which incorporated a Code of Best Practice on
Director's Remuneration. There are four main issues were dealt with: (1) the establishment,
membership and role of a Remuneration Committee in setting the remuneration packages for
the CEO and other directors; (2) the required level of disclosure and approval of the details
of directors' remuneration policy; (3) specific guidelines for determining a remuneration
policy for directors; and (4) the length of service contracts and provisions binding the
company to pay compensation for directors, particularly in the event of dismissal for
unsatisfactory performance. Further details of these recommendations and provisions are
provided in the executive remuneration framework section.
The proposals contained in the Greenbury Code are designed to ensure that
directors' remuneration is linked to individual performance and that there is greater
accountability and transparency in the determination of levels of remuneration. Following
publication, the Greenbury's recommendations were also taken on board by the London
Stock Exchange and incorporated into the UK Listing Rules. However, unlike the Cadbury
Code, it was not widely accepted as many believed that the recommendations made did not
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sufficiently deal with the issue of linking director's pay to company performance in the
interests of shareholders. Moreover, the Report was concerned with the process of
determining remuneration, not the level of remuneration itself; and thus it was felt that its
recommendations may not ease public concerns over the high levels of directors'
remuneration.
• The Hampel Report (1998)
The Hampel Committee was established in 1996 to review and revise the earlier
recommendations of the Cadbury and Greenbury Committees with the intention of creating
an overall code of corporate governance. The Hampel Report, which is subsequently
published in 1998, emphasis on the board principles of good corporate governance, rather
than detailed guidelines and rules as in the Cadbury and Greenbury Codes, in order to reduce
the regulatory burden on companies and avoid 'box-ticking' so as to be flexible enough to be
applicable to all companies. It was recognised that good corporate governance will largely
depend on the particular situation of each company. The Hampel's recommendation is
"company should include in their annual report and accounts a narrative statement of how
they apply the relevant principles to their particular circumstances" (para 2.1, p.16).
The Hampel Committee viewed corporate governance from a strict agency
perspective, i.e. corporate governance as an opportunity to enhance long term shareholder
value. This was a new development from the Cadbury and Greenbury Codes which had
primarily focused on preventing the abuse of the discretionary authority entrusted to
management. In particular, the Report favoured greater shareholder involvement in company
affairs. For example, the Report recommended shareholders, particularly institutional
shareholders, to adopt a 'considered policy' on voting. Another key advance was in the area
of accountability and audit. The board was identified as having responsibility to maintain a
sound system of internal control, thereby safeguarding shareholders' investments (although
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the board was not required to report on the effectiveness of the controls). Further, the board
was to be held accountable for all aspects of risk management, as opposed to just the
financial controls as recommended by Cadbury. The Hampel Committee, however, did not
advance the debate on director's remuneration, choosing only to reiterate principles inherent
in Greenbury. In particular, the Hampel Committee did not believe that directors'
remuneration should be a matter for shareholder approval in general meeting. This would not
become a requirement until the introduction of The Directors' Remuneration Report
Regulations in 2002.
In sum, the Hampel Report made recommendations on improving communication
with shareholders, and redressing the balance between implementing controls, and allowing
companies to find their own ways of applying corporate governance principles. The
Committee also consolidated the recommendations of the two previous reports (Cadbury and
Greenbury) and recommended the creation of a 'Combined Code' which was annexed to the
Listing Rules. Details of the Combined Code will be discussed in the following section.
• The Combined Code (1998)
The Combined Code consolidated the principles and recommendations of the
Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel reports. It was formulated in 1998 and revised in 2003
following the publication of the Higgs report. The Code is divided into two sections. The
first section outlines principles of best practice and their supporting provisions for
companies, while the second section does the same for shareholders. While compliance with
the Code is not mandatory, the Code was appended to the listing rules, which requires a
statement by companies to provide shareholders with sufficient information to be able to
assess the extent of compliance with section one of the Code. Instances of non-compliance
should be justified to shareholders.
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Section I of the Code is comprehensive covering topics such as the composition and
operations of the Board, directors' remuneration, relationship with shareholders, the supply
of information, and accountability and audit. The fact that the Code has provided both
principles and provisions has resulted in a Code that is powerful enough to effect specific
recommendations and flexible enough to be applicable to most companies.
Section 2 of the Code is much shorter, covering shareholder voting, dialogue with
companies and the evaluation of governance disclosures. As institutional investors invest on
behalf of the shareholders they represent, they have a responsibility to hold the companies in
which they invest to account. In particular, the Code recognised that the responsibility for
maintaining good dialogue and mutual understanding belongs to both companies and its
institutional investors. Finally when evaluating the quality of governance disclosure by
companies, institutional investors are to give due weight to all relevant factors. This is rather
vague and the area has been recognised as a shortcoming of the Code, leading to
membership associations of institutional investors having to produce guidance to its
members on this area.
• The Turnbull Report (1999) - Internal Control
A working party led by Nigel Turnbull, was established to develop guidance for
directors on the internal control principle and provisions within the Combined Code' and
provide assistance for companies in reporting how they had applied the Combined Code and
its principles to shareholders in the annual reports and accounts. The Turnbull Report, which
was published late 1999, based on high-level principles of good governance rather than rules
or detailed checklists. The Report's main recommendations were:
3 Code Principle:
'The board should maintain a sound system of internal control to safeguard shareholders'
investment andthe company's assets'
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o The board should conduct an annual review of the effectiveness of the
company's internal control system and should report to shareholders that they
have done so.
o There must be embedded monitoring process for the review of internal control
on a continuous basis
o The board should take a risk-based approach to the review. The board should
consider what the significant risks are and assess how they have been identified,
evaluated and managed. The board should also assess the effectiveness of the
related system of internal control in managing the significant risks.
o The review should cover all significant aspects of internal controls, including
financial controls, operational controls, compliance control, and risk
management.
o The board, not operational managers, is responsible for risk management and
internal control; and also takes responsibility for the disclosures on internal
control in the annual report and accounts.
o The board should annually review the scope of work, authority and resources of
the internal audit function
o Companies who do not have an internal audit function should assess the need for
one annually
In July 2004, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), chaired by Douglas Flint
reviewed the Turnbull Report. The FRC published updated guidance in October 2005, which
applied to financial years beginning on or after 1 January 2006. Minor changes were made
which included: (1) a new preface has been added to encourage companies to keep their
application of the guidance under review and to provide shareholders with more meaningful
information in their annual statement; and (2) clarification that directors will beexpected to
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apply the same standard of care when reviewing internal controls as when carrying out their
general duties.
• The Higgs Report (2002) - Non-Executive Directors
The Higgs Review (2002) on the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors
(NEDs) further develops the UK framework on corporate governance. This review was led
by Derek Higgs and begun in April 2002, with the final report published in January 2003.
The Report recommended a number of changes to the Combined Code for NEDs to take on a
more demanding and influent role on company boards. It examined the role, independence
and recruitment of non-executive directors. Higgs viewed the non-executive director's role
as: making contributions to corporate strategy; monitoring the performance of executive
management; satisfying themselves regarding the effectiveness of internal control; setting
the remuneration of executive directors; and being involved in the nomination, removal and
succession planning of senior management. The independence of NEDs had been mentioned
in the Combined Code with recommendations that board should comprise of at least one-
third ofNEDs and a majority of whom should be independence. However, the Code did not
detail how to assess independence. Therefore Higgs outlined a series of tests of
independence such as length of service (10 years), associations to executive management,
financial interest or significant shareholding. In particular, cross-directorships were
identified as compromising independence, the simplest case being where two directors act as
executive directors and non-executive directors alternatively at two companies. However, in
practice there may be a complicated network of inter-relationships known as, 'an old boy's
club' such that it remains difficult to externally determine a directors' independence. With
regard to recruitment, the Higgs Report recommended stronger provisions governing
nomination committees. Higgs called for all listed companies to establish a nomination
committee, chaired by an independent NED (not the Chairman) and comprising a majority of
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independent non-executive directors. Other important recommendations of the Higgs report
included:
o The Board should review its performance, the performance of its committees
and individual directors at least once a year;
o The Company Secretary should be accountable to the Board through the
. Chairman on all governance matters; and
o The terms of reference of the remuneration committee should be published.
• The Smith Review (2003) - Guidance on Audit Committees
An independent group, chaired by Sir Robin Smith, convened in January 2003 to
clarify the role and responsibilities of audit committees. The report was published in July
2003. The main recommendations are:
o The audit committee should comprise of at least three members, all members
should be independent NEDs
o Audit committee member should have significant, recent, and relevant financial
experience
o Suitable and timely training should be provided to committee members
Recommendations on the role of the audit committee were to monitor the integrity
of the financial statements, review the internal financial control systems, monitor the internal
audit function, make recommendations to the board on external auditors, appointment, and
monitor and review the performance and independence of external auditors. The
recommendations are appended to the Revised Combined Code (2003).
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• Revised Combined Code
The revised Combined Code, published in July 2003 was a direct result of the
recommendations of the Higgs report and the Smith review as outlined above. The revised
Combined Code aims to achieve more open and rigorous procedures for the appointment of
directors and improved induction and development of NEDs. As with the 1998 Combined
Code, the revised Code also takes a 'comply or explain' approach to encourage best practice
in corporate governance. Companies are required to report on their compliance against the
Code and should explain areas of non-compliance. The revised Code amounts to a
significant revision of the 1998 Code. In particular, the Code calls for:
o A separation of the roles of the Chairman and Chief Executive. The Chairman
should satisfy the criteria for independence on appointment, but should not,
thereafter, be considered independent when assessing the balance of board
membership;
o A board of at least half independent NEDs. The Code defines independence as
recommended by the Higgs Report;
o Candidates for board selection to be drawn from a wider pool;
o The board, its committees and directors to be subject to an annual performance
review;
o At least one member of the audit committee to have recent and relevant financial
experience; and
o The Code permits the chairman to chair the nomination committee, which is in
contrast to the Higgs Report, except where the committee is considering the
appointment of the chairman's successor.
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Following the revised Combined Code, there are a number of other reports that
further develop the corporate governance in the UK. Tyson report on the recruitments and
development of non-executive directors was commissed in late 2003. In December 2004
the Government launched the code 'Building better boards' to develop diversity in
boardrooms. Good governance code for the voluntary and community sector was
published in June 2005 to maintain and enhance public confidence in organisations. In
July 2005, the FRC announced a review of the implementation ofthe Combined Code and
a number of changes were incorporated in the revised Combined Code, published in July
2006, which supercedes and replaces the 2003 Code.
Corporate governance practice in the UK, with the Combined Code, number of
reports and recommendations, sets out best practices to guide companies, on a 'comply or
explain' basis, in applying their own corporate governance system. This corporate
governance framework and practice aim to enhance the accountability and responsibility of
the board in monitoring management and align their interests with those of shareholders.
The following section describes in more details current framework of executive
remuneration in the UK and the use of incentive contract in aligning the interest of
shareholders and managers.
2.3 Executive Remuneration Framework in the UK
As noted in the last section, the issues of executive remuneration are first discussed
and recommended in the Cadbury report. Although only three (out of nineteen) of Cadbury's
recommendations directly concern executive remuneration, the Cadbury report advocated a
sharp break with traditional UK corporate practice in compensating executive directors.
Particularly, the total remuneration of directors and that of both the chair and the highest
paid UK director were to be fully disclosed, with a breakdown of the base salary and
performance-based elements and an explanation of the basis on which relevant performance
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is measured. The pay of executive directors was to be determined by a remuneration
committee, which was to be comprised wholly or mainly of non-executive directors.
Directors' service contracts were not to exceed three years. In sum, the Cadbury report
sought to make the pay determination process more transparent, more accountable, and less
subject to executive influence and by setting up an institutional device that could relate
compensation to the firm's circumstances.
The Greenbury Report (1995) further develops the framework on executive
remuneration with a number of recommendations and provisions incorporated in the Code of
Best Practice on Director's Remuneration. The provisions are mainly on the remuneration
committee; determinants, disclosure and approval of remuneration policy; and service
contracts for directors.
• Remuneration Committee
The Greenbury Report recommends that all public companies should establish a
remuneration committee and that any company choosing to ignore this advice should be
required to explain why and, in its annual report, outline the alternative arrangements which
have been put in place. The remuneration committee should be given clearly defined terms
of reference and be a formal1y constituted committee of the board of directors, with ful1
responsibility for al1 matters relating to executive pay. The responsibilities of remuneration
committee should include: determining of company-wide policy on remuneration;
determining of individual remuneration packages for each executive director; and reporting
directly to shareholders on behalf of the board of directors on al1 matters relating to
executive remuneration. Furthermore, the remuneration committee should consist
exclusively of non-executive directors with no personal financial interest, no potential
conflicts of interest arising from cross-directorships, and no day-to-day involvement in
running the company. The fees of non-executive directors should be determined by the
whole board. The remuneration committee should consult the company's chairman and CEO
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about their proposals and have access to professional advice inside and outside the company
in determining policy on executive remuneration and specific remuneration packages.
Remuneration committee chairman should attend the company's Annual General Meeting to
account directly to the shareholders.
The Greenbury Committee rejects the suggestion that remuneration committees
might include independent members from outside of the company. Its reasons are that
remuneration committee members need to be fairly knowledgeable about all aspects of the
company, as well as particularly knowledgeable about the executive jobs they are assessing
and the performance of the executives who fill those jobs, including their contribution to the
overall success of the company. Greenbury argues that individuals whose only link with the
company is through membership of the remuneration committee could not "realistically
fulfil these conditions". However, it is questionable whether the argument is quite one-sided
as the Greenbury suggests. It might be argued that the Greenbury underplays the relative
contribution that independent specialists might make. For example, where someone is very
knowledgeable about salary developments across industry generally, this might more than
compensate for a lack of detailed knowledge about the company's operations. These issues
have been resolved and clearly defined in the Higgs Report (2002).
• Disclosure and approval provisions
The Greenbury report argues for full disclosure of information on all aspect of
remuneration for executive directors. The remuneration committee should produce a report,
which forms part of or be annexed to the company's annual reports and accounts, each year
to the shareholders on behalf of the Board. The report should set out the company's policy
on executive directors' remuneration including levels, comparator groups of companies,
individual components, performance criteria and measurement, pension provision, contracts
of service and compensation commitments on early termination. The report should also
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include full details of all elements in the remuneration package of each individual director,
such as basic salary, annual bonuses, benefits in kind, and long-term incentive schemes
including share options. Share holdings and other relevant business interests of the directors
should also be disclosed. All new long-term incentive schemes (including share options
schemes) for directors and senior executives, which potentially commit shareholders' fund
over more than one year or dilute the equity, should be approved by shareholders.
On the question of share options, nothing less than full disclosure of all details is
advocated, since the precise value of such schemes is difficult to estimate. The Greenbury
Committee calls for the full disclosure of the number of shares under option at the beginning
and end of the accounting period under review, as well as the number of options granted,
exercised or lapsed during the period, the exercise date and price of all options, the dates on
which options last lapsed, the market price of the share on the exercise date and a summary
of the performance criteria on which the exercise of each option is conditional. Finally, the
present value of pension entitlements earned during the year should be disclosed for each
director in the remuneration committee's report.
• Remuneration policy
The Greenbury Committee recognizes that the market for executive talent IS
imperfect and therefore that the remuneration committee will need some latitude In
determining the actual levels of remuneration. However, the remuneration committee should
provide the packages just needed and sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the
right calibre but should avoid paying more than necessary for this purpose. In determining
what the appropriate salary level should be for its senior executives, the remuneration
committee should judge where to position their company relative to other companies. They
should be aware what other comparable firms are paying, what their performance records are
and how performance and remuneration are linked in such firms. Drawing up the comparator
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group is itself important since the companies in it have to be similar in all respects to the
company in question. Linking part of executive remuneration to firm performance is seen as
one way to align the interests of executive directors with those of shareholders. It is for the
remuneration committee to determine how the remuneration packages for each of the senior
executives should be divided between fixed elements (i.e. basic salary, pension rights and
benefits in kind) and variable elements (i.e. annual bonuses, share options and other long-
term incentives); and the breakdown of the latter into annual bonuses and long-term
incentives, including share options.
Although the Greenbury Report sees a role for both annual bonuses and long-term
incentive schemes in encouraging and rewarding executive performance, it recognizes that
the balance between the two is likely to differ from one company to another. It argues the
need to base annual bonuses on some financial or operational yardstick that is "relevant,
stretching and designed to enhance the business". Annual bonuses should never become just
another guaranteed element in remuneration. Furthermore, the Report also recommends that
if bonuses are paid partly in the form of shares, then these should be held for some specified
minimum period of time. Likewise, long-term incentive schemes - including share option
schemes -should only be payable if stringent performance criteria are met. These criteria
should truly measure some aspect of company performance relative to a group of comparator
companies, and should not simply reflect general trends in inflation or stock market prices.
According to the Greenbury, executive share option schemes should be phased over a period
of time rather than granted in large blocks. They should never be granted at a discount to the
price prevailing at the time of issue and should not be exercisable in less than three years.
The Greenbury Committee is in favour of long-term incentive schemes other than share
option schemes, believing that these other schemes might be more effective in ensuring that
rewards are linked to performance and in encouraging directors to build up shareholdings.
The rewards under these other schemes could still consist of shares which would be
automatically payable so long as the performance criteria are met. The beneficiary would not
32
have to sell any of the shares in order to meet the purchase price because the shares are paid
as of right and no price is involved, although even under such schemes the recipient of
shares might have to sell some of them in order to meet the tax payment on them. Therefore,
such schemes might be more effective in encouraging directors to build up shareholdings in
the company, thereby aligning their interests with those of shareholders.
• Service Contracts and Compensation
The Greenbury Report notes that the large compensation payments to directors in
early 1990s are in part the result of the length of the service contract, which is often for a
period of three years and on a rolling basis. While accepting the need for flexibility - for
example, in the case of a newly appointed director - the Greenbury Report recommends that
contract periods should be reduced to one year only. In the case of contract termination, the
final settlement will be the result of negotiation, which will reflect the reasons for the
termination. The Greenbury is adamant that poor performance should not be rewarded; also,
that executives should be expected to mitigate their losses when their contracts are
discontinued.
Clearly, the Greenbury Report is an important document setting out framework of
the remuneration policy for executive directors. It covers main issues in the establishment
and status of remuneration committee, the determinants of remuneration policy for executive
directors, the disclosure and approval of the details of remuneration policy, and the length of
service contracts and compensation for directors.
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• The Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations 2002
The Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 ("the Regulations") required
quoted companies to prepare a Director Remuneration Report ("the Report"), which
complies with the Regulations, for each financial year containing specified information,
some of which required to be audited. The Regulations came into effect from 1 August 2002
to replace the Company Act's 1985 regulations on director's remunerations and be effective
for financial years ending on or after 31 December 2002. The Regulations require the
company to send the Report to shareholders for approval by ordinary resolution at the
Annual General Meeting. Failure to comply with the Regulations is a criminal offence.
Generally, the Regulations provide a framework which assists shareholders to assess how
well remuneration for executive directors is governed by the board. The shareholder vote on
a company's remuneration report, which includes the forward looking statement of policy,
provides the board and its remuneration committee with an annual signal as to how strongly
its intended policy and its actual practice in the past year are supported by its shareholders.
The Report thus strengthens the disclosure requirements previously set out in the Greenbury
Report.
Overall, the framework on executive remuneration in the UK has concentrated on
the transparency and standardization of the pay-setting processes that are independent of the
beneficiaries. The framework. however, does not address the pay-setting processes
themselves and has no direct implication to pay-performance sensitivity. Hence. the room
for academic research on executive compensation in the UK is still widely open despite the
well-set framework on executive pay.
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2.4 Conclusion
Corporate governance is an important aspect in the modern corporation following
the separation of ownership and control. It is a crucial device in aligning the interests of
managers with those of shareholders. Overall, corporate governance in the UK is set by
legislation, regulations, and the Combined Code, a guidance that contains general principles,
provisions and recommendations for best practice. The Code operates on the basis of
'comply or explain', which requires the companies to report whether they have followed the
Code or, if not, explain why they have not done so. The base of the Combined Code is the
Cadbury Report, which addresses the financial aspects of corporate governance and
subsequently produced a Code of Best Practice. Subsequently, the Greenbury and the Higgs
Report further developed the provisions and guidelines set by the Cadbury Report on
specific area, executive remuneration and non-executive directors.
The framework on executive remuneration is set by the Cadbury Report, the
Greenbury Report and subsequently the Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations 2002.
These Reports and regulations set out a framework to enhance the transparency of pay-
setting process with strict requirements on disclosures of executive compensation for listed
companies. The framework on executive compensation in the UK concentrates more on
standardizing the pay-setting processes rather than the processes themselves, the level of
executive compensation and sensitivity between executive remuneration and firm
performance.
Generally, the corporate governance and executive remuneration framework in the
UK follows a market-based approach that enables the board and the company to retain
flexibility in the way in which it organizes itself and exercises its responsibilities, while
ensuring that it is properly accountable to its shareholders. The flexibility allows companies
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to set out its own pay-setting procedures and rewards their executives in its own way. This
flexibility, however, causes diversion between companies in term of relating their executive
compensation with firm performance. The next chapter will describe the structure and
characteristics of executive compensation in UK companies and review of literature on pay-
performance relationship in the UK.
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Chapter 3
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION:
AREVIEW OF LITERATURE
3.0 Introduction
The framework for corporate governance and executive compensation, as set out in
the Chapter 2, has provided guidance and also regulations on executive compensation
practice in public listed companies. However, the framework and its Code of best practice
are more concerned with formalizing the process of determining executive remuneration,
rather than the level of remuneration itself. While its recommendations concerning
transparency and disclosure are welcomed, it did not materially ease public disquiet over the
high levels of executive remuneration. The level and determinants of executive remuneration
are major topics of public concern and the subject of a huge number of studies from different
perspectives. This chapter will provide a review of prior literature from different views on
the level and determination of executive compensation. Section 3.1 presents a review of
major theories and perspectives on the determinants of executive compensation. Three main
theoretical perspectives (agency theory, managerial power theory, and tournament theory)
are presented and discussed in line with other influential perspectives. Section 3.2 describes
the structure of a remuneration package for executive directors, the characteristics and
measurement of its components. This provides guidance for subsequent investigation on the
determinants of executive compensation. Section 3.3 presents a review of literature on the
determinants of executive pay. The review has three parts: (I) a narrative review of prior
literature on the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance as well
as firm size; (2) a statistical review (meta-analysis) of literature on the pay-performance
relationship; and (3) a review of the literature on other determinants of executive
compensation. The meta-analysis provides a statistical review, allows for the aggregation of
results from prior empirical studies to obtain an estimate of the true relationship between
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executive compensation and firm performance. Finally, Section 3.4 provides a summary and
conclusion.
3.1 Theoretical Perspectives on Executive Compensation
Executive compensation has been approached from different perspectives in the
academic literature. The dominant approach to the studies of executive compensation among
academics is the "optimal contracting approach", an agency perspective (by Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). According to agency theory, in order to align the interests of the managers
with those of shareholders, the optimal contract should be in form of an incentive
compensation contract that links managers' remuneration to firm performance. This
approach suggests a positive relationship between executive pay and firm performance.
However, Bebchuk, Fried & Walker (2002) with their managerial power perspective (or rent
capture view) argue that executives use their power to extract rents and influence their own
pay, which is not subject to firm performance, to the detriment of shareholders. An
alternative approach to executive compensation determination is the tournament theory
perspective (by Lazear and Rosen, 1981 a), which indicates that remuneration of an executive
director is determined through the position of the executive within the firm hierarchy. Other
perspectives on executive compensation are Murphy and Zabojnik's (2004) market-based
approach, which suggests that the level of CEO pay is determined by competition among
firms for executives and depends upon the portion of the CEO's skills that are transferable
across firms and industries. It is supported by social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954),
which indicates that executive remuneration is related to industry "norms" and the size of the
firm. The corporate growth model also suggests that firm size is a primary determinant of
executive compensation. Details of these theoretical approaches to studies of executive
compensation determination will be reviewed below.
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3.1.1 Agency theory perspectives
Based on the risk-sharing literature" (Arrow, 1971; 1996), agency theory includes
the so-called agency problem that occurs when cooperating parties (the principal and the
agent) have different goals and interests. Agency theory attempts to describe the agency
relationship between the principal and the agent using the metaphor of a contract (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). It is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency
relationships. The first is the agency problem that arises when there is a conflict of interest
between the principal and the agent; and when it is difficult and expensive for the principal
to verify whether the agent has behaved appropriately. The second is the problem of risk
sharing that arises when the principal and the agent have different attitudes toward risk, and
accordingly different actions with risk preferences. Because the unit of analysis is the
contract governing the relationship between the principal and the agent, the focus of agency
theory is on determining the most efficient contract governing the principal-agent
relationship given assumptions about people (self-interest, bounded rationality, risk
aversion), organization (goal conflict among members), and information (information is a
commodity which can be purchased).
Modern corporations appearing in the last century have brought into existence the
richest source of study for agency theorist (especially positivist researchers). With the
separation of ownership and control in modem corporations, which was first described in the
work of Serle and Means (1932), managers (the agent) have a chance to consume corporate
resources and to act opportunistically for their own benefit to the detriment of shareholders
(the principal). Fama and Jensen (1983b) pointed out that 'decision managers, who initiate
and implement important decisions are not the major residual claimants, ... are more likely to
take actions that deviate from the interest of residual claimants'. Agency theory asserts that
4 Risk-sharing literature describes the risk-sharing problem as one that ariseswhencooperating parties
have different attitudes towardrisk.
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firms can employ various mechanisms to minimize those opportunistic actions and align the
interests of the agent and those of the principal. Jensen & Meckling (1976) suggest the
incentive contract and ownership structure, including managers' equity ownership, as
mechanisms to align managers' interests with those of owners. Fama & Jensen (1983b)
describe the role of the board of directors as an information system that the stockholders
within large corporations could use to monitor the opportunism of top executives and
managers. Fama (1980) discussed the role of efficient capital markets and labour markets,
especially the market for corporate control, as information mechanisms that are used to
control the self-serving behaviour of top executives. However, due the scope of this thesis,
only those internal mechanisms (optimal contract, directors' ownership, and board of
directors) are focused upon.
The first mechanism, according to agency theory, is the design of an optimal
contract to align the interests of managers and shareholders. The optimal contract is the one
that minimizes agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Under the agency perspective, the
board (principal's representative) seeks to design an optimal incentive compensation
contract for top executives, in an attempt to maximize shareholders' wealth. The optimal
executive compensation package would be concerned with: (1) attracting and retaining high
quality executives; (2) providing executives with incentives to exert sufficient effort and to
make decisions that serve shareholders' interests; (3) minimizing overall costs. The optimal
contract thus should in form of an incentive contract as under imperfect information,
incentive contract based on the outcomes can help improving agency problems (Holmstrom,
1979). If the agent's actions are less than completely observable (as normally seen), the
principal will want to provide incentives for the agent by basing compensation on output
performance. The incentive contract, therefore, should comprise both fixed element (as risk-
averse agent assumption) and performance-based element. It can be expressed in the
following basic equation: Pay = CI + IS Performance, where Pay is the total reward received
in return of the agent's effort; u is a fixed amount; and Performance is a measure of the
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outcome of his performance; P is the reaction coefficient reflecting the sensitivity of
executive compensation to performance. The magnitude of the coefficient is interpreted as
reflecting the operation of principal-agent type mechanisms, with higher value of P
suggesting closer alignment of management and shareholders' interests (Conyon, et al.,
200 I). In this way, managers share the risk with shareholders and partially make the residual
claimants of interest resulted from their own decisions. Such outcome-based contract
motivates behaviour of the managers to align their interests with those of shareholders,
however, at the price of transferring risk to managers. The issue of risk arises because
outcomes (finn performance) are only partly a function of managers' behaviours. There are a
variety of factors (government policies, economic climate, competitors' actions,
technological changes, etc.) may cause uncontrollable variations in the outcomes. As the
outcomes uncertainty increases, it becomes increasingly expensive to shift risk to managers
(who are assumed to be risk-averse) despite the motivational benefits of outcome-based
contracts. It means when outcomes are increasingly uncertain and uncontrollable by the
agent, the performance-based contract witt not attractive as the agent is reluctant to bear
greater risks, and agency mechanism through optimal contract cannot be achieved.
Accordingly, the monitoring mechanism is proposed to minimize the problem of
information asymmetry and to prevent the agent from making decisions that divert resources
away from the principal's interests (Fama, 1980). The central of monitoring mechanism is
the investment in information systems (such as budgeting systems, reporting procedures,
board of directors and additional layers of management) to reveal the agent's behaviors and
get it more observable. Among those systems, board of directors is one particularly relevant
information system for monitoring executive behaviors. Board of directors is viewed as a
key internal governance mechanism and an 'essential monitoring device' to minimize agency
costs and management's opportunism (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Jensen and Meckling,
1976). The monitoring function refers directly to the responsibility of directors to monitor
managers on behalf of shareholders. Directors' monitoring function was discussed in a
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number of specific activities, including monitoring the CEO (Boyd, 1995; Daily, 1996),
monitoring strategy implementation (Rindova, 1999), planning CEO succession (Pitcher, et
aI., 2000), evaluating and rewarding CEO (Conyon and Peck, 1998a) etc. The primary driver
of each of these activities is the obligation (met by board's scrutiny, evaluation, regulation of
management's actions) to ensure that management operates in the interests of shareholders
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). When the monitoring function is effective, i.e. board of
directors provides richer information about executives' behaviors and actions, compensation
for executives is less likely to be based on firm performance. Executive would then be
rewarded for their knowledge and for taking well-conceived actions. Also, when board of
directors provide richer information, top executives are more likely to engage in behaviors
that are consistent with shareholders' interests.
3.1.2 The Managerial Power Perspectives
Bebchuk et al (2002)challenge the optimal contracting viewfrom agency theoryand
suggest that executive-pay-setting process in publicly traded companies has strayed far from
arm's-length models, a condition for optimal contract. Indeed, directors' behavior is also
subject to an agency problem, which in tum undermines their ability to address effectively
the agency problems in the relationship between managers and shareholders. Directors
generally wish to be re-appointed to the board, for attractive salary, prestige and valuable
business and social connections. Executives (especially the CEO) play an important role in
re-nominating directors to the board, thus directors usually have an incentive to favor the
CEO and other executives, and also pay arrangements for executives. Moreover, market
forces are not sufficiently strong and fine-tuned to assure the optimal contracting outcomes.
For these reasons, Bebchuk & Fried (2004) suggest that executives have substantial
S Arm's-length bargaining model assumed that pay arrangements are the product of arm's-length
bargaining. It is the bargaining between executives attempting to get the possible deal for themselves
and boards seeking to get the best possible deal for shareholders.
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influence over their own pay and the greater is managers' power, the greater is their ability
to extract 'rents' (i.e. arrangements that are substantially more favorable than those they
could obtainable under effective arm's-length bargaining).
One important building block of the managerial power approach is 'outrage' costs
and constraints. Outrage represents the economic and social costs to directors and executives
when a board approves a compensation arrangement favorable to managers. The more
outrage a compensation arrangement is expected to generate, the more reluctant directors
will be to approve it and the more hesitant managers will be to propose it in the first place.
Thus, whether a compensation arrangement that is favorable to executives but suboptimal
for shareholders is adopted will depend on how it is perceived by outsiders. To avoid or
minimize the 'outrage' that results from outsiders' recognition of rent extraction, executives
have strong incentive to obscure and legitimize (or more generally to 'camouflage', another
important building block of the managerial power approach) their extraction of rents in pay
arrangements. Camouflage thus allows executives to reap benefits at the expenses of
shareholders. More importantly, attempts to camouflage can lead to the adoption of
inefficient compensation structures that harm manager's incentives to appropriate
behaviors/actions and subsequently firm performance. Overall, the camouflage motive turns
out to be quite useful in explaining many otherwise puzzling features of the executive
compensation landscape (Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005).
The excess pay that executives are able to extract because of their positional power
constitutes rents. Because rent extraction is associated with managerial power, the
managerial power approach suggests that there is correlation between managerial power and
rents. Specifically, the managerial power approach predicts that pay will be higher and/or
less sensitive to performance in firm where managers have relatively more power (Bebchuk
and Fried, 2004). The power of the CEO and executives will depend largely on the
ownership structure of the firm. The power of executives tends to increase with their
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personal shareholdings and will tend to decrease with the percentage of shares owned by
outside stakeholders, especially institutional shareholders. The managers' power also
depends on the organization and composition of the board. When board of directors is
relatively weak or ineffectual vis-a-vis the CEO, there is more power to the CEO and
executive directors and subsequently high compensation. The managerial power approach
also points out that managers would tend to have more power when managers are protected
by anti-takeover arrangements. It is also important emphasis from managerial power
approach that the cost to the shareholders resulting from the extraction of rents might well be
higher than the amount of rents extracted by managers.
3.1.3 Tournament theory perspectives
Tournament theory considers a group of agents who compete for a fixed prize and
are rewarded on their relative performance(see Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990; Green and
Stocky, 1983; Lazear and Rosen, 1981 a; Prendergast, 1999; Rosen, 1986). An application of
tournament theory in the economics of executive compensation is the competition to become
CEO. The theory explains the large disparity between CEO pay and the pay of executives
located one level down the organizational hierarchy. It specifies that the prizes are fixed in
advance and agents (tournament participants) expend effort to increase the likelihood of
winning a prize. Rank-order schemes are appropriate in constituting relative performance
evaluation when neither the input nor output of an individual can be adequately measured on
a cardinal scale. A pure tournament compensation system relies on an ordinal measure of
performance and commits the principal to fixed total amount of compensation to be paid
across all agents. Individuals' shares rest on their ranking. Rosen (1986) adopts tournament
structure to explain hierarchical pay. Incentives are maintained by the manager valuing the
certain prize from his current rank plus the discounted sum of successive inter-rank reward
that may be achieved in future matches. An incentive-maintaining reward structure for risk-
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neutral managers requires a constant inter-rank spread, with a distinctly larger jump at the
apex. For risk-averse managers, the inter-rank spread must be strictly increasing as one
moves up the hierarchy with an even larger jump at the apex.
Tournament structures are desirable for two reasons. When managers' talents are
uniform, tournament structures can be justified purely on their ability to maintain managers'
incentives though out the hierarchy (Pavlik, et al., 1993). If managers' talent varies, then
tournaments can also help to identify the human capital of competitors. Thus tournaments
both provided incentives and help identify the human capital of the competitors. Moreover,
tournament theory implies that executives' compensation reflects, in addition to current
performance, their past (tournament) performance and the productivity induced on lower
ranks as part ofa firm's tournament incentive scheme for all its employees.
The limitations of tournament theory (as noted by Dye, 1984) are (I) an employee
with little perceived chance of wining may not be motivated through a tournament; (2) if
workers are to receive on average the expected value of their marginal product, then losers
of tournaments who would be paid less than their marginal product should switch to firms
that contract to pay workers their expected marginal product, thereby weakening the
incentive effects of tournaments; (3) there may be significant moral hazard problems through
which workers collude to reduce their effort levels or, more importantly, sabotage each
other's efforts. Lezear (1989) demonstrates that where uncooperative behaviour is concern,
some pay compression within a relevant reference group can be efficient. Nevertheless,
tournaments are an important rationale for promotion-based incentive schemes.
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3.1.4 Other perspectives on executive remuneration determination
• Market-based perspective
In challenging the managerial power theory by Bebchuk et al (2002); Murphy &
Zabojnik (2004) has proposed a market-based explanation for the recent trends of large and
continuous increase in CEO compensation. They reveal that both the trend in CEO pay and
the trend in outside hiring (not internally promoted) reflect a change in the composition of
managerial skills needed to manage a modem corporation. This is explained for (I) general
managerial skills (i.e. the skills transferable across companies) become relatively more
important for the CEO job; and (2) firm-specific knowledge are less important to be a CEO
candidate because these information is available widely and in computerized form. Thus in
Murphy & Zabojnik's model, an increase in the importance of the general relative to firm-
specific component of managerial capital leads to fewer internal promotions, more external
hires, and an increase in equilibrium average wages for CEOs. In contrast to the rent-
extraction hypothesis of Bebchuk et al (2002), Murphy & Zabojnik (2004) proposed that the
increase in pay is not only consistent with competition, but also is evidence of the
importance of the market for CEOs in determining CEO pay levels. In sum, the level of
CEO pay is determined by competition among firms for executives and depends upon the
portion of the CEO's skills that transferable across firms and industries.
• Neoclassical Theory
Neoclassical theory is initiated by Roberts (1956), Marris (1967) and Yarrow (1972).
Accordingly, executives' compensation is treated as an input of the production function. The
argument for this is there is a one-to-one relationship between compensation and executives'
"Ability Quotient", which is defined as the ability of a team of optimum size to earn profits
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from a standard set of assets under standard conditions (Marris, 1967). The concept of
Ability Quotient (AQ) required that executives are perfectly replaceable, i.e., any team of a
certain AQ will deliver the same expected performance and there is no special relation
between firms and their executives. It also assumes that the market for executives is in
overall equilibrium. Firms can always instantly get a team of given ability at a proper price.
Therefore, it is the shareholders who decide the compensation by determining the optimum
executive AQ level for their firms. It can be inferred that the lowest limit that the firm could
pay the executive is the payment he could get from his next best employment alternative and
the maximum compensation that a firm is willing to pay is the value of his AQ. In a perfect
competition market for executives, these two limits should be equal in equilibrium. However,
in an imperfect market, the pay rate should fall somewhere between the two limits.
This theory therefore predicts that executive on the top of the AQ ladder will be
hired to manage the largest firm and consequently will receive the largest compensation. In
case of two firms of identical characteristics accept CEOs of different ability, the firm with
CEO of higher ability will enjoy higher profits before deducting CEO remuneration than the
other, but profits after deducting that amount are the same. So the profitability for two firms
is the same. The salary differential between the two CEOs is the difference in their achieved
profits. However, if the pay is only a percentage of the higher profits, it is expected that the
CEO of the firm with higher profitability will have higher remuneration. This result led to
Marris's (1967) and Yarrow's (1972) prediction that CEO remuneration is related to firm
size and profitability.
• Socialcomparison theory
The theory of social comparison process developed by Festinger (1954) proposes
that the setting up of expected rewards is equity-securing as decision makers routinely base
upon a set of social norms and comparisons to determine compensation. Finns have to pay
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their executives at least at the 'going rate' for reasons of recruitment, motivation, retainment
and even external credibility (Ezzamel and Watson, 1998). Festinger (1954) pointed out that
there is a natural need for individuals to evaluate their abilities. In order to realize this need,
people choose, as comparison standard, others who are perceived to have similar abilities or
attitude. This point is also noted by Goodman (1974) that individuals are also more likely to
'select as comparisons others who are seen as slightly better or more expert'.
Furthermore, given the condition that executives' performance is 'ambiguous'
(March, 1984), one logical way for compensation committee to decide on compensation
levels is by making social comparisons. Members of the compensation committee normally
consist of those who do not serve on the management board, and who are frequently CEOs
of other firms (Kesner, 1987). This selection of members of management and those of
compensation committee may be based upon their similarity (Festinger, 1954). As such,
compensation committee members may make judgment about proper CEO pay by making a
comparison to the award they receive themselves.
In sum, executive compensation has been approached from different perspectives
such as dominant agency theory, the managerial power perspective, tournament theory,
market-based perspective, etc. Each perspective suggests different determinants of executive
remuneration, which are supported by empirical studies. This thesis, however, concentrates
on three main conceptual perspectives, namely agency theory, the managerial power
perspective, and the tournament theory; to derive hypotheses on the determinants of
executive pay components and pay structure to be presented in Chapter 4. Before reviewing
prior literature on executive compensation, the following section provides the structure of a
normal executive compensation package and description of its components, as a guide for
later review and analysis.
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3.2 The Structure of Executive Compensation Package
Although there is substantial heterogeneity in pay practices across firms, industries
and countries, most executive compensation packages are comprised of base salary, annual
bonuses and incentive pay, which includes stock options and long-term incentive plans
(LTIPs). Murphy's (1999) survey on US data provides a comprehensive review of the
executive compensation literature with details of pay components. According to the survey,
pay level has increased substantially over time, which is largely attributable to the increase
in the grant-date value of stock option grants, and varies by industry. Moreover, executive
pay is higher in larger firms despite the fact this relationship has weakened over time. In the
UK, Conyon et al (2000) describes the structure of executive compensation as complex with
different elements of incentive pay including share options (which is contingent on
performance criteria) and long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Using a sample of the 200
largest companies in the 1997 fiscal year, Conyon et al (2000) documented that
approximately one third of companies had introduced LTIPs as a complement to executive
option plans. Later work by Conyon and Murphy (2000) provides a comprehensive
comparison of pay practices in the US and the UK. They document the differences in the
percentage of share option grants (valued at grant date) over total pay, where the US CEOs
have a higher percentage than their UK counterparts. In addition, American CEOs earn 45%
more in cash pay and 190% in total pay, even after controlling for size, industry, growth
opportunities, CEO human capital and other observable characteristics. In sum, the structure
of executive compensation is comprised of the following elements.
Base salaries, a key component of executive employment contracts, are typically
determined through competitive 'benchmarking'. Murphy's (1999) survey shows that
salaries comprise a declining percentage of total compensation. However, the salary-
determination process still receives substantial attention from executives since (1) base
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salaries represent the 'fixed component' in employment contracts, that "risk-averse
executives will naturally prefer a dollar increase in base salary to a dollar increase in target
bonus or variable compensation" (Murphy, 1999, p.2498); and (2) most components of
compensation are measured relative to base salary levels: target bonus as percentage of base
salary, option grants as multiple of base salary, pension benefits and severance arrangements
also depend on salary levels. Conyon's et at(2000) survey for 200 companies in UK for the
1997 fiscal year shows that salary is still a significant part of executive cash compensation
(about 70%) and of total compensation (54%).
Survey by Bruce Overton Consulting (2003) of 100 large and 100 small US
company show that salaries for CEO positions normally increased around 7 percent for
every two years. Executive salaries are adjusted less frequently at low level because (1)
salaries are used to establish the executive's basic life style, which does not typically change
on an annual basis, and (2) executive salary increases are intended to recognize the labor
market value of the executive's position, not to reward performance. In fact, in most
companies, non-executive directors who are acutely aware of potential conflicts of interest
between managers and shareholders over the level and structure of compensation (normally
devolved to a remuneration committee) make decisions about executive pay. In practice,
however, most remuneration committees take advice and derive information from the
company itself (i.e. human resource department) and from outside professional advisors.
This practice and the volume of information disclosure in annual reports about executive pay
have led to a "ratcheting up" effect (an upward pressure) on executive pay (Conyon et al,
2000). Ezzamel & Watson's (1998) study of UK firms also support the hypothesis of
"ratcheting up", which contends that executives paid below the going market rate are more
likely to have their compensation increased but those above the prevailing market rate are
less likely to see their compensation reduced.
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Annual bonus plans, which are paid based on single-year accounting performance,
can be categorized in terms of three basic components: performance measures, performance
standards, and the structure of the pay-performance relation (Murphy, 1999). Under typical
plan, no bonus is paid until a threshold performance is achieved, and a "minimum bonus"(as
percentage of target bonus) is paid at the threshold performance. Target bonuses are paid for
achieving the performance standard, and there is typically a "cap" on bonuses paid (as
percentage or multiple of target bonus). The "incentive zone" (the range between the
threshold and cap) indicates the range of performance realizations where incremental
improvement in performance corresponds to incremental increase in bonuses. According to
Murphy's (1999) survey, a variety of financial and non-financial performance measures are
used, in which almost are accounting profits (such as revenues, net income, pre-tax income,
operating profits or economic value added). Non-financial performance measures are less
common, mostly used in utilities industry, and include individual performance, customer
satisfaction, operational and/or strategic objectives... Each performance measure used in the
plan can be determined by different performance standards 6 • Also, there is variety of
different ways determining payouts from bonus plans. The most common payout method is
the "80/120" plan that no bonus plan is paid unless performance exceeds 80% of the
performance standard, and bonuses are capped once performance exceeds 120% of the
performance standard. The next most common type of plan is "Modified Sum-of-Target",
where target bonus pool (the sum of the target bonuses across individual participants) is
adjusted depending on actual performance at the year-end and this actual bonus pool is
6 Murphy (1999) summarizes six performance standards including (1) "Budget" standards (based on
performance measured against the company's business plan or budget goals); (2) "Prior-Year"
standards (based on year-to-year growth or improvement); (3) "Discretionary" standards
(performance targets are set subjectively by the board of directors following a review of the
company's plan, prior-year performance, budgeted performance, or a subjective evaluation of the
difficulty in achieving budgeted performance); (4) "Peer Group" standards (based on performance
measured relative to other companies inthe industry or market); (5)"Timeless" standards (measuring
performance relative to a fixed standard); and (6) "Cost of Capital" standards (based on company's
cost ofcapital such aseconomic value added).
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typically divided among participants based on their individual target bonus. These two
payout methods account for 70% of the plans in Murphy's (1999) sample companies. Other
methods include formula-based plans (bonus pool is determined based on both target
bonuses and individual performance) and discretionary plans (firm and individual
performance is assessed subjectively by the board of directors based on a variety of financial
and non-financial criteria).
Stock options are contracts, which give the recipient the right to buy shares at a pre-
specified exercise price for a pre-specified term. In practice, most options expire in 10 years
(83%) and are granted with exercise prices equal to the "fair market value" on the date of
grant (95%), (Murphy, 1999). Executive options are non-tradable and typically forfeited if
the executive leaves the firm before vesting or the stock price does not reach a pre-
determined price hurdle or performance not exceed the market index within a specified
period of time. Stock options reward only stock- price appreciation and not total shareholder
return (different from executive stock ownership) because it does not include dividends.
which is paid accumulatedly upon exercise of the underlying options (Murphy, 1999). Since
the payout from exercising options increases dollar for dollar with increases in the stock
price. stock options provide a direct link between managerial rewards and share-price
appreciation. As the value of options increase with stock-price volatility, executives have
incentives to avoid dividends and to favor share repurchases. Lambert et al (1989) find that
expected dividends decrease following the initial adoption of top management stock option
plans. Moreover, executives with options have incentives to engage in riskier investments
(Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987 and Hirshleifer and Suh, 1992).
Unlike boards in the US, the majority of boards in the UK are now attaching
performance criteria to executive stock option contracts. This practice is following the
Greenbury's (1995) code, which recommended that all long-term incentive schemes,
including executive stock options, should be subject to "challenging performance criteria".
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The Greenbury report argued that remuneration committees should "consider criteria which
measure company performance relative to a group of comparator companies in some
variable or set of variables, reflecting the company's objectives such as total shareholder
return". It also recommended that "directors should not be rewarded for increases in share
prices or other indicators which reflect general price inflation, general movements in the
stock market and movements in a particular sector of the market or the development of
regulatory regimes".
One crucial issue in applications of executive stock options in both research and
practice is options' valuation, which is the value of the option at the grant date. The best
known and most widely utilized method for calculating executive stock option is the Black-
Scholes pricing formula adjusted for continuously paid dividends (as described below),
which measures the grant-date expected value of the option. Black and Scholes (1973)
demonstrate that, since investors can hedge, options can be valued as if investors were risk
neutral and all assets appreciate at the risk-free rate. The standard Black-Scholes formula
calculates the value of a single European call option as:
where P is the grant-date share price, X is the exercise price, T is the time remaining until
expiration, d is the annualized dividend yield, (J is the stock-price volatility, r is the risk-free
discount rate, NO is the cumulative normal distribution function, and
In(1'/ X) + [lnO + r) -In(1 + d) + (12/2J Tt = _ . _ : _ - ~ ' = - ' - . ; . . . - _ : . . ~ _ ! . - = - -
fJy'T
The value ofan executive option grant is simply the product of the call value and the
number of options in the grant. Since executives can hold many grants of options, to value
53
accurately value the stock options held, each grant needs to be valued separately and then
take the sum of all grants.
However, the valuation of executive stock options according to Black-Scholes
method is not without consequences. First, the Black-Scholes value, as measure of the
company's opportunity cost of granting the option, will typically overstate the value to the
executive-recipients (Hall and Murphy, 2000). Second, the Black-Scholes formula assumes
constant dividend yields and stock-price volatilities, assumption which is less sensible for
executive options expiring in a decade (Murphy, 1999). Third, executive stock options are
subject to forfeiture if the executive leaves the firm prior to vesting; this probability of
forfeiture reduces the cost of granting the option and thus implies that the Black-Scholes
formula overstates option values (Conyon and Murphy, 2000). Finally, the Black-Scholes
formula assumes that options can only be exercised at the expiration date, but executive
options can be exercised immediately upon vesting, which has implication for reduction in
the cost of granting options (Murphy, 1999 and Carpenter, 1998). Due to these limitations of
Black-Scholes method, this study values stock options in a more comprehensive way as
described in Chapter S.
Long-term Incentive Plans (LTIPs), are typically grants of shares of stock that
become "vested" only upon attainment of certain performance objectives (in the UK); or
take two primary forms (in the US) including (1) "restricted stock" grants that vest with the
passage of time (not performance criteria) and (2) multi-year bonus plans typically based on
rolling-average three or five-year cumulative accounting performance (Conyon and Murphy,
2000). In the UK, the Greenbury (1995) report focused on the potential drawbacks of
executive share option schemes and highlighted a clear preference for Long-term Incentive
Plans. The report stated that introducing such plans "may be effective, or more so, than
improved share option schemes in linking rewards to performance". Conyon's et al (2000)
study, which was using 1997 fiscal year data, shows that sample companies are making
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more use of grants under LTIPs with 49.5%of companies have introduced an LTIP scheme.
This study also suggests that in the majority of companies, LTIPs are substitutes for, rather
than complements to, executive shareoption plan (see descriptive analysis in Chapter 5).
Valuation of LTIPs is extremely complicated due to the performance conditions
attached to the plan. Bucket al (2003) give an example of the complexity of LTIPs in UK by
the case of HSBC, where LTIPs for executives are subject to performance in comparison to
329 other banks over the world. Buck et al (2003) then propose a valuation method, which
estimates the performance conditions attached to the plan to generate a provisional level and
value of award. Other valuation method suggested by Westphal & Zajac (1994), which is
also used by several large consulting firms in conducting survey of executive compensation
(for example, TowersPerrin, Manifest), is as follows.
LTIPs Value =Price x Shares x Target x (1/ [r +p +f ]:)
Where:
Price = the granted shareprice underLTIPs
Shares = the number ofsharesgranted
Target = the target payout, expressed as proportion of sharesgranted
r = the risk-free interest rate
p = long-term average equity premium
f = forfeiture risk
z = length of performance period
Detail of the valuation method to estimate LTIPs value used in this study is presented in
Chapter S.
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In sum, major components of executive compensation package are salary, annual
bonus, share option schemes and long-term incentive plans. Prior research (see Conyon et aI,
2000; Murphy, 1999) documented salaries as main element of executive pay. However, there
is evidence of increasing proportion of incentive pay in form of share option and LTIPs
(Murphy, 1999). In this study, the components of executive compensation package are
grouped in two measures: cash compensation (which includes salaries, bonuses and other
benefit in kinds) and long-term incentive compensation (which includes share options and
long-term incentive plans). The use of cash compensation measure and total compensation
measure, which is sum of cash compensation and long-term incentive pay, is common in
prior research (see Buck, et al., 2003; Conyon, et al., 2001; Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; Hall
and Leibman, 1998; Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Main, et
al., 1996; Murphy, 1985).
3.3 Executive Compensation and Firm Performance - Review of Literature
3.3.1 Narrative Review of Prior Literature
Research on top management compensation has gone on for more than 70 years with
growing amount of empirical studies, especially since early 1980s in line with the emergence
and general acceptance of agency theory. The agency theory argument that executive
remuneration should be related to firm performance in order to align managers' and
shareholders' interests, has received the most attention in literature. This has led to a vast
body of empirical studies, which have attempted to examine the extent of the relationship
between executive compensation and firm performance (Murphy, 1999). In general, whilst
the majority of empirical studies do find evidence of a statistical relationship between
executive pay and firm performance, the economic significance of the relationship has been
found to be very small (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Jensen and Murphy, 1990).
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Early empirical studies lend support to the managerial notion that firm size was
important determinant of executive compensation, with firm performance (specifically
accounting profit) plays a less significant role in determining the level of executive
compensation (Cosh, 1975; Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970). Cosh (1975) demonstrates that
company size is major determinant of executive compensation, using a sample of 1600 UK
companies. Baumols (1959) applied sales maximization hypothesis and also documented a
positive correlation between cash compensation and firm sales. This result is supported by
the work of McGuire et at (1962) and Hogan & McPheter (1980). These researches argue
that CEOs of larger firms have more responsibilities and have to put more effort, ceteris
paribus, to manage the operation and should be paid more than those CEOs in smaller firms.
However, Barro & Barro (1990) find the relationship between changes in compensation are
only associated with sales growth if accounting performance and stock returns are not
included in the regression. Similarly, Jensen and Murphy (1990) find sales growth is only
significant in explaining remuneration if accounting performance is omitted.
These earlier studies were subject to a number of methodological problems such as
potential omitted variable bias (see the critique by Ciscel and Carroll, 1980). Later studies
have amended the economic specification of their regression to include a greater range of
potential determinants of remuneration. As a result, such studies have tended to find that
both firm size and firm performance are significant determinants of executive remuneration
(see, for example, Murphy, 1985). Furthermore, Tosi et at (2000) did a meta-analysis of
prior studies and concluded that firm size and firm performance explained about half of
variance in executive compensation. Pavlik et at (1993) note that, in general, accounting
performance explains more of the variance in cash compensation (salary plus cash bonus)
than does stock performance, but when a more comprehensive measure of compensation
(including share options, LTIPs) is examined, stock return tends to explain more of the
variation than accounting performance. Rosen (1990), summarizing the results of a number
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of studies, estimates that the influence of accounting return on the log of cash compensation
is approximately ten times as great as that of stock return.
Later researchers (Buck, et al., 2003; Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; Hall and
Leibman, 1998; Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Main, et al.,
1996; Murphy, 1985) used more frequently a broader definition of executive compensation
that includes stock options and long-term incentive plans. These elements represent the
incentive aspect of the remuneration contract that is suggested by agency literature to reduce
agency cost and align the interest of managers with those of shareholders (Holmstrom, 1979;
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Fama (1980) shows that in a multi-period contract, the agent
must consider future wages that will depend on the results of the agent's current actions and
effort. Lambert (1983) extends the agency theory by showing that in multi-period contracts,
the commitment of firm and executive to long-term contracts can reduce agency cost.
According to agency theory, contracts incorporating information revealing the agent's
unobservable effort will result in lower agency costs than will flat wage contracts.
Practically in empirical executive compensation literature, stock compensation receives
more empirical supports (Jackson and Lazear, 1991; Lambert, 1993; Paul, 1992; Scholes,
1991) for incentive reasons to align the interests of executives and shareholders. Paul (1992)
and Lambert (1993) agree that if the purpose of compensation were to align the interests of
executives and shareholders, it would seem most reasonable to compensate solely based on
stock price. However, Bizjak et al (1993) argue that under asymmetric information, an
"over-emphasis" of compensation based on short-term stock price may lead
managers/executives to attempt to manipulate current stock price through less-than-optimal
investment choices. Supporting this view, Lambert and Larcker (1987) demonstrate that
agency theory does not imply that the optimal contract simply ties the agent's compensation
exclusively to the firm's stock price.
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Whilst the majority of these studies (Abowd, 1990; Conyon, 1998; Cosh and
Hughes, 1997;Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Main,et al., 1996;
Main, 1991; Murphy, 1985) do report a positive and statistically significant relationship
between executive compensation and firm performance. However, a number of other studies
indicate only weak or statistically insignificant relationship between executive pay and firm
performance (see Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a; Akhigbe, et al., 1995; Attaway, 2000;
Baker, et al., 1988; Conyon and Leech, 1993; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Conyon, et al.,
2001; Decktop, 1988; Ezzamel and Watson, 1998; Leonard, 1990; Mangel and Singh, 1993;
McKnight, 1996; Veliyath, 1999). In particular,Gregg et al (1993) even found evidence ofa
negative relationship between executive pay and shareholder returns. Conyon (1995) also
suggests that the growth in executive pay generally exceeds the growth in firm performance.
Jensen & Murphy (1990) estimates that CEO wealth (including salary, bonus, the value of
shareholdings, etc.) changes by $3.25 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth.
Although the changes in CEO wealth were found to be positively and significantlyrelated to
changes in shareholder wealth, as predicted by agency theory, Jensen & Murphy contend
that the magnitude of the relationship(economic significance) is small and inconsistentwith
the implications of agency theory. Later survey by Conyon & Murphy (2000) also report that
the median CEO of US firms receives of 1.48% of any increase in shareholder wealth and
only 0,25% ofchanges in shareholder wealth for CEOs in the UK.
To further investigate the sensitivity of executive pay on performance and the
magnitude of pay-performance relationship, the next section presents a statistical review
using a meta-analysisof the results of prior pay-performance empirical studies.
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3.3.2 A Meta-Analysis of the relationship between Executive Compensation and
Firm Performance
Prior empirical research, which examined the relationship between executive
compensation and firm performance, has been subject to narrative review by Pavlik et a/
(1993). Reviewing 31 relevant studies, Pavlik et a/ (1993) documents mixed results with
both positive and negative, significant and insignificant relationship; rather than evidence of
systematic relationships. Subsequent survey by Murphy (1999) comprehensively reviews
range of studies on executive compensation. However, it did not note evidence of systematic
relationships or observed correlation between executive pay and firm performance. A meta-
analysis by Tosi et al (2000) includes 38 studies and tests the hypothesized relationships
between firm size, firm performance and CEO pay. They show that firm size accounts for
more than 40% of the variance in total CEO pay, whHe firm performance accounts for less
than 5% of the variance. However, ten out of 38 studies included in Tosi et al (2000) are
unpublished dissertations, working papers or even unknown authors. Moreover, the adjusted
mean correlation reported by Tosi et al (2000) seems overstate the true relationship between
compensation and firm size or firm performance. The adjusted correlations is, on average, 17
percent higher than the observed correlations; and there are 14 adjusted correlations greater
than 0.80, notably there are two perfect correlation (r = 1.0), which may not realistic in
social science context.
Given the continuing interest and empirical attention to executive compensation as
well as the lack of an up-to-date systematic review on compensation-performance empirical
studies (provided the problems associated with Tosi's et ai, 2000, meta-analysis), this
section provides a meta-analysis of the relationship between executive compensation and
firm performance with updated empirical studies. As we have identified 43 relevant
empirical studies (25 of those are same as Tosi's et at, 2000), we are able to provide a meta-
analytic review of the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance.
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With sufficient number of studies, conclusion drawn from meta-analytic review will be more
preferable than narrative review, as meta-analysis allows researchers to correct for various
statistical artifacts and to aggregate results across studies to obtain an estimate of the true
relationship between variables (Hunter and Schmidt, 1990). The remainder of this meta-
analysis is followed by review of compensation-performance literature, sample description,
meta-analysis procedure, results and conclusion.
• Data and Coding
A number of search techniques have been used to identify empirical studies related
to executive compensation and firm performance. The initial data search consisted of
computer searches of the following database: ABI Global, ESCO Premier, Sciencedirect, etc.
In addition, reference lists of the potentially applicable articles, especially Tosi et al (2000),
have been examined for relevant studies. The goal was to identify all empirical research that
reported a correlation coefficient on the relationship between executive compensation and
firm performance. It is not necessary that compensation-performance relationships be the
main focus of a study, only that a simple correlation between these variables be available.
The simple correlation coefficients have been collected rather than regression coefficients
because regression slopes and intercepts are usually not comparable across studies, and, thus
cannot be meaningfully cumulated in a meta-analysis (Hunter and Schmidt, 1990). While
correlation coefficient is scale-independent, regression coefficients require all studies have
used exactly the same scales to measure variables, which is normally impossible in meta-
analysis.
Initially, over 60 articles and papers that reported simple or pooling correlations are
identified. However, some of those are unpublished documents or from unknown authors
taking from reference lists of articles, which cannot be assessed for details, are not included.
The final sample includes 43 published studies with a total of 56 samples drawn from 21,237
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companies. Many of the 43 studies yield information on multiple pay-performance measures,
which results in 124 reported correlation coefficients between different measures of
executive compensation and firm performance. The complete collection of source
correlations and related sample size statistics is summarized in Appendix I. The reported
correlation in Appendix I is average correlation between one measures of compensation
with different performance measures in one study.
Executive compensation. There are two measures of executive compensation using
to code studies in this chapter: total compensation and cash compensation. Total
compensation includes salary, annual bonus, long-term incentive plans and stock options,
which are generally valued with Black-Scholes model. Some studies using logarithm of total
compensation or change in total compensation are also encoded as total compensation. There
are 24 out of 43 studies using total compensation in examining the relationship with firm
performance. Cash compensation is defined as the sum of salary and annual bonus. And the
use of logarithm or change in cash compensation is also encoded as cash compensation.
Some studies use both salary and bonus as compensation measures, of which an average
correlation is coded as cash compensation. There are 32 studies using cash compensation in
examining the relationship with firm performance.
Firm performance. Studies are coded according to their use of performance
measures or firm size measures. To allow post hoc exploration, performance measures were
further subdivided into accounting profits, shareholder returns, ROAIROE, and other
performance measures, which including Tobin's Q. Size measures include indicators of sales,
total assets, market valuation, and miscellaneous size measures including number of
employees.
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• Meta-analytic procedure
This meta-analysis is conducted in accordance with those guidelines provided by
Hunter & Schmidt (1990). Meta-analysis is a statistical technique, which allows for the
aggregation of results across studies to obtain an estimate of the true relationship between
two variables in the population. The strengths of meta-analysis include its scientific rigor,
little bias in the inclusion of studies, objective weighting of the studies, allowing the
examination of moderating variables, estimations of relationship stability, and its ability to
overcome many of the problems of traditional narrative research reviews (Schmidt and
Klimoski, 1991 a). Accordingly, correlations (simple correlations in cross-sectional samples
and pooling correlations in panel samples) between variables of interest are collected and
coded as the data for meta-analysis.
Meta-analytic procedures require that each observed correlation be weighted by
sample size of the study in order to calculate the mean weighted correlation across all of the
studies involved in the meta-analysis (to correct for sampling error). Variance statistics
(standard deviation) of the observed correlations is then calculated to estimate the variability
in the relationship between variables of interest. In addition, a 95 percent confidence interval
is also calculated to allow assessment of the statistical significance of the weighted mean. A
95 percent confidence interval that does not include zero is an indicator of a relationship
existed between variables of interest (Dalton, et al., 1999). Following these step, series of
meta-analyses on subgroups of correlations are further conducted representing the various
categories of compensation measures, finn performance and finn size measures. For each of
these subgroups, weighted mean, variance and confidence interval are calculated (see Table
3.1 ).
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• Meta-analysis Results
Table 3-1 presents the results of meta-analysis for executive compensation and firm
performance and firm size from 124 correlations extracted from 43 empirical studies and
across 21,327 companies. As suggested by Table 3-1, the correlation coefficient between
executive compensation and overall firm performance is 0.07 indicating that there is a
positive relationship executive compensation and firm performance. The 95% confidence
interval, which is from 0.045 to 0.094, does not include zero suggesting that the true
association between executive compensation and firm performance is positive and
statistically significant. A breakdown of performance measures suggests that firm
performance measured in shareholder returns and accounting rate of return (i.e. ROEIROA)
has slightly higher correlation with executive compensation than that measured in absolute
accounting performance (such as profits). In all cases, except other performance measures,
the 95% confidence interval does not include zero, providing evidence that a positive
relationship exists between executive pay and firm performance. A positive association
between executive compensation and firm performance suggested by this meta-analysis
result is consistent with the review by Murphy (1999) and Tosi et al (2000). Despite the
significance of the relationship, the correlation coefficient is quite low (at 0.07) suggesting
that the association between executive pay and firm performance has little economic
significance, which is already commented by Jensen and Murphy (1990), and Conyon and
Murphy (2000).
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Table 3-1: Meta-analysis ofthe relationship between executive compensation
andfirm performance
95%
No. of Sample Corrected Corrected Confidence
Variables Correlation size Correlation Variance Interval
Performance Measure
Overall firm performance 66 13,143 0.070 0.010 .045 - .094
Profits 16 6,370 0.067 0.014 .009 - .126
Shareholder Returns 19 3,709 0.077 0.011 .030 - .124
ROA/ROE 25 10,03 1 0.078 0.007 .046 - .111
Others 6 2,669 0.028 0.006 (.034) - .090
ize Measure
Overall firm size 58 16,356 0.219 0.012 .191 - .247
Sales 35 11 .881 0. 18 1 0.034 .120 - .242
Total Assets 12 2,263 0.4 11 0.017 .338 - .485
Market Valuation 8 2.082 0.246 0.0 17 .156 -.337
Other 3 465 0.229 0.053 (.032) - .490
Executive Compen ation x Performance Measure
Cash Comp x Firm Perf. 39 19.557 0.055 0.017 .0 14 - .096
Total Comp x Firm Perf. 27 5.817 0.117 0.015 .071 - . 164
Cash Comp x Firm ize 35 13,345 0.207 0.009 .176 - .239
Total Comp x Firm Size 25 5,007 0.250 0.005 .22 1 - .279
With respect to firm size, the correlation coefficient of the pay-size relationship is
0.21 9 and the 95% confi dence interval does not include zero. This implies that there is a
positive association between executive compensation and firm ize; and this association is
statistically significant. Within the measures of finn size, sale are mostly used with 35
reported correlations, however, the correlation coefficient of the relationship between firm
sales and executive pay is the smallest (at 0.18 1). In all cases, e. cept for other size measures,
the 95% confidence interval does not include zero, suggesting that there is strong evidence
of a positive relationship between e. ecutive compensation and firm size (mea ured in sales.
market valuation, and total assets). This result is consi tent with prior review by Murphy
( 1999) and Tosi et al (2000) for a strong and positive relationship between executive pay
65
and firm size. In comparison to the study by Tosi et al (2000), however, this meta-analysis
reports a smaller correlation coefficient of the pay-size relationship (0.219 in this study
compared with 0.520 reported by Tosi et al). This is due to the fact that this meta-analysis
includes recent empirical studies, which reported lower correlation coefficients of pay-size
relationship than those reported by earlier studies. This might indicate that the association
between executive pay and firm size has decreased over time, as suggested by Jensen and
Murphy (1990).
Table 3-1 also presents the results of the analysis examining the relationship
between pay components (i.e. cash compensation and total compensation) and firm
performance and firm size. The results suggest that the correlation coefficient between total
compensation and firm performance (at 0.117) is much higher than that between cash
compensation and performance (at 0.055); as well as the overall pay-performance correlation
coefficient (at 0.070). This may imply that the inclusion of long-term incentives in total
executive compensation helps to improve the connection between executive compensation
and firm performance in the way that benefits shareholders. In all cases, the 95% confidence
interval does not include zero, implying strong evidence of the relationship between
executive pay components and firm performance and firm size.
The meta-analysis is continued with an analysis investigating series of measures of
executive compensation, of which the results are presented in Table 3-2. The results show
that in log form, executive compensation is strongly related to shareholder return with the
correlation coefficient of 0.293 for total compensation and 0.140 for cash compensation.
With regard to measures of firm size, log of sales is also strongly associated with the log
form of compensation with the correlation coefficient of 0.423 for cash compensation and
0.324 for total compensation. This again confirms the strong connection between executive
compensation and firm size.
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Table 3-2: Individual Meta-analysis of specific measures of compensation
Cash Total 6. (Cash 6. (Total Log/Cash Log(Total
Variables Camp Comp Comp) Comp) Comp) Comp)
Performance measure s
Profit .239 .398 .022
6.Profit .2 10 .205 .238
Shareholder returns .042 .0 17 .2 17 .069 .140 .293
ROA .053 .08 1 .270 .080 .103
ROE .227 .059 .023 .080 .189 .196
Others -.003 .250 .03
ize Measure
ales .340 .360 .020
Sales .198 .0 19 .157
Log (Sales) .395 .18 1 .423 .324
Total Assets .424 .593
Log (Total Assets) .110 .452
Market Valuation .238 .424
Log (Market Value) (.308)
Others .277 .040
• Conclusion
The meta-analysis has shown a statistical review of prior studies and confirmed a
positive correlation between executive compensation and firm performance as well as firm
size. In almost all cases, the 95% confidence interval does not include zero sugge ting that
the pay-performance and pay-size relationships are statistically significant. The overall
correlation coefficient between executive pay and performance of 0.07 indicates that the true
relationship between executive pay and performance i positive and statistically significant.
The meta-analysis also suggests that the inclusion/introduction of long-term incentives helps
to improve the sensitivity of executive pay on performance. However, the correlation
coefficient of pay-performance relationship is quite low, implying little economic
significance of the relationship between firm performance and executive pay.
Meta-analy is result how a strong evidence of a positive relationship between
executive pay and firm size. The elasticity of executive pay with respect to firm size is
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estimated at 0.22 suggesting that a 10% increase in firm size results in 2.2% increase in
executive pay. The meta-analysis results also indicate the explanatory power of firm size has
declined over time.
Although total compensation including stock options and long term incentive plans
has been more popular in empirical studies since 1990s, these studies mostly use panel data
to examine the pay-performance relationship and seldom report simple correlations. Thus,
many of these studies are not included in this meta-analysis; resulting in the dominance of
cash compensation measure in studies. The exclusion of a number of recent studies, which
failed to report simple correlations, is one of the weaknesses of this meta-analysis. Overall,
firm performance explains only 1.38%7 of variance in total compensation for executive
directors, whilst firm size explains 6.24% 8 variance of total compensation. This result
suggests further investigation on the determinants of executive compensation from factors
other than firm performance and firm size.
3.3.3 Other determinants of executive compensation
As noted earlier, prior literature indicates that there are many determinants of
remuneration, other than firm performance and firm size, such as human capital factors and
external labour market factors. There are number of hypotheses regarding the level of
remuneration which are based on the effect of an individual's human capital attributes on
his/her remuneration. Such theories argue that, given individual performance may be
unobservable, due to the difficulty in separating out the effects of individual effort,
remuneration is based on input factors (such as individual's human capital) as indicators of
an individual's performance. Moreover, individual receives lower remuneration in their early
7 Explained variance: R2(ToIaI PIYXFirmPcrfOl'l1llllcc) = 0.1172 = 0.0138= 1.38%
8 Explained variance: R2(TotaIPayx FinnSize)= 0.2502 = 0.0624= 6.24%
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years on the job as they acquire firm specific human capital, in the expectation that they will
receive higher remuneration in the future (Becker, 1964). Similarly, Murphy (1986) uses a
'learning' model to argue that a manager's human capital is revealed over time and hence
remuneration is adjusted to incorporate these more precise estimates of human capital.
Alternatively, Spence (1973) argues that human capital factors act as screening or signaling
devices, whereby these factors can be used prior to appointment to indicate the level of the
individual's productivity once in the job. However, the empirical evidence of the importance
of human capital factors is mixed (see Agrawal, 1981; Pavlik, et al., 1993). Rosen (1982)
argues that the larger firms, being more complex, are required to employ better managers.
Hence the relationship between remuneration and firm size may be explained by the higher
marginal product (human capital) of these better managers. However, Pavlik et al (1993)
note that changes in remuneration once an executive is in post should reflect performance. In
support of this, Barro and Barro (1990) report that initial compensation is significantly
related to firm size. Hence, given that there may be a positive relationship between firm size
and human capital factors, the inconclusive findings with respect to human capital attributes
may reflect the difficulties in filtering out the effects of firm size and human capital
attributes. Murphy (1985) argues that the exclusion of human capital variables constitutes a
serve omitted variables problem and suggests that lack of a positive relationship between
executive remuneration and firm performance is caused by failing to control for firm size
and individual manager characteristics.
Riahi-Belkaoui (1992) argues that executives' remuneration may also be affected by
forces external to the organization, particularly the external perception of the managerial
ability of the executives (their organizational effectiveness) and the social performance (the
responsibility to the community, environment) of the company. Analyzing a sample of US
firms, Riahi-Belkaoui reported results consistent with the view that there was a positive
relationship between executive remuneration and external perceptions of organizational
effectiveness. However, he reported a negative and significant relationship between
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remuneration and social performance, implying that executives were penalized for such
activities. Moreover, the presence of institutional shareholders helps to increase the
monitoring function of the board of directors that subsequently limits an excessive pay
package for executive director.
Other relevant determinant of executive compensation, given the criticism of the
lack of independence of non-executive directors and the remuneration committee, is 'social
influence considerations', whereby non-executive directors sitting on the remuneration
committee use remuneration received in their own companies to 'frame' the remuneration of
the CEO (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). This is consistent with Main and Johnston's
(1993) finding that the existence of a remuneration committee is associated with higher level
of remuneration. The 'social influence considerations' are similar to the Ezzamel and
Watson's (1996) arguments that remuneration committees, in conjunction with outside pay
consultants, contribute significantly to increases in executive compensation. Ezzamel and
Watson's (1996) suggest that pay consultants base their recommendations on comparisons
with external market rates of pay (possibly based largely on firm size) rather than on the
individual directors' and indeed the firm's performance. As a consequence, the remuneration
of directors who appear to be underpaid relative to the market is increased on the advice of
pay consultants, but the remuneration of 'overpaid' directors is not reduced.
As the discussion illustrates, the determinants of executive compensation are
extremely complex. Hence, the agency model of remuneration, which focuses on the
relationship between executive pay and firm performance, will not provide a complete
picture of the nature of executive compensation. Moreover, empirical studies which focus
solely on the relationship between pay and performance are likely to suffer from severe
misspecification problems.
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3.4 Conclusion
It is clear from the discussion presented in this chapter that executive remuneration
is an extremely complex topic for investigation. There are many potential determinants of
executive compensation. The most common determinants of executive compensation from
prior literature are finn performance and finn size. The results of the meta-analysis
presented in this chapter have indicated that there is strong evidence of a positive
relationship between executive compensation and finn performance as well as finn size.
Whilst finn size is a significant determinant of executive pay, the economic significance of
the pay-performance relationship is relatively low. Beside finn performance and finn size,
prior studies also reveal other factors, such as human capital factors, share ownership,
monitoring of the board, managerial power, rank order in the corporate hierarchy and
external labour market factors, which play an important role in determining the level of
executive compensation.
The conflict of theoretical perspectives and the methodological difficulties in
incorporating potential factors into an empirical model partly explains the inconsistencies
reported in prior empirical studies. The agency model of executive remuneration has
provided a useful framework for examining the relationship between executive
compensation and finn performance, particularly in the context of the current corporate
governance debate where concern has been expressed over the apparent lack of a
relationship between executive pay and finn performance, In contrast, managerial power
perspective suggests an alternative explanation of executive pay, that managers use their
power to extract rent and influence their own pay in the detriment of shareholders. This
approach might help to explain the low correlation between pay and finn performance found
in prior empirical studies, which is based on agency theory. Tournament theory, on the other
hand, gives a different view to explain the level of executive remuneration. The relative
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performance, rather than absolute performance, in a competitive process (a tournament)
between executives and the ranking order in the organizational hierarchy are the main
determinants of executive compensation. These three theorieswill form our argument for the
development of hypotheses in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4
DETERMINANTS OF EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION:
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
4.0 Introduction
Within the debate over executive compensation determination, as reviewed in
Chapter 3, there are many potential determinants of executive compensation. The agency
theory argues for an optimal incentive contract, which suggests performance as a main
determinant of executive compensation. However, agency research, while conceptually
important, has produced weak or even statistically insignificant results on the relationship
between executive pay and performance (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Jensen and Murphy,
1990; Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Murphy, 1999). Having different view, the managerial
power theory suggests that executive's power, rather than firm performance, plays a key role
in setting their own compensation arrangement and extracting 'rents' to the welfare of the
shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Alternatively, the tournament theory argues that the
relative performance and rank-order in the organization's hierarchy are the most important
determinants of executive compensation. These three dominant perspectives only have set
out different explanations of the observed levels and composition of executive pay. It is,
therefore, likely that research examines alternative models from different views may be
more fruitful in explaining executive remuneration.
Accordingly, this chapter provides theoretical arguments from alternative
perspectives and develops hypotheses on the determinants of executive compensation for
empirical tests. The arguments concentrate on three dominant perspectives: agency theory,
the managerial power theory, and the tournament theory. Although this set of theories is not
exhaustive, the models based on these perspectives are prominent in their respective fields
73
and each perspective has been the subject of prior and extensive empirical work. Agency
theory and the managerial power theory have contrasting views over the relationship
between executive remuneration and firm performance. Accordingly, hypotheses derived
and developed from agency theory and the managerial power theory are presented together,
when possible. The tournament theory, however, suggests a quite identical explanation of
the determinants of executive compensation; hence hypotheses derived from the tournament
theory are presented separately.
Whilst most prior research concentrated on the determination of pay level, there
have been relatively few investigations (except for Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Lewellen, et al.,
1987; Veliyath and Cordeiro, 2001) on the determinants of elements of pay and the structure
of executive pay. Contrasting results from prior empirical studies on the determinants of
executive pay and the literature gap suggest that further investigation on executive pay
elements and structure of executive pay maybe more fruitful in explaining the determinants
of executive compensation. Accordingly, this chapter develops hypotheses on the
determinants of cash pay component, long-term incentive pay component and total executive
pay; and the determinant of pay structure (ratio of long-term incentives in total pay). The
extensive analyses of executive pay are expected to help explaining more clearly the forces
in pay-setting process and the determinants of executive pay.
In deriving the hypotheses, there is a separation between the cost of executive
compensation to the granting company and the value of the compensation package to
executive. This is due to the fact that there is great difference between the cost of long-term
incentive pay to the company who grants the incentives and the value of those incentives to
executive director who receives. As described in Chapter 3, the best known and widely used
method of estimating executive stock options is the Black-Scholes pricing model. However,
this valuation method is criticized for overestimating the value of options to executive
directors who are risk-averse, in whose private wealth portfolios their company stock is
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already over-weighted and who are not allowed to exercise until vesting (Hall and Murphy,
2000; Murphy, 1999). In addition, the cost of incentives to company and the value of such
incentives to executives vary greatly due to the performance conditions attached to those
incentives. Accordingly, the derived hypotheses will take into account of possible effect of
the difference between the cost of incentives to company and the actual value of incentives
to executives in examining executive pay determinants.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 presents theoretical framework and
arguments, mainly from agency theory and the managerial power theory, for hypotheses on
the determinants of executive pay, components of pay and executive pay structure. Three
different groups of factors and criteria are identified that potentially determines executive
pay components and structure of executive compensation. The hypotheses on the first group,
organizational contingencies such as firm performance and firm size, are presented in
subsection 4.1.1. Subsection 4.1.2 presents the arguments and derived hypotheses on the
individual contingencies including executive shareholdings, executive tenure and executive
age. The effect of monitoring function, which includes proxies such as the proportion of
non-executive directors in the board, board size, and institutional shareholdings; is discussed
and hypothesized in subsection 4.1.3. The effect of the difference between cost and value
incentives is presented along with other pay-determinant hypotheses. Section 4.2 discusses
the tournament theory and its predictions of the shape of executive compensation level. The
key predictions of the tournament models are (1) executive pay is largely attached to job
levels, and (2) the pay gap is widening through the corporate hierarchy. Other predictions of
the tournament theory concerning the effect of contestant number on the tournament prize
and the economic efficiency ofthe tournament pay structures are hypothesized consequently.
Finally, Section 4.3 presents a conclusion.
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4.1 Determinants of Executive pay level and Incentive pay ratios
This section provides a theoretical framework from agency theory and the
managerial power theory to develop hypotheses on the determinants of executive pay level
for different components as well as the determinants of the proportion of long-term
incentives in total compensation. The factors that influence the level of executive pay and
long-term incentive pay ratio can be categorized in three main groups, as discussed earlier.
Organizational contingencies factors are those at corporate level such as firm performance
and firm size. Agency theory indicates that organizational contingencies are positively
related to executive compensation. The second group of factors is individual contingencies,
including executive shareholdings, executive tenure and executive age. Broadly, individual
contingencies are predicted to increase executive power and positively relate to executive
compensation as suggested by the managerial power theory. The monitoring function of the
board of directors and institutional shareholders are supposed to playa key role in executive
pay-setting process. Details of these factors are discussed in the following sections.
4.1.1 Organizational contingencies and Executive compensation
Firm Performance and Executive Compensation
Agency theory suggests that incentive contract is the first-best solution to minimize
the agency problems and to align the interests of managers with those of the shareholders.
An incentive contract based on firm performance can help to reduce the agency costs due to
moral hazard (lack ofeffort) and adverse selection (misrepresentation of ability) (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). Accordingly, agency theory predicts a positive correlation between
executive pay and firm performance. Whilst the majority of empirical studies on agency
theory did find evidence of a statistical relationship between executive compensation and
firm performance, the economic significance of the relationship has been found to be very
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smal1(Conyon and Leech, 1994; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1999). Such low
economic significance may be particularly explained by the fact that prior research has
generally relied on a single measure of executive pay: cash pay (the aggregation of salary
and bonuses) on the one hand or total pay (the aggregate of salary, bonuses, stock options
and long-term incentive plans) on the other. Lewellen et al (1982) has explained this
limitation through the ex post settling-up process. Specifically, the changes in salary are
lagged with respect to firm performance and usually growth with firm size; bonuses are
contemporaneous with firm performance; while the value of long-term incentives (stock
options and LTIPs) is correlated with future firm performance. Thus, splitting the pay
construct to different components may enhance understanding of the pay-performance
relationship.
As discussed in Chapter 3, there are three main components of executive
compensation package: salary, bonuses and long-term incentive pay (which includes share
options and long-term incentive plans). Salary is referred as the 'fixed component' that is
used to establish the executive's basic life style and to recognize the labor market value of
the executive's position, not to reward performance. Bonuses, on the other hand, are
designed as a function of current year performance and thus expected to be strongly related
with firm performance. Whilst the size of long-term incentive pay (i.e, stock options and
LTIPs) is normally granted referencing to current year performance with attached conditions
of subsequent years' performance. Hence both cash pay (which includes salary and bonuses)
and long-term incentive pay are expected to have positive relationship with firm
performance.
The managerial power perspective, however, demonstrates that executive pay-
setting process has strayed far from arm's length model and the managerial power, rather
than firm performance, plays a key role in the compensation arrangement (Bebchuk and
Fried, 2004). According to the managerial theory, executives with powers can influence their
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own pay's arrangement to extract greater 'rents' to the welfare of the shareholders. However,
Bebchuck and Fried (2004) also argue that the amount of 'rents' extracted by executives is
dependent on the 'outrage' costs. 'Outrage' might cause embarrassment or reputational harm
to executives and it might reduce shareholders' willingness to support incumbents in proxy
contests or takeover bids (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). To avoid the 'outrage' that results from
outsiders' recognition of rent extraction, executives have strong incentive to 'camouflage'
their extraction of rents by limiting the use of observable pay (i.e, salary) and using more of
(so called) incentive pay. However, risk-averse executives with power will presumably
protect themselves by limiting their exposure to firm risk. In addition, the strong desire to
'camouflage' might lead to the adoption of inefficient compensation structures or
performance-related pay structures that favour powerful executives. Hence, according the
managerial power theory, the incentive pay component tends to subject to easy performance
hurdles, such as firm size or accounting performance, rather than market performance.
As suggested by agency theory, the compensation package for executive directors
should be in term of performance-based incentive contract with greater incentive pay
components. In addition, when the company achieves better performance (i.e, greater
profitability) it has more ability to increase the compensation for executives (both base pay
and incentive pay components). However, the increased salary will become fixed cost of
operations and it can impact on future compensation costs of the company; whilst annual
bonuses are normally limited to the specific percentage of base pay (i.e. salary). Many
companies, then, decide to reward their executives following good performance as long-term
incentives (share options and LTIPs) and make it variable cost rather than an increase in
base pay. Hence, agency theory predicts that when firm performance increases, the ratio of
long-term incentive pay in total executive compensation will also increase. The managerial
power theory also supports a positive relationship between incentive pay ratio and firm
performance, despite an alternative way. As discussed above, to avoid the 'outrage' costs,
executives with power have strong incentive to 'camouflage' their extraction of rents by
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limiting observable pay (i.e. salary) and disguising 'rents' as incentive pay. Hence, the
proportion of long-term incentive pay in total compensation is expected to positively relate
to firm performance.
Following the above arguments, the hypothesis is derived as follow.
HI: Executive pay components and executive pay structure are positively related to firm
performance
Another issue in discussing the pay-performance relationship is the difference
between the cost of granting long-term incentives to the company and their value to
executives who receive. Murphy (1999) asserts that stock options cost more to shareholders
to grant than they are worth to executive-recipients, and should only be granted if the
incentive effect (i.e. the increased performance created by improved stock-based incentives)
exceeds the difference between the company's cost and the executive's value. Hall and
Murphy (2000; 2002) also argue that undiversified and risk-averse executives will generally
place a much lower value on company stock options than would outside investors. In
addition, the value of LTIPs is also much lower than its cost to company due to the
'challenging performance criteria' (Greenbury, 1995) attached to the LTIPs. Canyon and
Murphy (2000) and Conyon et al (2001) even estimate that the actual value of LTIPs is only
about 20% of their face value. The divergence between the cost and value of long-term
incentives has implications for evaluating the incentives provided by executives' long-term
incentive pay (Hall and Murphy, 2002). Options and LTIPs are granted to provide incentives
to the extent that executives can take actions that increase the value of the options/LTIPs
from the perspectives of executives. While most studies of executive incentives have
followed Jensen and Murphy (1990) in defining the 'pay-performance sensitivity' from the
cost of options/LTIPs; Hall and Murphy (2002) suggest that a more appropriate way of
evaluating incentives is the use of the options/LTIPs value to executives. Hence, the
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relationship between executive pay and firm performance is likely to be affected by the use
of cost of long-term incentive pay to company and its value to executive directors.
Hypothesis is as follow.
H2: The relationship between firm performance and executive compensation is affected
by the use ofcost pay or pay value as measures ofexecutive pay.
Firm Size and Executive Compensation
The study of firm size as a determinant of executive pay stems from the late 1950s.
Baumol (1959) and Roberts (1958) have supported the concept that executive compensation
is directly related to firm size. Empirical studies by McGuire et al (1962), Lewellen &
Huntsman (1970); Cosh (1975); Ciscel & Carroll (1980); Hogan & McPheter (1980), found
positive associations between cash compensation and firm sales. Baker et al (1988)
document that large firms pay their executives higher than small firms and the elasticity of
compensation with respect to finn sales of about 0.3 (i.e. a 10 percent larger in sales, finn
will pay its executives an average of 3 percent more). A meta-analysis of prior pay-size
studies presented in Chapter 3 also suggests that the true relationship between executive
compensation and finn size is positive and the correlation coefficient is about 0.22.
Theoretically, the larger the finn the greater the number of shareholders; and, other things
being equal, the worse the agency problem. Moreover, founding family holdings of
executives tend to decline with finn size. Accordingly, self-interest executives have chance
to consume company's resources and set their compensation linked to finn size for their own
interests and deviate from the value-maximization interests of shareholders. In addition, the
percentage of organizational resources devoted to individual executive's rewards also
smaller in large finn compared to small finn (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992). The board
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and shareholders, hence, find it less concern and willing to pay executives an excessive
compensation package.
According to the managerial power perspective, self-interest executives with power
has substantial influence over their own pay and the greater is executives' power, the greater
is their ability to extract 'rents'. In order to extract 'rents' without the 'outrage' cost,
resulting from outsiders' recognition of rent extraction; executives have incentive to
'camouflage' their extraction in pay arrangements. The desire to 'camouflage' might lead to
an adoption of inefficient compensation structures, which are linked to firm size rather than
firm performance, to favour powerful executives. Moreover, self-interest executives with
power will protect themselves from firm risks by setting their compensation related to firm
size (a more controllable outcome) rather than firm performance (a less controllable
outcome). With power, executives also tend to 'camouflage' their rent extraction by a
greater proportion of incentive pay, which is more likely relating to firm size rather than firm
performance. Overall, both agency theory and the managerial power theory as discussed
above support a positive relationship between firm size and executive pay elements as well
as structure of executive pay (incentive pay ratio). The hypothesis is derived as follows.
H3: Executive pay components andpay structure arepositively related tofirm size
According to the main stream of agency theory, however, the primary responsibility
of executive directors is to maximize shareholder wealth through raising firm performance
and share price, not the firm size. Strategy to increasing firm size is not considered as value
maximizing for shareholders and thus incentive pay should not base on firm size. Practically,
Jensen and Murphy (1990) demonstrate that the explanatory power of firm size has declined
over time. Agency theory also asserts that the incentive contract (proportion of incentive pay)
is associated with the risk of outcomes (uncertainty of firm performance). As the firm size
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increase, there is less uncertainty in the performance because larger firms diversify their
business better than smaller firm.
With regard to the cost versus the value of long-term incentive pay, the managerial
power theory emphasizes that the cost to shareholders resulting from the extraction of rents
might well be higher than the amount of the rents themselves (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).
From prior discussion, Murphy (1999) and Hall and Murphy (2002) also assert that long-
term incentives (stock options and LTIPs) cost more to shareholders than they are worth to
executives. Moreover, the value of long-term incentives to executives subjects to
performance conditions of the company in subsequent years. The performance conditions are
normally measures both in absolute terms (growth of EPS, shareholder returns) or relative
performance (ranks in peer group of competitors). The value of long-term incentives hence
is independent of finn size.
4.1.2 Individual Contingencies inDetermining executive Compensation Elements
Executive shareholdlngs
Agency literature by Jensen and Meckling (1976) documents that shareholdings
owned by managers helps to align the interest of shareholders and managers. According to
Jensen and Meckling (1976), managers' natural tendency is to allocate the finn's resources in
their own best interests, which may conflict with the interests of outside shareholders.
However, as managers' equity ownership increases, their interests coincide more closely
with those of outside shareholders, and hence the conflicts between managers and
shareholders are likely to be resolved. However, shareholdings owned by executives are
normally subject to institutional restrictions or controls on equity trading unlike diversified
investors. This is because the equity trading of executives, who possess private and inside
information of the firm and their own ability/effort, will signal the market and other
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investors of unfavourable firm perspectives. Such restrictions on executive's equity transfer
may create greater transaction costs in trading the investment than that for diversified
investors. Therefore, the magnitude of the existing shareholdings owned by managers may
influence their willingness to accept further risk bearing, such as stock options and restricted
stocks, in their compensation contracts. Hence it can be derived that existing shareholdings
owned by executives prevent them from accepting compensation contract with high
proportion of share-based contingent elements. Also, from the principal's viewpoint, the
close relationship between executive shareholdings and firm value suggests that executive
shareholdings are likely to be substitute for incentive compensation as the mechanism to
align the interests of managers and shareholders. Thus, a board compensation committee will
not find it necessary, ceteris paribus, to incorporate higher incentive elements in the
compensation contract for executives. The hypothesis according to agency theory thus is
derived as follow:
lli!li. Executive pay components andpay structure are negatively related with executive
shareholdings
The managerial power approach, however, predicts that as an executive's share
ownership increases, thereby making executive more powerful vis-a-vis other shareholders,
his/her compensation will increase. With higher power through share ownership, the
executive will try to extract more 'rents' with excessive compensation arrangement. And to
avoid 'outrage' costs, executives will try to 'camouflage' the amount and performance-
insensitivity of compensation. Hence, according to the managerial theory, the level of
compensation and incentive pay ratio are predicted to be positively related to executive's
share ownership. Hypothesis is.
H46: Executive pay components and pay structure is positively related with executive
shareholdings
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Executive Tenure &Ape
Executive with longer tenure (and assumingly higher age) is argued to have greater
level of firm-specific human capital (Buchholtz, et al., 2003). According to human capital
theory, longer tenure with age leads to greater expertise and experience for executives, who
can have greater contribution to increase firm value; and hence, their compensation tends to
increase (Agrawal, 1981). The managerial power perspective suggests that tenure and age
will increase executives' power and allow them to extract rents at the detriment of
shareholders wealth. It is suspected that the longer the tenure of executive, the more
entrenched they are likely to become and the more power to pursue their own interests rather
than those of shareholders. Firstly, executives (in particular, the CEOs) nominate new board
members (Herman, 1981; Mace, 1971; Pfeffer, 1972; Vance, 1983). Thus, they may be able
to exercise increasing influence over board composition, adding new directors and removing
troublesome ones (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989). Initially, new executive directors may
have little influence over their boards, since their predecessors presumably nominated most
board members, who therefore have little personal loyalty to the new executive. However,
over time executives (CEOs) may he able to populate boards with their own nominees. Since
these new outside directors owe their position to the executive (CEOs), they may not
evaluate those individuals objectively, and their loyalty may be to the executives (CEOs)
rather than to stockholders. Thus, as Fredrickson et al (1988) observed, it is possible that
"CEOs gain power over time as they gain voting control, establish a patriarchal aura, or co-
opt the board of directors". A second factor leading to increased influence is that with time
executives may be able to gain control over firms' internal information systems. By doing so,
they may be able to withhold relevant information "from compensation committees when
that information would attribute poor firm performance to bad management" (Coughlan &.
Schmidt, 1985). In addition executives may be able to use control over information systems
to determine the agendas of board meetings in a manner that casts them in the most
favourable light. Hill and Phan (1991) also argue that once executives establish a
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performance record and build relationship with key stakeholders, they may be difficult to be
removed. Thus, according to managerial theory (and human capital theory), tenure and age
play important role in determining the level of executive compensation.
In addition, the managerial power theory argues that executives with increasing
power will try to extract 'rents' rather than acting on shareholders' interest. And to avoid the
'outrage' cost, which results from outsiders' recognition of rent extraction, powerful
executives have incentive and ability to 'camouflage' their extraction of rents in term of
"controllable-conditions" incentive pay elements rather than observable pay elements (e.g.
salary). Hence the proportion of long-term incentives in total executive compensation is
expected to increase along with executive tenure and age.
However, by the time (age) and with longer tenure in the position, executive
directors tend to have larger proportion of their private wealth holding in company's shares,
which are accumulated from prior years' share-based compensation. Hence, agency theory
argues that risk-adverse executives, who presumably protect themselves by limiting their
further exposure to firm risk, are less likely to accept an incentive-driven compensation
contract. Hill and Phan (1991) also comment that the strength of the relationship between
executive compensation and stock returns decreases with tenure. It means proportion of
incentive pay in total executive compensation will decrease with executive tenure and their
age.
Following the above arguments, hypothesis is developed for executive tenure and
executive age as follows.
ll1:. Executive pay components and pay structure are positively related to executive
tenure and executive age.
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4.1.3 Monitoring Function and Managerial Incentives
According to the agency theory perspective, optimal incentive contract is stressed as
the first-best solution to the agency problems. When the optimal contract cannot be achieved
or managers are reluctant to bear greater risks, owners (shareholders) must create alternative
mechanisms to monitor managerial actions by investing in information system such as
budgeting systems, reporting procedures, board of directors, and additional layers of
management (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). One particularly relevant information system for
monitoring executive behaviors is the board of directors. Board of directors is viewed as a
key internal governance mechanism and 'essential monitoring device' to minimize agency
costs and management's opportunism (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983;
Weisbach, 1988). The optimal level of monitoring should be based on the magnitude of the
incentive gap between principal and agent (Fama & Jensen, 1983). A higher level of
monitoring by boards of directors would be required when a manager does not accept any
compensation risk tied to firm performance. Strong monitoring is therefore particularly
appropriate when managerial incentives are only weakly tied to firm performance, and the
benefits of monitoring would outweigh the costs.
The monitoring function of the board refers directly to the responsibility of non-
executive directors to monitor managers on behalf of shareholders. Monitoring function
concerns an ex post "settling up" process whereby monitors (board of directors) directly
observe and evaluate either the agent's behaviors, outcomes, or both and then determine
compensation awards (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Directors' monitoring function was
discussed in a number of specific activities, including monitoring the CEO (Boyd, 1995;
Daily, 1996), monitoring strategy implementation (Rindova, 1999), evaluating and
rewarding CEO (Conyon & Peck. 1998) etc. The primary driver of each of these activities is
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the obligation (met by board's scrutiny, evaluation, regulation of management's actions) to
ensure that management operates in the interests of shareholders (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).
According to agency theory, the ownership structure of the firm may affect the
ability and incentives of shareholders to provide alternative forms of monitoring.
Specifically, the concentration of ownership will help to reduce the cost of monitoring and
increase the level of monitoring. Institutional shareholders represent the most important
shareholding group, who has incentives to obtain the information necessary to effectively
monitor management. Hence the following sections firstly discuss the first two proxies
which measure the board monitoring function (board size and balance of non-executive
directors on the board) and the relationship with executive compensation. One may argues
for other proxies of board monitoring function, however, these two proxies are the most
classic and dominant measures of board monitoring; and it is also due to the availability of
data. Secondly, the presence and concentrated ownership of institutional shareholders are
discussed in connection to level of monitoring and executive compensation.
Boardsiz,
According to agency theory, there are increased problems of communication and
coordination and decreased ability of the board to control management when there are more
members on the board (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). Board effectiveness may decline as
board size increases above a moderate number. Jensen (1993), Firstenberg & Malkiel (1994)
and Lipton & Lorsch (1992) suggest a board of seven to nine members. Firstenberg &
Malkiel (1994) argue that a board with eight or fewer members "engenders greater focus,
participation, and genuine interaction and debate". Larger board is unlikely to function
effectively that could make coordination, communication and decision-making less
manageable and easier to be controlled by CEO (Jensen, 1993). Also, the largeness can
significantly inhibit a board's ability to initiate strategic actions (Goodstein et 01, 1994). This
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idea is consistent with the more general view that larger boards may be less participative,
less cohesive, and less able to reach consensus. Judge and Zeithaml (1992), for example,
reported that larger boards were less likely to become involved in strategic decision making.
Yermack (1996) concluded that whatever benefits may be associated with board largeness
may be overwhelmed by poor communication and decision-making process. Mintzberg
(1983) also suggested that board members' assessments of top management are more easily
manipulated when boards are large and diverse. Hence, agency theory predicts that larger
boards tend to be less effective in monitoring and supervision, and subsequently the level of
executive pay components tend to be higher.
When the size of the board is getting large, the monitoring function of the
board is diminishing in controlling the behavior of executives and thus the
monitoring mechanism is not effective in resolving the agency problems. In this case,
it is necessary to use incentive contract, as a more optimal choice, to align the
interests of managers with those of shareholders. Hence, the proportion of incentive
pay in total compensation for executive directors is expected to relate positively to
the size of the board. In addition, the managerial power perspective predicts that
when the board is relatively weak and ineffectual, executives would tend to have
more power to extract rents through compensation arrangement. Core et a1 (1999)
find that CEO compensation is higher under the following conditions: (l) when
board is large, which makes it more difficult for directors to organize in opposition
to the CEO; (2) when more of the outside directors have been appointed by the CEO,
which could cause them to feel a sense of gratitude or obligation to the CEO; and (3)
when outside directors serve on three or more boards, and thus are more likely to be
distracted. Accordingly, given larger board, executives are likely to have more power
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to extract 'rents' and 'camouflage' rent extraction in term of higher incentive pay
element, which is supposed to relate easy performance conditions.
Non-Executive Directors
There is near consensus in the conceptual literature that effective boards will be
comprised of greater proportions of outside directors (Lorsch & Maciver, 1989; Mizruchi,
1983; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). The preference for outside-dominated boards is largely
grounded in agency theory, which emphasizes the monitoring functions of directors.
According to agency theory, outside non-executive directors are believed to provide
effective monitoring and controlling executives' behaviors to ensure executives engages in
those actions that are consistent with shareholders' interest. Fama (1980) and Fama & Jensen
(1983) viewed non-executive directors as professional referees and experts in internal
organizational control because of their independence from firm's management. Agency
scholars thus argue for a board consisting of primary outside non-executive directors. This
view is illustrated by the work of Weisbach (1988), Dalton & Rechner (1989), Daily &
Dalton (1994), Barnhart et al (1994), Daily (1995), Daily & Johnson (1997), Cole et al
(2001), etc. Once the monitoring is effective (with the presence of major outside non-
executive directors on board), it is not necessary to have an incentive contract that ties
executive compensation to firm performance. Effectively, the level and proportion of
incentive pay in total compensation would be negatively related to the balance of
(percentage of non-executive directors in) the board.
Although executives' power depends on the composition of the board in the way
that the more effective board, the less power for executives to extract rents; Bebchuk et al
(2002) argue that an independent director may not be a effective monitor as he/she might
follow CEO's wishes because the CEO appointed him/her to the board of directors. This
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could cause them to feel a sense of gratitude or obligation to the CEO. Hence, the
managerial power theory has contrasting view on the role and effectiveness of non-executive
director.
Institutional Shareholdlngs
Institutional investors have emerged as an important group of shareholders, who
seek a more active governance role. Individual shareholders with relatively small
shareholdings have little incentive to gather and bear the costs of collecting information to
enable them to monitor and control the behavior of management (Stiglitz, 1985). Unlike
individuals, institutional shareholders essentially invest their own investors' money and they
thus have a legal fiduciary obligation to take proactive actions to protect their investments
against erosion in value (Krikorian, 1991). In addition, institutional investors normally hold
a substantial number of shares in the invested companies and their high aggregate ownership
makes it difficult for them to sell off their shares in response to poor firm performance, as
their move may adversely affect the stock price. It is also difficult for institutional
shareholders to find appropriate alternate investments, considering that they already own
significant stakes in most firms in the economy. The barriers to exit provide institutional
shareholders with the incentive to exercise voice in corporate governance, especially to
influence pay-setting process for executive directors (David & Kochhar, 1996). In addition,
ownership in hundreds of firms provides institutional investors the opportunity to gain
economies of scale in monitoring compensation policy (Black, 1992). Through their
interactions with various companies in their portfolios, institutions can likely develop the
ability to determine whether the compensation policy of a firm is appropriate. Hence, the
presence of institutional shareholders with incentives to obtain the information necessary to
effectively monitor management should increase the level of monitoring activity. And more
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concentrated ownership structure (hares owned by institutional shareholders) should be
associated with greater level of monitoring.
According to agency theory, when the level of monitoring increases, the owners
(shareholders/board of directors) have more control on the behavior of managers and
compensation is less likely to be based on firm performance. As Conyon and Leech (1994)
argue, in the presence of alternative and cheaper monitoring devices such as large
institutional shareholders, both shareholders and directors may prefer compensation
contracts which are not based on firm performance. Hence, according to agency theory, the
presence and concentration of large institutional shareholders results in lower level of
incentive compensation for executive directors as well as the proportion of incentive pay in
total compensation. The managerial power theory (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) also argues
that the presence of institutional shareholders serves to reduce the power of managers to
extract rents through compensation. It suggests a negative correlation between the equity
ownership of institutional shareholders and the amount of executive compensation. Cyert et
al (2002) support this view and show that doubling the percentage ownership of institutional
shareholders reduces non-salary compensation by 12-14 percent. Bertrand and Sendhil (200 I)
find that CEOs in firms lacking large external shareholders, the cash compensation of CEOs
is reduced less when their option-based compensation is increased. It is the managerial
power perspective, which supports that a higher concentration of shareholders (presence of
institutional shareholders) results in a significantly smaller amount of options grants to top
executives. Hence, the managerial power theory has same base as the agency theory to
suggest that the presence of large institutional shareholders results in lower level of incentive
pay as well as lower ratio of incentives in total compensation for executives.
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In light of these above arguments on board size, balance of non-executive
directors on the board and the presence of institutional shareholders, a single
hypothesis can be derived as follow.
H6: Executive pay components and pay structure are negatively related to the level
monitoring and the effectiveness ofthe board
4.2 Determinants of Executive Compensation: Tournament Theory
According to tournament theory, as reviewed in Chapter 3, the relative performance
and rank-order in organizational hierarchy are the main determinants of executive
compensation. The tournament theory, initially developed by Lazear and Rosen (1981a),
tried to explain the large disparity in compensation for executives in different level in the
organizational hierarchy. Lazear and Rosen (1981a) comment that "On the day that a given
individual is promoted from vice-president to president, his salary may triple. It is difficult
to argue that his skills have tripled in thatone-day period, presenting difficulties for standard
theory where supply factors should keep wages in those two occupations approximately
equal. It is not a puzzle, however, when interpreted in the context of the prize" (p.847).
Lazear and Rosen suggest that,eventhough the salary of the top executives may well exceed
all measures of their marginal product, it canstill be economically efficient. Thejustification
is that the high compensation of the CEO acts as an incentive for other lower executives to
compete and exert their effort to get promoted. Hence, the higher position in the
management hierarchy, not the marginal product, is associated with the higher level of
compensation.
However, not simply a positive correlation between rank-order and level of
compensation, the tournament theory predicts that there will be an increasing compensation
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gap as individuals move up the hierarchical ladder (Conyon, et al., 2001; Lambert, et al.,
1993; Main, et aI., 1993; Rosen, 1986). In a sequential elimination tournament, agents
compete against each other at a given organizational level. On the basis of their relative
performance, the winning agents are then promoted to the next level of the hierarchical
ladder. Rosen (1986) argues that: "There are many rungs in the ladder to aspire to in the
early stages of the game, and this plays an important role in maintaining one's enthusiasm
for continuing. But after one has climbed a fair distance, there are fewer rungs left to attain.
If top prizes are not large enough, those that have succeeded in achieving higher ranks rest
on their laurels and slack off in their attempts to climb higher". Rosen (1986) then concludes
that "extra weight on top-ranking prizes is required to induce competitors to aspire to higher
goals". Conyon et al (2001) suggest that motivation in the tournament is also provided by
the possibility of further (future) job slots in the hierarchy. The value of winning is not only
the prize at that level but also includes the possibility to compete for larger prizes at higher
levels. However, the option to compete in future rounds diminishes as an individual
competitor moves up the organizational hierarchy. To substitute for the loss of option, the
compensation for current level should be increase. In sum, tournament models predict that
executive compensation is an increasing function of organizational level, or the relationship
between executive compensation and organization level is convex. Following empirical
support by Lambert et al (1993) and Main et al (1993) based on US data, and Conyon et al
(2001) based on UK data, our hypothesis is follow:
H7: There is convex relationship between executive compensation and organisational
level.
According to the tournament theory, however. the promotion to a higher
organisational level is based on the relative performance of the contestants in the
competitions. Hence the compensation for executives is rewarded for the relative
performance, not the absolute performance. In the composition of executive pay, it is likely
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true for cash components (especially salary) rather than for long-term incentive components,
which is conditional on firm performance. It thus predicts a stronger convex relationship
between organisational level and cash pay than incentive pay. Also, the convex relationship
is more likely when the cost of incentives and executive pay to company (nominal prizes for
executives following relative performance and rank-order) is used than when is the actual
value of incentives/pay to executives (which is conditional on firm performance in
subsequent years).
The second models predicted by tournament theory is that the tournament prize is
increasing in the number of competitors (see Conyon, et aI., 2001; Lambert, et aI., 1993;
Main, et aI., 1993; O'Reilly, et aI., 1988). Each tournament participant implicitly gives up
some of their expected salary associated with their marginal product or performance
(Conyon, et aI., 2001). This excess then becomes part of the overall tournament prize for the
next organizational level. O'Reilly, Main & Crystal (1988) tested the hypothesis that the
larger the number of candidates competing for a CEO position, represented by the number of
vice-presidents, the greater would be the disparity in pay between the CEO and other
executive levels. However, although they did report a statistically significant result, it was in
the opposite direction to that predicted by tournament theory. In their later work, Main,
O'Reilly & Wade (1993), do isolate a positive relationship between the number of
tournament participants and pay differentials. However, although finding results that were
consistent with the operation of tournaments, they concluded that there was little support for
the empirical importance of consideration of pay equity at the top of corporations. Further
support for tournament theory, Lambert et al (1993), using internal data from 142 companies,
show that the differences in compensation between hierarchical levels are consistent with
tournament theory. Also, Conyon et al (2001) show that the premium for winning the
tournament is increasing in the number of executive directors, again consistent with
tournament models. Following the arguments of tournament theory and prior empirical
support, the next hypothesis is derived.
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H8: The tournament prize (the gap between compensation levels) is positively related to
thenumber ofcontestants (number ofexecutives on the board)
The third testable tournament model, which is suggested by Conyon et al (2001),
Bloom (1999) and Main et al (1993), predicts a positive correlation between executive pay
dispersion and firm performance. Theoretical tournament models argue that, to induce effort
by agents, a relatively large prize (i.e. a gap or variation in pay) is required to motivate
contestants. If a large prize (pay gap) induces higher effort by executives then this should be
reflected in higher outputs and performance. Bloom (1999) argues that "a wide spread
between pay levels increases the returns for higher performance, thus creating a positive
pay-performance link and inducing higher future performance"; and "organizations should
benefit from the combined effort of high performers and hence, organizational performance
should be improved commensurably". Main et al (1993) find a positive effect of the
coefficient of wage variation on return on assets, but not on shareholder returns. Eriksson
(1999) finds a positive effect of pay dispersion on a performance index. Conyon et al (2001),
however, suggest that pay dispersion does not have a robust positive or negative effect on
corporate performance. Along with the argument of tournament theory and empirical
supports, hypothesis is derived as follow.
H9: Paydispersion ispositively relatedtofirm performance
Other prediction of tournament theory is that average pay level of executive
team is influenced by pay dispersion. Hypothesis is as follow.
l!11!:. Average pay levelofexecutive teamispositively relatedtopay dispersion.
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4.3 Conclusion
Thischapter has presented theoretical arguments and priorempirical supports for the
derived hypotheses on the determinants of executive pay components and structure of
executive pay. These testable propositions are developed based on the threemain theoretical
perspectives: agency theory, managerial power perspective, and tournament theory. The
contrasting viewbetween agency theory and managerial power theory is analyzed to develop
hypotheses on the determinants of executive pay components and pay structure. According
to agency theory and the managerial power perspective, the determinants of executive pay
components and pay structure are divided in three groups. The first group of determinants is
organizational contingencies including firm performance and firm size. The second group of
determinants concerns those individual contingencies such as executive's shares ownership,
executive tenure and age of executive directors. Monitoring function of the board of
directors (board size, board independence) and the presence of institutional shareholders
form the third group of determinants. The hypotheses derived from the view of the
tournament theory build up another partof this chapter. According to the tournament theory,
executive compensation is determined by their rank-order in the organizational hierarchy.
The pay gap between executive levels is increasing with hierarchical ladder, the number of
executive directors, and the firm performance.
Along with the prediction of the determinants of executive paycomponents and pay
structure, hypothesis (H2) is also developed to take into account of the difference between
the cost of incentive pay to company and the value of such incentive to executive directors.
All these hypotheses, to be tested in subsequent chapters, are concentrated on three
theoretical perspectives: agency, managerial power and tournament. The testing models,
however, will incorporate control variables for the best explanation of the determinants of
executive compensation. Details of methodology and measurement of variables are
presented in the nextchapter.
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Summary of developed hypotheses are presented in the following table.
Table 4-1: Summary oftestable hypotheses
Hypotheses Description
I ~ Executive pay components and executive pay structure are positively related
I to firm performance
-
I H2 The relationship between firm performance and executive compensation is
affected by the use of cost payor pay value as measures of executive pay
H3 Executive pay components and pay structure are positively related to firm
size
- ,-
I H4a Executive pay components and pay structure are negatively related with
executive shareholdings
_.-
I H4b Executive pay components and pay structure is positively related with
I
executive shareholdingsI
- H5 Executive pay components and pay structure are positively related toI II executive tenure and executive age
.- --- - .- - - - -- ---- -
H6
l- -
I 1-17
H8
t 119
Executive pay components and pay structure are negatively related to the
level monitoring and the effectiveness of the board J
There is convex relationship between executive compensation and - ~ ~
Iorganisational level
-------
IThe tournament prize (the gap between compen ation Ie el ) i positively
I related to the number of contestants (number of executives on the board)
---1f------------------ --- -- ---
Pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance
HIO Average pay level of executive team is positively related to pay disper ion.
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Chapter 5
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION
5.0 Introduction
This chapter presents the methodology to be adopted in conducting this research. It
also describes the measurement of variables and characteristics of the sampled firms, which
are used for empirical analyses. As this study seeks to address the following broad research
question: 'What is the nature of the relationship between executive compensation, corporate
governance and performance?', it is expected that the study is conducted within deductive
approach following the philosophy of positivism. Accordingly, theories and prior literature
are reviewed (as described in Chapter 3), deducing hypotheses are discussed and developed
(Chapter 4), quantitative data and analyses are used to test the presented hypotheses. In this
study, panel data will be collected and multiple regression analyses using panel data are
employed to test the presented hypotheses. In addition, Arellano-Bond General Method of
Moments (GMM) is also used to further examine the dynamic effect of panel data.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5. t discusses panel data analyses with
the fixed and random effects models as wel1 as the dynamic panel data analysis using
Arellano-Bond GMM estimator. Section 5.2 presents the basis and rationale for the selection
of sample used in this study. Section 5.3 discusses the measurement of executive pay
variables, performance variables and governance variables. The descriptive analyses of
executive pay and other governance variables are presented in section 5.4. Final1y, section
5.5 presents a conclusion.
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5.1 Panel data analysis
Quantitative analysis have three traditional forms: (1) time-series analysis, which
would in principle require investigations to be conducted over a relatively long period of
time, probably with the use of limited samples (see Sekaran, 2000); (2) cross-sectional
analysis, which are designed to obtain information on variables in different contexts, with
the aid of large samples, often over a short period of time (see Hussey and Hussey, 1997);
and (3) panel data analysis, which helps to estimate more complicated models and to
achieve more flexibility in modeling the differences in behavior across individuals (Green,
2003). Cross-sectional distributions, which look relatively stable, hide a multitude of
changes and may not give a full explanation of results. On the other hand, time series studies
are often plagued with the problem of serial correlation in the error term. Also, modern time
series work particularly concerns with the stationarity, or otherwise, of the variables to be
included to avoid problems of spurious correlation. Time series analysis is also subject to
multi-collinearity and not controlling for individual heterogeneity, which may run the risk of
producing biased results. In addition, the sample data to be collected in this research has
short time intervals of five years, which is not appropriate to use time series analysis. Hence,
panel data analysis is likely an appropriate method to be used in this study.
A number of benefits from using panel data have been listed by Hsiao (1985),
Klevmarken (1989), Solon (1989) and Baltagi (1995). Firstly, it controls for individual
heterogeneity, which may cause biased results in time series and cross-sectional studies.
Secondly, panel data give more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among
the variables, more degree of freedom and more efficiency in comparison with time series
studies. Thirdly, it is better used in studying the dynamics of adjustment with observations
over a period of time, whilst, cross-sectional distributions hide a multitude of changes.
Fourthly, panel data are better able to identify and measure effects that are simply not
detectable in pure cross-section or pure time-series data. Finally, more complicated
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behavioral models are better-constructed and tested using panel data rather than purely
cross-sectional or time-series data.
Since the panel data analysis captures both the cross-sectional and the time-series
dimensions, the basic framework for discussion is a regression model of the following form:
Yil =PXii + z,a + Eil (5.1)
Where the firm number i =J,2, ...N and time period I = J,2.... T. There are K regressors in Xj"
not including a constant term. The heterogeneity or individual effect is Z; a where z, contains
a constant term and a set of individual or group specific variables, which may be observed or
unobserved, and all of which are taken to be constant over time I (Greene, 2003). As it
stands, this model is a classical regression model. If z, is observed for all individuals, or all
the regression coefficients are constant, then the entire model can be treated as an ordinary
linear model (or pooled model) and fit by least squares. However, this is unlikely to happen
in the panel data analysis where z, is unobserved for all individuals. The Pooled Ordinary
Least Squares Regression, then, will not take into account of serial correlation in the
disturbance term, which is resulting in inefficient and inconsistent estimates. Panel data
analysis offers alternative estimation methods: the Fixed Effects estimation and the Random
Effects estimation.
5.1.1 The FIxed Effects Model
The fixed effects model assumes that differences across units can be captured by
differences in the constant term, allowing the intercepts to vary across individuals rather than
over time. The heterogeneity, or individual effects, Zj in Equation 5.1 is unobserved but
correlated with XiI' The fixed effects model is formulated as:
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Yit = aj + fJXit + eit (5.2)
In the fixed effects model, the intercept (a;) is different across firms; the differences
may be due to special features of each company such as managerial style or managerial
philosophy (Gujarati, 2003). However, each individual intercept does not vary over time;
that is, it is time invariant. The slope coefficient (jJ) is assumed to be constant across
individuals or over time. The fixed effects estimator, then, uses a transformation to remove
the unobserved effect a; prior to estimation. To estimate the fixed effects (i.e. to allow for
the fixed effect intercept to vary between individuals), the dummy variabletechnique is used,
particularly the differential intercept dummies. Thus the fixed effectsmodel is also known as
the least-square dummy variable (LSDV) model, which is also a classical regression model.
(5.3)
(where: j=2,3,..,n; Dj i = 1 if the observation belongs to firm jth, 0 otherwise)
The fixed effects model assumes the intercept (aj) to change across units rather than
over time. To account for time effect, we can use the dummy variables (time dummies) just
as the one used to account for individual effect. However, the use of too many dummy
variables results in the degrees of freedom problems and the possibility of multicollinearity.
Moreover, the LSDV approach may not be able to identify the impact of time-invariant
variables included in the model. Also, the fixed effectsmodel assumes that the error term (UiI)
follows the classical assumptions U,,- N(O,d2) , which may not be applied in the model. To
deal with these problems, the random effectsmodelcan be used.
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5.1.2 The Random Effects Model
The random effects model is used when the heterogeneity, or individual effect, is
unobserved and assumed to be uncorrelated with the included variables. It assumes that the
individual specific terms (aJ are randomly distributed with a mean value of a (i.e. a, = a +
u.; where U; is a random error term with a mean value of zero and variance of a/) and is
formulated as:
Yit =PXit + a + u,+ Bil (5.4)
The usual assumptions of the Random Effects estimation are that individual error
components (i.e. u, & Bi') are not correlated with each other and are not autocorrelated across
both cross-section and time series units (Gujarati, 2003). When the random intercept of each
firm is uncorrelated with regressors (i.e. COV(XiI. Ui) = 0). the Random Effects model is
considered the appropriate estimation method and the Random Effects estimates will be
more efficient than those obtained by the Fixed Effects model. However, the condition of
independence between individual error component (Ui) and regressors (Xii) does not usually
hold. The random effects estimation. hence, makes stricter assumptions about the nature of
effects.
5.1.3 Model selection - Sargan Test
The challenge facing a researcher is: which model is better. the fixed effects or the
random effects model (Gujarati, 2003). The answer to this question hinges around the
assumption about the likely correlation between the individual error component (Ui) and the
regressors (Xii)' If u, and the Xit are uncorrelated, the Random Effects model may be
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appropriate; whereas if u, and the Xii are correlated, the Fixed Effects model may be
appropriate.
It is possible to test for the appropriateness of using the fixed effects estimation or
the random effects estimation. Baltagi (1995) confirmed that the Hausman' (1978)
specification test (hereafter, Hausman Test) can be used to decide between employing the
Fixed Effects model or the Random Effects model. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test
is that there is no correlation between the regressors and the firm effects (Ho: COV(Xih Ui) =0)
and the Random Effects can be assumed. The alternative hypothesis is HI: COV(XiI' Ui) '* 0
and the Random Effects cannot be assumed. Hence, if the Hausman test statistic is
significant, the Random Effects estimation is inconsistent and Fixed Effects estimation
should be used.
5.1.4 Dynamic Panel Data: Arellano-Bond GMM estimation
Panel data are well suited for examining dynamic effects (Baltagi, 1995; Greene,
2003). One way to allow for dynamic effects in panel data models is by the inclusion of a
lagged dependent variable (first differencing). However, it is well-known that the
introduction of the lagged dependent variable will generally mean that standard estimators
are biased and inconsistent (Greene, 2003). Specifically, biased and inconsistent estimates
result from the expected serial correlation between the error term and the lagged dependent
variable in the model.
(5.5)
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the model, in both the fixed and random
effects settings, leads to substantial complications in the estimation due to the correlation
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between the lagged dependent variables and the error term even if it is assumed that ei/ is not
itself autocorrelated (Greene, 2003). To deal with this problem, the general approach relies
on instrumental variables estimators and on a GMM estimator. In either the fixed or random
effects cases, the heterogeneity can be swept from the model by taking first differences,
which produces:
(Y,/ - Yu·JJ = P(Xi/ - XU-I) + Y(Yi,,-/ - Yu-.z} + (e, - ei,,-JJ (5.6)
However, the explanatory variable (Yi"./ - Yu-.z) in Equation 5.6 is still correlated with (8it - 8i,"
JJ. To get rid of that, Anderson and Hisao (1981) suggest using either ~ Y u . . = (YI,'-Z- YU.J) or
Yu-] as an instrument for (Yu-/ - Yu.]), which is not be correlated with ~ e i i = (eit - ei,'./) if the eit
is not serially correlated. This instrumental variable (IV) estimation method leads to
consistent but not necessarily efficient estimates of parameters in the model because it does
not make use of all the variable moment conditions and it does not take into account the
differenced structure on the residual disturbances (Baltagi, 1995).
Arellano and Bond (1991) improved the estimates of Anderson and Hisao (1981) to
achieve a more efficient estimation by using the orthogonality that exists between the lagged
dependent variable and the error term. Arellano-Bond (1991) argued that consistent
estimation could be attained by utilising the Generalised Method of Moments following
moment restriction when the number of the observation is large and the number of time
periods is small. The Arellano-Bond methodology starts with taking the first difference to
eliminate the individual effects as the Mil = (Bit - BI,,_/) is the first-order moving average. In
the next step, the values of the lagged dependent variables will be used as instruments. For
example, in Equation 5.6, as Yi,,-Z is highly correlated with (Yi,,-/ - YI".Z) but not correlated with
(ei' - 8,.1-/)' then it can be considered a valid instrument for (Yu-/ - Yu-z). In a similar vein, both
YI,I-J and Yu·z are valid instruments for (YI,'_/ - YI".Z). Overall, for the time period T, the valid
instruments are YlbYIZ, ...,YI.T-] (Baltagi, 1995).
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Arellano and Bond (1991) propose testing for the second-order serial correlation
based on residuals from the first difference equation. Hence, the Arellano-Bond GMM
estimates will be consistent in the absence of second-order serial correlation in the error term
of the first difference model. In the test of autocorrelation (AR), the first-order
autocorrelation is expected (i.e. ARI test statistic should always be significant) due to the
fact that Arellano-Bond GMM regression runs on first differences. The second-order
Arellano-Bond test statistic AR(2) is used to test the autocorrelation in the models. If the
Arellano-Bond test statistic is insignificant, there is no autocorrelation in the regression
models and thus the estimates are unbiased. Arellano and Bond (1991) also suggest that in
the absence of the serial correlation of the error term, the estimates of the OLS and GMM of
the first differenced model would be consistent. Furthermore, the Sargan's (1958) test of
over-identifying restrictions is used to test for the validity of the GMM estimator.
5.1.5 Implications ofPanel Data Analysis
Following the above discussion, the panel data analysis technique will be used to
estimate the determinants of executive pay components and structure of executive pay in
Chapter 6 as well as to test the predictions of tournament theory in the context of executive
compensation in Chapter 7. The proposed models of executive pay determination are firstly
estimated using the fixed effects estimation. Second, the random effects estimator is used to
estimate the proposed models. To decide between the fixed and random effects models, the
Hausman test will be performed. The significant value of the Hausman test statistic
establishes that the random effects estimator is inconsistent and the fixed effects estimator
should be used. The results of the empirical analysis will present only the consistent
estimation method (the fixed or random effects estimator) along with the results of Hausman
test statistics.
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To further account for the dynamic effects in the proposed models, the Arellano-
Bond GMM estimator is used. The empirical results of the Arellano-Bond GMM estimates
will be reported if there is no second-order autocorrelation suggested by the Arellano-Bond
order two test statistics and the instruments are valid suggested by the Sargan test statistics.
The proposed models examining the predictions of tournament theory in the context
of executive compensation are also tested using the fixed and random effects estimators. The
Hausman test will decide which models are used.
5.2 Sample selection
The sample was selected from the UK firms quoted on the Official list of the
London Stock Exchange comprising the FTSE-350 index for the period 2001 to 2005. The
choice of the FTSE-350 companies is because the agency problems are likely to be most
severe in large firms, which are subject of corporate governance reforms. FTSE-3s0
companies are also representative of the UK capital market accounting for more than 90
percent of market valuation. Time period is collected from 2001 to 2005 due to the
availability of data. According to the Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations (2002), it
is mandatory that a listed company publishes a detailed remuneration report as part of their
annual reports on or after 31sl December 2002. Because of the requirement to disclose
comparative information, companies' annual reports also present data on executive
remuneration for the financial year 2001.
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The list of companies comprising FTSE-350 index is taken from the London Stock
Exchange website on 31 October 2006. In order to be included in the sample, the firms had
to be quoted on the Official list for at least a year before the date of their financial year end
for 2001. This condition was imposed in order to ensure that corporate governance,
executive pay and firm performance were not affected as a result of a new listing. Also, only
those firms listed on the Official list of the London Stock Exchange for full five-year period
from 1999 to 2003 are selected to ensure balanced and consistent data. Moreover, the sample
excluded those firms operating in the financial sector (i.e. banks, investment companies,
insurance and life assurance companies and investment trusts), and real estate sector. This is
deemed necessary because these firms are, in general, subject to different set of regulatory
accounting and taxation considerations. Given the above issues, the whole population for the
data in this study was reduced from 350 to 185 firms across 9 industries.
Due to the labour-intensive nature of optionsILTIPs valuation, which limits the
length of the panel, the sample of 50 firms was then selected randomly from these 185 firms
over the five-year period from 200 I to 2005. This results in a balanced sample of total 250
firm-year observations for firm-level variables (i.e. firm performance, governance variables.
and control variables). For each company in each year from 2001 to 2005, the remuneration
data are collected for all executive members of the board of directors. This results in an
unbalanced sample of 345 executive directors with up to five years from 2001 to 2005. The
total executive-year observations of this sample are 1,137 consisting of comprehensive data
on executives' remuneration and individual variables.
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Table 5-1: Distribution offirms by industry classification
%0/
%0/ total
No. Industry population FTSE 350 Sample Coverage sample
I Oil & Gas 6% II 4 36% 8%
2 Basic Materials 7% 12 3 25% 6%
3 Industrials 31% 58 14 24% 28%
4 Consumer Goods 16% 30 8 27% 16%
5 Health Care 3% 5 I 20% 2%
6 Consumer Services 27% 50 15 30% 30%
7 Telecommunications 2% 3 2 67% 4%
8 Utilities 5% 10 I 10% 2%
9 Technology 3% 6 2 33% 4%
Total 100% 185 50 27% 100%
Financials (omitted) 102
Companies listed after 2000 63
Total FTSE-350 350
All the data on executive remuneration, corporate governance variables and
executives' individual variables are collected manually from companies' annual reports.
Companies' annual reports are a common resource tool when examining executive
compensation and corporate governance details, which are cheaply accessible and open to
public scrutiny (Main and Johnston, 1993). Companies' annual reports are also reliable and
popular sources of compensation data due to the low response rates from compensation
departments of large public companies (Eskew and Watson, 1998). Particularly, the
Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations (2002) required quoted companies to prepare a
Director Remuneration Report, which complies with the Regulations, for each financial year
containing detail information on the remuneration for each executive directors, some of
which required to be audited. Hence, the compensation data collected from companies'
annual reports are quite sufficient and reliable for the analysis. The information on corporate
performance is collected from Datastream.
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5.3 Measurement ofvariables
This section provides somejustification for adoptingparticularvariables to be used
in the empirical analysis in subsequent analysis chapters and the measurement of these
variables.
5.4.1 Executive Compensation Measures
Executive compensation is normally comprised of basic salary, annual bonuses and
long-term incentives (including share options and LTIPs). In this analysis, the variables of
interest are (1) cash compensation, which is the sum of salary, annual bonuses and other
benefits in kinds; (2) long-term incentive pay, which includes share options and LTIPs; and
(3) total compensation, which is sumof cash compensation and long-term incentive pay.The
variables of long-term incentive pay and total executive pay are measured both at cost to
company and their value to executive directors. The measurement of these variables is
discussed as follows.
• Cash Compensation
Cash compensation includes salary, annual bonuses and other benefits in kind.
Salary and other benefits in kind are those payments made to executive directors that
reported in the annual reports. As salary is relatively 'fixed component' in the employment
contracts, salary for an executive in their first or last year at the firm will be measured by
his/her annual salary. Annual bonuses figure refers to the short-term aspects of bonus pay
and reflects actual bonus payment reported in the annual reports. Due to skewness in the
distribution ofexecutive cash pay, the natural logarithm of executive cash pay is used in this
analysis.
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• Long-term Incentive Pay
Long-term incentive pay to an executive director is normally in forms of share
options, LTIPs, or both share options and LTIPs. The valuation of long-term incentives,
hence, includes the valuation of share options and the valuation of LTIPs. Buck et al (2003)
proposed a multi-period valuation method, which values an LTIP or option scheme,
normally with standard three-year plan duration, equal to one third of the provisional final
value of award assuming current performance maintained. In this study, however, long-term
incentives in one year is deemed the incentives (share options and/or LTIPs) granted in that
particular year. The first reason is that both cost of incentives to company and value of
incentives to executive-recipients are calculated; and the cost of incentive pay has immediate
effect on shareholders, which deteriorate diluted earnings, not spreading out in there-year
period. Second, the availability of data prevents the application of multi-period method. The
remuneration data prior to 2001 are not available in detail from companies' annual reports as
they are not required to do so. The third reason is due to the fact that most companies did try
to grant their executives long-term incentive awards annually. In this study's sample of 345
executives from 50 companies, there are only 38 executives (11%) fail to receive long-term
incentive in subsequent years 9 following the introduction of the plans. Hence, it is not
unreasonable assumption that the amount of long-term incentives granted in the financial
year is representative for the cost and value of incentive pay in that year.
Following the discussion in Chapter 3, the cost of executive share options to
company is measured by the Black-Scholes formula (Murphy, 1999). The standard formula
as reminded from Chapter 3 is as follow.
9 Thisexcludes executives wholeave the company in the yearof the plans andarenoteligible to
receive the awards.
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where P is the grant-date share price, X is the exercise price, T is the time remaining until
expiration, d is the annualized dividend yield, a is the stock-price volatility, r is the risk-free
discount rate, NO is the cumulative normal distribution function, and z is calculated as
follows.
In(Pj X) + [lnO + r) -In(1 + d) + 02/2J:r
%. - - - - - - - r = - - - - - - - ~ ~
- (TVi
The detail information on number of options granted, exercise price, grant date, expiry date
are collected from companies' annual reports. Grant-date share price is collected from
Datastream. Risk free rate for 5 years from 2001 to 2005 is five-year nominal yield from
British Governance Securities disclosed by the Bank of England. Stock volatility is
calculated from historical share price of the company. The average stock volatility of the
sampled companies in five years from 2001 to 2005 is 33.6%, which is approaching with the
stock volatility of 31.8% for US companies reported by Hall and Murphy (2002). Dividend
yield is calculated as the dividend per share in the year divided by year-end share price of
the company. The Black-Scholes' valuation of the share options is then calculated using
macro-embedded excel sheet created by Hall and Murphy (2002). The cost to company of
share options granted to an executive in one year is calculated as the number of options
granted multiplies by the value of one options generated by the Black-Scholes formula.
The value of share options to risk-averse and undiversified executive-recipients,
however, is much lower than the Black-Scholes' valuation of share options (Hall and
Murphy, 2000; Murphy, 1999). To estimate the value of a non-tradable option to an
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undiversified risk-averse executive, Hall & Murphy (2000) have proposed additional inputs
to Black-Scholes formula including company's beta value, market risk premium, executive's
wealth, percentage of executive's wealth held in company's stock and executives' risk
aversion score. However, it is practically difficult to collect data on executive's wealth,
percentage of wealth held in company's stock and the degree of risk aversion for each
executive as suggested by Hall and Murphy for the modified Black-Scholes valuation. In
addition, most executive share options in the UK are granted subject to performance
conditions, which subsequently reduce the value of share options granted. Accordingly, this
analysis values a non-tradable option to an undiversified risk-averse executive as its cost to
company (i.e. the valuation amount estimated by Black-Scholes formula) multiplying by the
percentage of options to be vested subject to performance hurdles. The vesting percentage of
options is normally disclosed in companies' annual reports in subsequent years (mostly three
years after the granting year). Hence the actual vesting percentage of executive share options
granted from 2001 to 2005 is collected from companies' annual reports in 2003 to 2008 (if
available). For companies that do not disclose the information on vesting of prior year
executive share options; the vesting percentage is estimated according to the performance
criteria specified in the plan.
Long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) are grants of cash or shares (usually the latter)
that become 'vested' only upon attainment of certain performance conditions. The cost of
LTIPs to company is measured as the face value of shares granted (i.e. number of shares
granted under LTIPs multiplies by the share price on grant date). This measure assumes that
all performance conditions will be met and the entire shares under LTIPs will be vested in
the future. In most case, this will be the maximum measurement of LTIPs. This is not an
unreasonable assumption from the point of view of shareholders and companies, who have
to provide provisions for these contingent payments. The cost to shareholders also includes
deterioration of diluted earnings (especially diluted EPS).
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The value of an LTIP scheme to executive directors is estimated by evaluating
performance conditions attached to the plan. For any particular year, the valuation of an
LTIP scheme is calculated as follow. First, the performance of the company for the scheme's
period is measured, using the performance criteria specified in the scheme, from subsequent
years' annual reports (normally three years from the beginning of the granting year). For
example, an LTIP scheme granted in the financial year 2001 generally has three-year
performance period starting from the beginning of the accounting year 2001 to the end of the
accounting year 2003. Hence, company's performance for the scheme's period can be
collected from company's annual report 2003. Similarly, performance conditions for the
plan granted in 2005 are measured and can be calculated from company's annual report
2007. Second, the performance measures are compared with the performance of companies
in the comparator group as defined by the plan. This comparison generates an actual level of
vesting for the specified LTIP plan. This valuation is generally similar to the method used by
Buck et al (2003), who also compare performance measures with those of companies in the
comparator group to generate a provisional level and value of award (based on year-end
share price). In this study, however, the valuation of an LTIP plan is estimated using the
share price on the grant date. Specifically, the cost of an LTIP plan is equal to the number of
share granted multiplying by the calculated vesting level and the share price on the date of
grant. It is not unreasonable to use the grant date share price rather than later years' share
price because it represents current cost of award.
With the effect of the Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations (2002), most
companies publish a detail remuneration report (attached to the annual report) with a
comparison of company's performance with that of the comparator group for the last five
years. In addition, many companies also report the level of vesting of previous executive
LTIP plans that due in that financial year. This provides great assistance to evaluate
performance conditions and estimate actual vesting level of LTIP plans. For those
companies and years that reported vesting level is available, the value of an LTIP plan to
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executives is simply calculated as production of number of shares granted, grant date share
price, and reported vesting level without further calculation of performance measure and
comparison with that of the comparator group.
In sum, the cost of long-term incentive pay to company is calculated as sum of cost
of options (which is estimated using Black-Scholes formula) and the cost of LTIPs (nominal
value of LTIPs at the grant date). The value of long-term incentive pay to executives is sum
of value of options and value of LTIPs, which is estimated by measuring performance
conditions specified in the plans, using subsequent years' performance information. The
value of LTIPs is calculated as the number of shares granted under the plan multiples by the
share price at the grant date and multiplies by the vesting percentage estimated/reported for
the LTIP plans. Again, due to skewness in the distribution of incentive pay, the natural
logarithm of incentive pay (both cost and value of incentive pay) is used in this analysis.
• Total Executive Compensation
Total executive pay is simply the sum of cash pay and long-term incentive pay. As
there are two measures of incentive pay (i.e. cost of incentive pay to company and value of
incentive pay to executive), total pay is also measured in cost of total pay to company and
value of total pay to executive. The natural logarithm of total executive pay is used to
control for the skewness in the distribution of executive pay.
• Pay Gap
Pay gap is described as the difference in pay between CEO and other executives in
the board of directors. In this analysis, pay gap is measured as the log ofCEO pay minus the
log of average pay received by non-CEO executive team. This procedure is consistent with
O'Reilly et al (1988), Main et al (1993), Eriksson (1999), and Conyon et al (2001). As there
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are three different components of executive pay (i.e. cash pay, long-term incentive pay, and
total pay), which is measured in both cost to company and value to executive; pay gap is also
measured in five different ways.
CPGAP = log (CEO cash pay) - log (average of other executives' cash pay)
ICPGAP = 10g(CEO incentive cost pay) -Iog(average of other executives' incentive cost pay)
IPVGAP =10g(CEO incentive pay value) -log(average of other executives' incentive pay value)
TCPGAP =10g(CEOtotal cost pay) -Iog(average of other executives' total cost pay)
TPVGAP =10g(CEOtotal pay value) -Iog(average of other executives' total pay value)
• Average Executive Pay
Average pay is the average of total pay received by the executive team (i.e. all
executive members in the board of directors). This measure is used to examine the
relationship between executive pay and pay dispersion or firm performance as suggested by
tournament theory. This measure is in line with Main et al (1993) and Eriksson (1999). Due
to skewness of distribution, the variable is measured in natural logarithm form.
• Pay dispersion
Pay dispersion is constructed as the coefficient of variation of total pay for the
executive team. The coefficient of variation is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation
(0') to the mean (JJ) of compensation of executive team (i.e. all executives in the
board of directors including the CEO).
(J'
c,; = -
J.t
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5.4.2 Measurement of performance variables
• Total Shareholder Return (TSR)
Shareholder returns is a market measure of firm performance that is defined as the
total returns per common share. The returns per ordinary share include dividends per share
(which is sum of interim dividend and final dividend) and share price appreciation gained
during the financial year.
where PI is share price at the end of the financial year; Po is share price at the beginning of
the financial year; DPS is dividend per share (which includes both interim dividend per share
and final dividend per share). TSR is a primary benchmark for shareholders and investors to
assess firm performance. It is a relative performance that can be used to compare the
performance of different companies and over time. The information on share price and
dividend per share are collected from Datastream.
• Tobin's Q
Tobin's Q is another market measure of firm performance developed by Tobin
(1969). It is a ratio of the market value a listed company's stocks to the value of company's
equity book value. Previous studies, however, show different ways in measuring Tobin's Q
ratio, which are summarized in the Table 2 below.
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Table 5-2: Different measurements of Tobin 's Q ratio
Authors (year) Definition of Tobin's Q
Yermack (1996) Tobin's Q = Market value of assets
Replacement cost of assets
Short & Keasey (1999) Using Valuation Ratio (VAL) as a UK approximation to
Tobin's Q ratio.
VAL = Market value of e q q i t t at the accounting year-end
Book value of equity at the acco unting year-end
Carter et al (2003) Tobin's Q is calculated using method suggested by Chung &
Pruitt (1994)6, which is as follow:
Approximate Q - MVE + PS + DEBT
- TA
Where:
- MVE : is the product of a firm's share price and the
number of common stock shares outstanding
- PS: is the liquidating value of the firm's outstanding
preferred stock
- DEBT: is the value of firm's short-term liabilitie net of
its short-term assets, plus the book value of firm's long-
term debts
- TA: is the book value of the total assets of the firm
As there are important differences between the U and UK governance systems
(Short & Keasey, 1999), the measurement of Tobin's Q, which is generally measured by the
market value to book value of equity ratio, is also expectedly different. As this study is
doing empirical analysis using data from UK listed firms; a Tobin's Q follow UK
approximation is better measurement. The definition of Tobin's Q ratio u ed in this study i
as follow:
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T b' , Q - Market value of equity at the accounting year-endo ms - B k value of itv at th . d00 0 equity t t e accountmg year-en
More specifically, it can be measured using the following accounting information, which is
extracted from Datasteam.
T b' 'Q MVE+DEBTo ms =------
TA-CL
Where: - MVE is the market value of equity (i.e. market capitalisation)
DEBT is the value of long-term debts, (i.e, total loan capital repayable
after l-year), It includes debentures, bonds, convertibles, and 'debt
like' hybrid financial instruments
TA is total assets
CL is total current liabilities, which includes current provisions, trade
and other creditors, borrowings repayable within I-year and any other
current liabilities, Trade accounts payable after I-year are also included
10 SeeChung & Pruitt (1994), A simple approximation of Tobin's Q, Financial Management, 23,70-
74
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• Earnings Per Share (EPS)
Earnings per share are the earnings after tax in one financial year distributed to one
ordinary share. EPS is measured as the ratio of total earnings after tax but before dividends
to the weighted average of ordinary shares in the financial year. EPS is extracted from
Datastream.
. Net IncomeEarnings per share=-------------
Weighted Average Common Shares
• Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)
Return on capital employed is a measure of the returns that a company is realizing
from its capital employed. It is commonly used as a measure for comparing the performance
between businesses and for assessing whether a business generates enough returns to payfor
itscost of capital.
ROCE = Earnings before interests and taxes
Total Capital Employed + Short-term borrowing - Intangible assets
5.4.3 Measurement ofgovernance variables and control variables
• Board size
The size of the board is measured as the number of directors present on the board at
the end of the accounting year. The members of the board of directors are extracted from
companies' annual reports. Previous studies use different proxies for board size variable.
While Yermack (1996) uses natural logarithm of the size of the board; Eisenberg et a/
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(1998) uses log log transformation of board size to make the distribution of the board size
variable more symmetric. Recent studies by Singh & Davidson (2003) and Erhardt et al
(2003) use the number of board members as proxy for board size. In this study, to ensure a
symmetric distribution of variable, a natural logarithm of board size is used to proxy for this
variable.
• Percentage of non-executive directors
Percentage of non-executive directors is defined as the ratio of the number of non-
executive directors to the total members of the board. This measure is consistent with
previous studies (Coles et al, 2001 and Singh & Davidson, 2003). The role of non-executive
directors in the corporate governance debate is emphasized by the Cadbury Committee
(1992) and the Higgs Report (2002). Information on the number of executive and non-
executive directors was extracted from companies' annual reports. The companies'
description of the status of the director was used to distinguish between executive and non-
executive directors.
• Institutional shareholdings
Institutional shareholdings are defined as the total percentage holdingof institutional
shareholders owning 3% or more shares in the company. Institutional ownership data are
extracted from the annual reports of the samplecompanies from the years 2001 to 200S. The
available data on ownership interests contained in the annual report is determined by the
Companies Act 1985 that details of external interests which amounted to 3% or more of
issued ordinaryshare capital were required to be disclosed.
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• Executive ownership
Executive ownership is measured as the percentage of equity shares owned by
executive directors at the accounting year end. Hence, this variable has the range from 0 to
100 percent. This definition of executive ownership is consistent with that of Morek et al
(1988) and Short & Keasey (1999). These shareholdings include both beneficial and non-
beneficial shares held by directors at the end of the accounting year. The information on
executive ownership is also extracted from company's annual report.
• Executive Tenure
Executive tenure is measured by the number of years an individual had been on the
current executive position. This measure is consistent with that used by Hill and Phan
(1991). The information on executive tenure is collected from company's annual report. In
the annual report, only the number of years an executive stays on their current position is
considered as executive tenure, not number of years working for the company or number of
year staying on the board of directors.
• Executive Age
Executive age is another proxy for experiences of executive directors. It is measured
by the number of years of executive age that is reported in the company's annual report. This
measure is consistent with Hill and Phan (1991), who identify that executive age is one of
important human capital proxies for explaining executive compensation.
• Firm size
There is a considerable consensus among previous research regarding the
measurement of size. Among those, total sales and total assets are two dominant measures of
firm size. Other measures of firm size include market valuation, number of employees,
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capital employed, etc. This study employs natural logarithm of market valuation as the
measure of firm size. This is due to the fact that companies are included in the FTSE-350
index (this study's data sources) based on their market valuation. The information on market
valuation is extracted from Datastream.
5.4 Descriptive Analyses
5.4.1 Analysis ofExecutive Pay
Summary statistics for the remuneration variables of executive directors of the
sample companies are presented in Table 5-3. All variables in Table 5-3 are shown as
averages over the five-year period 2001-2005. Key observations from this table are
presented below. Across the sample period, the mean salary is £346,680 and the mean bonus
is £231,860, which makes total cash-compensation is average of £635,030 a year. The total
compensation of executive directors is average at £952,680 a year, including the vested
amount of options and LTIPs (the optionslLTIPs to be received by executives after
accounting for performance conditions). The comparative information can be referred to
Buck, Bruce et al (2003), who did report an average executive pay of £532,58611 (total
rewards include detailed LTIP valuations) in the year 1997-1998, based on observations of
1,602executive directors in 287 non-financial FTSE-350companies. This shows an increase
of 80% in remuneration for executive directors in a short time period. Conyon et al (2001)
also report an average total compensation of £555,03012 for 532 executive directors in 100
companies drawn from the 150 largest UK stock market companies in 1997-1998. However,
Conyon et al (2001) estimate the value of LTIPs by simply discounting the maximum value
by 20% to reflect contingent performanceconditions.
II Buck et al (2003) actuaJlt rep,0rted mean of Ln(total rewards) = 13.1855, it canbe worked outthat
'totalrewards' is equal to e 3.\8 '= 532,586 (£)
12 Conyon et al (2001) report mean total compensation for 100 CEOs is 828,571 and other 432
executives are £561,567 (fordivisional CEOs) and £421,771 (for other executive directors). Assume
equal number of divisional CEOs and other executives, this works out an average total pay of 532
executives is£555,030.
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Table 5-3: Summary Statistics ofExecutive Compensation
Variables Mean Median SD Min MlL"(
Salary (£'000) 364 .68 3 13.68 20 1.12 62.00 1,728 .00
Bonus (£ '000) 23 1.86 11 7.00 358.15 0.00 5,783.00
Benefit (£'000) 38.45 18.12 86.82 0.00 1,411.00
Cash Pay (£'000) 635 .03 476 .00 534.04 78.00 6,883.00
Cost of Opt ions (£ '000) 233.73 66.85 739.9 1 0.00 11 ,300.00
Cost of LTIPs (£'000) 340.71 147.50 961.0 2 0.00 23,800.00
Cost of Incentives (£' 000) 574.44 262.83 1,337.27 0.00 23,75 9.14
Total Pay at Cost 1,209.47 749 .27 1,743.40 78 .00 26, 178. 14
%Incentives-Cost/Total Pay at 32.4% 35. 1% 22.5% 0.0% 91.9%Cost
Options Value (£'000) 166.07 0.00 492.16 0.00 7, 130.89
LTIPs Value (£'000) 163.00 0.00 416 .24 0.00 7,599.7 1
Incent ive Pay Value (£'000) 329.07 122.81 743.17 0.00 10,229.21
Total Pay Value (£'000) 952.68 633.10 1,168 .27 78.00 17,[ [2.21
% [ncentive value/Total Pay 22.5% 22.2% 20.5% 0.0% 90.4%
value
% Value to executives/Cost to
company
- For Options 79.9% 100.0% 37.9% 0.0% 100.0%
- For LTIPs 54.1% 53.9% 38.4% 0.0% 100.0%
Tota l Incentiv es 65.4% 76.7% 36.2% 0.0% 100.0%
Total executiv e pay 87.5% 100.0% 16.9% 8.1% 100.0%
The median total compensation value of the sample executives, however, is much
lower at £633,100 (compared to mean of £952,680) a year \ ith a minimum value of £78,000
to a maximum of over £17 millions. The median cash pay is also lower at £476,000
(compared to the mean of £635,030). In addition, the standard deviation is very high
compare to the mean value of pay. The coefficient of variation of total pay value is 1.23 (i.e.
equal to £1,168,2701£952,680), cash pay is 0.84 (i.e. £534 ,0401£635,030) and incentive pay
value is 2.26 (i.e. £743,170/329,070). This results show that there is great variation in
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executive compensation, especially in the value of incentive pay component. Because of this
skewness in the distribution, the measures of executive pay are in the natural logarithm
forms.
Table 5-3 also indicates that the company's cost of granting compensation is much
higher than the actual value to the executive-recipients. The average incentive pay value is
£329,070 compared to its cost of £574,440 to company; while the averagetotal pay value is
£952,680 in comparison to its cost of £1,209,470 to company. Summary statistics on the
ratio of pay value to cost of pay suggest that the value of incentive pay to executive is about
65.4% of its cost to company, while the value/cost ratio of total pay is higher at 87.5%13. In
term of incentive pay, the value of options is about 80% of its cost to company, while the
value of LTIPs is about 54%of its cost to company. The difference between valueof options
and LTIPs is due to the fact that the cost of optionshas already been estimated using Black-
Scholes formula and its value is only accounting for the performance conditions attached to
the option plan; whilst the cost of LTIPs is the maximum cost of shares granted at the grant
date. The ratio of LTIPs' value to executive over their cost to company (54%) is much
higher than the simple estimation made by Conyon and Murphy (2000) and Conyon et al
(200I) that the valueof LTIPs is only about 20%of their facevalue.
The ratio of long-term incentive pay over total executive pay is average 22.5% in
value to executive and 32.4% in cost to company. In comparison with Conyonand Murphy's
(2000) survey on CEO total compensation in fiscal year 1997, where long-term incentive
pay accounted for 19% of total executive pay, this result shows a slightly change in the
composition of compensation package for executive directors. Hence, although companies
13Note that mean percentage of pay value over cost of pay cannot becalculated simply bydividing
the mean of pay value to the mean of cost pay to calculate the percentage. The nature ofdistribution is
such that, in effect, the ratio of pay value over cost pay for each executive in the sample has to be
calculated and then summed to find the mean ratio for thesample. This figure will not necessarily be
same as simply using the sample means asthe basis ofthecalculation.
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are granting higher proportion of incentive pay to ali gn ex ecutives ' interests with those of
shareho lde rs; the composition of compensation package does not really change from the
executives' perspective.
Table 5-4: Exec utive remuneration by year (Not adjusted/ or Inflation)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Change
Salary (£' 000) 320.86 338.98 358.39 378.98 408 .72 27%
/98.25 / 84.69 / 90.98 / 87.54 /96.38
Bonus (£'000) 202.55 176.20 213.86 262.67 288.96 43%
497.09 260.2/ 283.35 3/1.65 324.85
Cash Pay (£'OOO) 556.36 542.31 610.20 681.22 749.22 35%
650.45 4/0.3/ 460./8 496.// 506.4 7
Cost of Options (£'000) 307.4 1 275.18 232.93 162.04 135.70 -56%
/ .08 7.78 897.3/ 555.84 354.60 263.99
Cost of LTIPs (£'000) 230.79 215.44 250.78 444 .29 456 .68 98%
553./5 386.46 376./6 /.639./3 733.24
Cost of Incentives (£'000) 538.20 490 .62 483 .71 606.33 592.38 10%
/ ,502.38 / .083./6 857. /1 / . 7/3 .22 8/ 7.55
Total Pay at Cost 1,094.56 1,032.93 1,093.91 1,287 .55 1,341.61 23%
2,066.76 / ,396.48 / ,2//.93 2.0/4.26 / ,226.96
%Incentive-Costffotal
Pay at Cost (*) 30.1% 30.3% 32.7% 33.6% 35.6% 18%
24.2% 23.3% 22.2% 2/.9% 20.0%
Options Value (£'000) 182.72 179.94 200.44 149.72 108.95 -40%
587.42 595.05 546.85 342.06 250.0/
LTIPs Value (£'000) 137.70 133.97 130.35 22 1.08 200.13 45%
502.87 278.79 257.70 600.20 309.40
Incentives Value (£'000) 320.42 313.9 1 330.78 370.80 309.08 -4%
95/.92 734.45 738.42 726.66 42/ .03
Total Pay Value (£'000) 876.78 856.22 940.98 1,052.02 1,058.31 2 1%
/ ,537.29 /.063.29 / ,097.84 / ./28.37 822.9/
%Incentives Value/Total
Pay Value (*) 20.1% 22.0% 22.1% 25.2% 23.7% 18%
20.5% 2/ .7% 2/ .2% /9 .7% /8.9%
Value/Cost of options 83.1% 75.9% 80.3% 87.5% 70.9%
Value/Cost of LTIPs 48.9% 59.4% 46.9% 57.6% 57.0%
Value/Cost of Incentives 65.7% 65.8% 63.7% 69.8% 61.9%
Value/Cost of Total Pay 87.6% 88.9% 86.9% 88.6% 85.3%
Observation s 249 229 232 223 204
(, ote: Standard deviation in the italic)
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Table 5-4 provides further information on the remuneration package of executive
directors by years from 2001 to 2005. Total pay value to executives has increased 21% in
five years from 2001 to 2005, while the cost of pay to company has also been up by 23%.
This percentage change is in line with the increase in salary, which is at 27% in five years.
While annual bonuses increase at double rate (43% in five years), the value of long-term
incentive pay is slightly lower in 2005 comparing to that in 2001. From this result, it is likely
that the proportion of long-term incentives in total pay will decrease. However, the ratio of
long-term incentives over total pay is in the upward trend with 18% in five years for both
cost of incentives and incentives' value. This is due to the fact that the variation ofexecutive
pay has decreased dramatically. Specifically, the coefficient of variation of total pay value
drop from 1.75 in 2001 to 0.78 in 2005; while the coefficient of variation of cash pay and
incentive pay value are from 1.17 to 0.67 and from 2.97 to 1.36, respectively. This indicates
that there is a big improvement in variation of executive pay between the sampled
companies from 2001 to 2005.
Also worthy of noting from Table 5-4 is the growth of LTIPs and the decline of
options as the choice to grant long-term incentives to executive directors of the sample
companies between 2001 and 2005. The amount ofLTIPs granted by companies has nearly
doubled between 2005 and 2001; while executives received 45% more of LTIPs in 2005
compared to 2001. On the other hand, the value of options has declined 40% in five-year
time and the cost of options was down 56%. The result suggests that companies are
following recommendations made by the Cadbury Committee and the Greenbury Committee
to apply more 'challenge performance conditions' in granting incentives to executive
directors. This illustrates the effect of recent governance reforms in changing companies'
remuneration process, which tie executive remuneration more closely with performance of
the firm. Although there is a significant change in growth of LTIPs and decline of options,
total incentives are unchanged (controlled for inflation in Table 5-5) suggesting that LTIPs
are substitutes, rather than complements, to share options as incentives to executives.
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By controlling for inflation, Table 5-5 presents the real-term compensation for
executives of sample companies in 5 years from 2001 to 2005 . Total pay value in real-term
increases on ly 9% in five-year time from 200 1 to 2005. T he correlation matrix between pay
variables are presented in Table 5-6.
Table 5-5: Executive remun eration by year (Adjustedfor Inflation)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Change
Salary (£ '000) 320.86 333.40 342.58 351.78 368.91 15%
/98.25 /8/ .66 /82.55 /74.08 / 77.25
Bonus (£'000) 202.55 173.30 204.43 243.82 260.82 29%
49 7.09 255.93 270.85 289.28 293.2/
Cash Pay (£'000) 556.36 533.38 583.28 632.33 676.25 22%
650.45 403.56 439.87 460.50 457./4
Cost of Options (£'000) 307.41 270.65 222.65 150.41 122.48 -60%
/ ,08 7.78 882.54 53/ .32 329./4 238.28
Cost of LTIPs (£'000) 230.79 211.89 239.72 412.40 412.20 79%
553./5 380./0 359.57 /,52/.48 66/.83
Cost of Incentives (£'000) 538.20 482 .55 462.37 562.81 534.69 -1%
/ ,502.38 / ,065.33 8/9.29 1,590.26 737.92
Total Pay at Cost 1,094.56 1,0 15.93 1,045.64 1,195.14 1,210.94 11%
2,066.76 / ,3 73.50 / ,/58.45 /,869.69 t. /0 7.46
%Incentive-Cost/Total 30.1% 30.3% 32.7% 33.6% 35.6% 18%
Pay at Cost(*)
Options Value (£'000) 182.72 176.98 191.59 138.98 98.34 -46%
587.42 585.25 522.72 317.5/ 225.66
LTIPs Value (£'000) 137.70 131.77 124.59 205.21 180.64 3 1%
502.8 7 274.20 246.33 557./3 279.27
Incentives Value (£'000) 320.42 308.75 316.19 344.18 278.98 - 13%
95/.92 722.36 705.84 674.5/ 380.02
Total Pay Value (£'000) 876.78 842.13 899.46 976.51 955.23 9%
/,537.29 /,045. 78 / ,049.39 / ,04 7.3 742.76
%Incentives Value/Total
Pay Value (*) 20.1% 22.0% 22.1% 25.2% 23.7% 18%
20.5% 2/.7% 2/.2% /9.7% /8.9%
Observations 249 229 232 223 204
(Note: Standard deviation in the italic)
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Table 5-6: Correlation Matrix between Compensation Variables
LnCash Lnlnct Lnctpay Lnlnctv Lntpayv PctInctc PctInctv
LnCash 1.0000
LnInct 0.6527 1.0000
(0.0000)
Lnctpay 0.8878 0.9110 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
LnInctv 0.6530 0.9064 0.8575 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Lntpayv 0.9175 0.7971 0.9546 0.8821 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
PctInctc 0.2424 0.8251 0.6456 0.7187 0.5069 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
PctInctv 0.2282 0.5404 0.5298 0.8169 0.5872 0.7579 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Notes: p-value in parentheses
5.4.2 Analysis of governance variables and firm performance
Table 5-7 reports the summary statistics of governance variables and performance
variables. The average shareholder return of the sampled companies is 14.1 % per year.
Although this return is lower than that reported by Buck et al (2003) at 21.9% for the
accounting year 1997; it is higher than the average market return for the period 2001-2005,
which is about 10% per year. The average share ownership of an executive director is 0.72%
total ordinary shares of the company. With the average of 4.75 members in the e ecuti e
team, the shareholdings of the executive team reach a significant level of 3.4% total hares
and executive team becomes a substantial shareholder. Average tenure of e. ecutive director
is 5.22 years, The board of directors is average of 10.87 member with 56.3% are non-
executive directors. The number of board member is lower than Conyon and Peck' s (1998)
study, which reported average board member of 12.52 for 94 FT E-I00 companies from
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1991 to 1994. Recent study by Brammer et al (2007), however, reported the size of the board
is only 8.8 members for 543 companies listed on the FTSE All-Share Index in 2002. The
difference might come from different data set where FTSE-100 companies tend to have
bigger board than FTSE 350's and FTSE All-Share' s ones. In term of the proportion of non-
executive directors on the board, the data are consistent with Brammer' s et al (2007) study,
which reported 55% of non-executive directors in the board in 2002. This proportion,
however, is higher than 47% board members being non-executives reported by Conyon and
Peck's (1998) research. This result suggests an improvement in boardroom governance with
majority of the board are non-executive directors, which is consistent with recommendations
advanced by advocates for corporate governance reform, such as the Cardbury (1992) and
the Greenbury (1995) Committees.
Table 5- 7: Summary statistics ofperformance variables ami governance variables
Variables Mean Median SD Min Max
Shareholder Return (%) 14.1 % 14.7% 38.4% -86.6% 186.3%
Tobin's Q 2.26 1.70 2.58 0.60 26.90
ROCE (%) 1.0% 18.4% 156.6% -1089% 674.7%
EPS (p) 21.01 15.2 43.57 -280.4 210.8
Executive Ownership (%) 0.72% 0.01 % 4.98% 0.00% 59.48%
Age (years) 51.68 52 7.18 3 1.00 75.00
Tenure (years) 5.22 4 4.54 1.00 32.00
Board Size 10.87 11 2.59 5.00 18.00
LnBsize 2.36 2.39 0.24 1.61 2.89
NEDs (%) 56.3% 55.6% 10.7% 30.0% 86.7%
Institutional Ownership 25.9% 21.3% 18.9% 0.0% 92.4%
Market Value (£'million) 8,593 1,775 23,000 71 128,000
LnMV 21.50 21.29 1.41 18.07 25.57
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Table 5-8 Correlation Matrix ofCompensation, Governance & Performance
TSR TbO Race EPS Eown Tenu A2e LnBZ NEDs Inst Lnmv
LnCash 0.052 -0.090 0.026 0.108 0.012 -0.025 0.145 0.322 0.319 -0.071 0.605
0.078 0.002 0.380 0.000 0.698 0.398 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0/8 0.000
LnInct -0.026 0.029 -0.019 -0.211 -0.007 0.024 0.108 0.350 0.362 -0.087 0.645
0.432 0.386 0.564 0.000 0.825 0.463 0.00/ 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000
LnTpayc 0.032 -0.101 0.048 -0.014 -0.020 -0.057 0.043 0.377 0.323 -0.081 0.640
0.277 0.00/ 0./06 0.63/ 0.501 0.053 0.146 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000
LnInctv -0.018 0.076 -0.033 -0.220 -0.015 0.010 0.059 0.298 0.381 -0.091 0.623
0.6/7 0.033 0.364 0.000 0.679 0.772 0./02 0.000 0.000 0.01l 0.000
LnTpayv 0.051 -0.067 0.034 0.018 -0.013 -0.046 0.056 0.353 0.310 -0.044 0.618
0.085 0.025 0.25/ 0.536 0.666 0./24 0.061 0.000 0.000 0./40 0.000
Payratioc 0.007 -0.091 0.070 -0.160 -0.069 -0.102 -0.157 0.273 0.148 -0.057 0.347
0.805 0.002 0.018 0.000 0.02/ 0.00/ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.054 0.000
Payratiov 0.031 -0.002 0.040 -0.138 -0.056 -0.068 -0.155 0.216 0.107 0.041 0.286
0.293 0.958 0.174 0.000 0.058 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.168 0.000
TSR 1.000
TobinQ 0.025 1.000
0.405
ROCE 0.158 -0.015 1.000
0.000 0.612
EPS 0.248 -0.002 0.132 1.000
0.000 0.946 0.000
Eown -0,0]5 0.043 0.014 0.097 1.000
0.620 0.149 0.638 0.001
Tenure 0.038 0.028 -0.032 0.155 0.176 1.000
0.196 0.351 0.285 0.000 0.000
Age 0.064 -0.170 0.070 0.040 -0.066 0.318 1.000
0.031 0.000 0.018 0.178 0.026 0.000
LnBz -0.123 -0.088 0.008 0.041 0.051 -0.036 0.024 1.000
0.000 0.003 0.793 0.17/ 0.087 0.220 0.426
NEDs -0.020 -0.030 0.029 -0.128 -0.042 -0.132 0.007 0.093 1.000
0.494 0.311 0.334 0.000 0.159 0.000 0.825 0.002
Inst 0.002 -0.021 0.060 -0.101 0.140 -0.011 -0.029 0.142 0.167 1.000
0.959 0.484 0.045 0.001 0.000 0.701 0.325 0.000 0.000
Lnmv -0.073 0.018 -0.017 0.039 -0.057 -0.067 0.024 0.553 0.290 -0.153 1.000
0.013 0.536 0.567 0.191 0.054 0.025 0.417 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: p-va!ue in italic
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5.5 Conclusion
The present chapter had two objectives. First, it presented the methodology to be
adopted in assessing the determinants of executive compensation and testing the predictions
of tournament theory. The research approach is a deductive approach owing to positivism
philosophy. Accordingly, the panel dataanalysis is used to test the presented hypotheses. A
static panel dataanalysis with the fixed effects estimation and the random effects estimation
is firstly discussed. The fixed effects model assumes the intercept to change across units
rather than overtime, while the random effects model allows individual specific terms to be
randomly distributed. A Hausman test will decide the appropriateness between employing
the fixed effects model or the random effects model. In addition to the static models,
Arellano-Bond GMM estimation is used to allow for the dynamic effects of panel data
models by including a lagged dependent variable.
The second objective of this chapter was to introduce the sample and measurement
of variables used to examine the determinants of executive pay as well as to test the
tournament theory in the context of executive compensation. It is noted that from a sample
of 50 UK quoted companies in 5 years from 2001 to 2005, two sets of data are constructed:
(1) unbalanced data of345 executive directors in five years 2001-2005 (1,137 observations)
with details of their pay and individual variables; and (2) balanced data of 50 companies in
five years 2001-2005 (250 observations) with details of performance and governance
variables. In addition, this chapter also provides descriptive analyses of executive pay and
other governance and performance variables. A number of interesting aspects of executive
compensation have emerged from this analysis. Firstly, there is evidence of the significant
growth in executive pay in comparison to prior period. Specifically, the average executive
pay in the period 2001-2005 has increased 80% comparing to that in 1997 reported by Buck
et al (2003) and Conyon et al (2001). Secondly, the analysis confirms the difference between
the cost of granting long-term incentives to company and the value of those incentives to
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executives. The value of share options is about 80% of their cost to company, while
executives receive LTIPs pay at 54% of its cost to shareholders. Thirdly, during the sample
years, there is a clear growth in the use of LTIPs and decline in the use of options. The cost
of granting LTIPs has increased 98% while the cost of options drops 56%. Also during the
sample year, the variation of pay between executive and between companies has reduced
considerably with the coefficient of variation of total pay drops from 1.75 in 2001 to 0.78 in
2005. Thus, in sum, it is clear that there have been changes in the level and composition of
executive compensation of UK quoted companies over the period 2001 to 2005.
This chapter has set out measurement of variables, specified empirical models, and
analyzed descriptively the sample data. The next two chapters will present empirical results
testing the determinants of executive pay components, structure of executive pay and
tournament pay structure.
132
Chapter 6
EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON DETERMINATIONS OF EXECUTIVE
PAY COMPONENTS AND INCENTIVE PAY RATIOS
6.0 Introduction
As discussed in previous chapters, literature on the determinants of executive
compensation has produced conflicting results with very small economic significance
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1999; Conyon and Murphy, 2000). The examination of
the components of executive pay components and the structure of executive pay package
might be more fruitful in understanding the determinants of executive pay. Agency theory
and the managerial power perspective have provided theoretical frameworks to derive
testable hypotheses on the determinants of executive pay components and pay strucuture
(incentive pay ratio), as discussed in Chapter 4. The purpose of this chapter is to present an
empirical analysis of the determinants of executive pay components and incentive pay ratio
to test those hypotheses. Specifically, this chapter examines the determinants of total
executive pay, determinants of cash pay components, long-term incentive pay components,
and the ratio of long-term incentives to total executive pay (executive pay structure). In each
pay determination model, the empirical results from OLS estimator are first presented
following by an Arellano-Bond GMM estimator, which controls for the dynamic model and
time varying dependent variable (see Chapter 5). The empirical model is also tested using
both measures of dependent variables: the costof executive pay to company and the value of
payto executives.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 provides empirical evidence on the
determinants of the level of executive pay components. Firstly, results relating to the
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determinants of total executive compensation are presented in subsection 6.1.1. Secondly,
subsection 6.1.2 discusses the empirical results relating to the determinants of cash pay (sum
of salary and bonus). The empirical results testing the determinants of incentive pay
components, including options and long-term incentive plans (LTIPs), is presented in
subsection 6.1.3. Section 6.2 discusses the empirical results on the determinants of executive
pay structure (via the ratio of long-term incentive pay to total executive compensation).
Finally, section 6.3 presents a discussion and conclusions.
6.1 Determinants of the Level of Executive Pay Components
In this section, the empirical results examining the determinants of executive pay
components are presented. The reader is reminded of the hypotheses on the determinants of
executive pay components derived from both agency theory and the managerial power
perspective in Chapter 4 as follows:
HI: Executive pay components and executive pay structure arepositively related tofirm
performance
H3: Executive pay components andpay structure arepositively related tofirm size
!!JJI.: Executive pay components andpay structure are negatively related with executive
shareholdings
!:HJl.: Executive pay components and pay structure is positively related with executive
shareholdings
H5: Executive pay components and pay structure are positively related to executive
tenure andexecutive age
lHl Executive pay components and pay structure are negatively related to the level
monitoring andthe effectiveness ofthe board
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Theempirical model used to test these hypotheses is constructed as follows.
Ln(Pay)
Where:
(l + ~ I P e r f o r m a n c c + ~ ~ Lag-Performance + ~ 9 L n ( S i z e e + ~ 3 E x e O w w
+ ~ 4 T e n u r r + ~ 5 A g g + ~ 6 L n ( B s i z e e + ~ 7 N E D D + ~ 8 I n s t O w w + ~ 9 C E O d u u
Ln(Pay): logarithm of TotalPay,Cash Pay,and Long-term Incentives
Performance: Firm performance measured in TSR,Tobin's Q, ROCE, EPS
Lag Performance: Finn performance of previous year (year t-I)
Ln(Size): logarithm of finn's market valuation
ExeOwn: Executive's shareownership
Tunre: Tenure of executives (years in currentposition)
Age: Ageof executive directors
Ln(Bsize): Logarithm of number of board members
NEDs: Percentage of non-executive directors in total members on the board
InstOwn: Percentage of shareownership held by institutional shareholders
CEOdum: CEOdummy variable (equal I for CEO, 0 otherwise)
The model uses both an OLS estimator and Arellano-Bond GMMestimator. Due to
the nature of the GMM estimator, the lagged performance variable will be dropped in
Arellano-Bond regressions. In each model of the detenninants of compensation, both the
empirical results from OLS regression and Arellano-Bond GMM regression are shown with
different performance measures and distinguishing between the cost of pay to the company
and the value of pay to executives. The results of the empirical analyses are presented
separately for the determinants of total executive compensation, cash compensation and
long-term incentives. Details of these resultsare shown in the following sections.
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6.1.1 Determinants ofTotal Executive Compensation
This section presents the empirical analysis of hypotheses regarding the
determination of the level of total compensation for executive directors. To begin with,
Table 6.1 presents the empirical results (using OLS estimator) examining the determinants
of cost of total executive compensation to the company. As illustrated in Table 6.1, the
determinants of total executive pay are tested with alternative definitions of firm
performance: TSR (total shareholder return), Tobin's Q (which was defined in Chapter 5),
ROCE (return on capital employed), and EPS (earning. per share), respectively. Each
performance model takes on OLS regressions with both fixed effects and random effects.
The Hausman specification test is, then, performed to decide which regression model can be
used and only the results of appropriate type of regression models are presented in Table 6.1.
Specifically, the Hausman test statistics in all regressions are significant suggesting that
fixed effects regressions should be used. To further examine the dynamic effect of panel data,
regressions using consistent Arellano-Bond generalized method of moments (GMM)
estimator are used. Details of Arellano-Bond GMM estimation and methods have been
discussed in Chapter 5. The empirical results of the dynamic Arellano-Bond GMM
regressions are presented in Table 6.2. As shown in Table 6.2, Sargan test statistic is
insignificant in all performance equations, suggesting that the overidentifying restrictions do
not present and instrumental variables are uncorrelated with a set of residuals and therefore
the instruments are valid (i.e. exogenous).
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Table 6-1: Determinant of Total E. ecutive Pa y - Cost to company
(OLS regression)
61.23···
Fixed
11 37
Hausman Test L-?3.58..• 57.8!··..:.. _1 ~ 6 . 5 9 · · ·
Fixed or Random ! ! _ F i x ~ i x e ~ t Fixed _
11 :37' '" "' I " 11 37 11 37Observations (N)
Performance Variables
Dependent Variable: TSR TobinQ ROCE EPS
Total Pay (Cost to Co.) Coe fficient Coeffici ent Coe ffic ient Coefficient
(I-statistic) (I-stat istic) (I-statistic) (I-statistic)
I Performance I
I
-
1.1320· " -.0289··· .0242··· .0005(3.19) (-2.72) (2.82) (1.04)
....---- --- - -- - - -- f- - - - -- - 1
I Lag Performance .1211" · -.0044 .0049···
-.0015···
I (3.4 1) (-0.83) (2.80) I (-3. 10)~ g of Firm' s Market Va luatio n '---'
-=Pf-.1486· · · .3068··· .2354 · " .2628· · ·I (3.10) (6.99) (5.79) (5.96)I
- i -- -
I Executive Ownership .6639 .8764 .6265 .6392
IExecutive Tenure (0.41) (0.54) (0.39) (0.39) l.•.0574· · · .0619··· .0646"· .0655· "
IExecutive Age
(4.45) (4.85) (5.04) (5.1 1) 1--.0054 .0051 .0102 .0087(0.44) (0.42) (0.83) (0.70)
I Log of Board Size - - - 1- - - -- 1.1211 -.0067 .1191 I .0569
(1.03) ( - - . 0 0 L ~ : " 1 1 _ I (0.48) i,- -- - -- ------_.._. -- - --EDs .1775 .1295 .1057 .0914
(0.77) (0.57) (0.46) (0.40)
- --
- -- - -
\ Institutional Shareho ldings -.1952 - . 2 2 ~ - . 1 3 1 1 -.1404 I
(- 1.1 8) (-1.46) (-0.79) (-0.85) I
.....
- -
CEO Dummy .7324· · · .7313··· .7268··· I .7388··· I
(9.16) (9.17) I (9.06) (9.20)
IConst- -
-- ---
i6 .302\ ; ••-,
-t -
9.2667· " 7.1732*·· 6.8315· · · I(8.33) (6.28) (7.47) (6.73)
------- --- -- - -- --
-
. -
-
--- : : 9 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r · ~ j ~ ; 8 ; ~ ~ ~ : -. --~ t e s t - - - - 28.56··· I--_._---_._.. J - jR2 0.344 1
- - - -- - - --
00 0 : Statisncally significant at I% level respectively
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Table 6-2: Determinants of Total Executive Pa y - Cost to Company
(Arellano-Bond GMM Estimator)
Performance Variables
Dependent Variable: TSR TobinQ ROCE EPS
Total Pa y (Cost to Co.) Coefficie nt Coefficient Coe fficient Coefficient
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic)E--·--·_-·...---···-···-..-·- ---_..__._-_.- ~ - ~ - - - - ... ~ . _ - - - - .._- _.. _ - - - _ . . . ~ . _ _ _._-_._...._-Lag Dependent Variable .4676*'" * .4413 **'" .4462 *** .4330**'"
(4.62) (4.53) (4.63) (4.45)
.__._- - - -_...__.._..__.__._.
.__._._----,f--...--._-...-
Performance .0850* .022 1 .0347*'"* .0002
( \. 77) ( \.03 ) (3.74) (0. 19)
-_.- --_._- _.__._-_._-
___•__•• M.__
-'.'--"-_._---_.-
Log of Firm's Market Valuation .1247* .1805**'" .1843*** .2031 **'"
( \.72) (2.64) (2.87) (3.00)f----.-------.-.----.-.... - ~ - - ..._._-------- ._..__._---_.._--
Executive Ownership 2. 178 2.079 2.007 2.102
(0.7 1) (0.69) (0.67) (0.69)
--_._-_.__._._._., f----.'----.-i-----__ - - - _ . _ - ~ ~ .
Executive Tenure .1127**'" .1138 **'" .1136*"'* .1144 **'"
(3.77) (3.84) (3.90) (3.87)
- -_._.__._-_._------f--.-...------ ----_..' ,.__._--_.-_..._--------_.IE x e c c ~ : : Age -.0298 -.03 10 -.0293 -.03 11(-0.44) (-0.47) (-0.45) (-0.47)
----------
--._---
Log of Board Size .4003*'" .4046 ** .3792*'" .3831**
(2.48) (2.5 1) (2.43) (2.40)
----------_.--_..._--_.._-_.-
,.__._---- f------. ..- ._-------
NEDs -.3934 -.4 161 -.3492 -.4 138
(-\.09) (-\.16) (- \.00) (-1. 16)
.---_._...__...__._--_..__.._._ ---_._._-
--------- -------_.-
_._-_.
Institutional Shareholdings .1237 .0998 .0270 .1204
(0.48) (0.39) (0.11) (0.47)
... _._-----
-----:..__._---1--- --_.
I
CEO Dummy .7440 **'" .7419 *"'* .7187**'" .7423 ***
(6.84) (6.89) (6.76) (6.9 1)
I
___·_..__M ..._ ______·_
.f---....-.-.--- --1--.._----
Const -.0652 -.065 8 -.067 1 -.066 1
(-0.96) (-0.97) (- \.0 1) (-0.97)
____ __ _ .___..___ ~ . R R ..._ f--.---._" __.H ___•• ___·t_,__H '
--- -- - ---I
f------..--------.--.. -------._._----
Sargan Test 3.44 3.60 4.45 4.0 1
.___.. ~ H . _ . ~ ~ ..M__•__._·
__'_ MM' _ '__'_
--_..._---_...._._..- • •____ .. _M•
Arellano-Bond order I -5.53**'" -5.47*"'* -5.18*** I -5.39***
---_.._---_._.._.._._---_.- -----_._.._--f---.---- 1---"
Arellano-Bond order 2 1.28 1.19 0.12 \.0 9
- .
._-
-
-_.
Observations (N) 5 14 5 14 514 5 14
". "", """ : Statistically significant at 10%, 5% & 1% level respectively
As illu strated in T abl e 6.1, the s ign a nd s ignificance of the performance var iables
are de pe nde nt on the mea sure of performance used . T he shareho lde rs return (T R) and
re turn on ca p ita l employed (ROCE) coe ffic ients are posit ive and significa nt (a t the I percent
level ), while the absolute performan ce measure (E PS) is ins ign ificant. T he Tobin's Q
measure of performan ce even shows a negati ve and significant coe ffic ient, which implie a
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negative relationship between executive pay and firm performance. The difference between
performance measures (TSR and Tobin's Q) appears to be the nature of the two measures.
Whilst Tobin's Q is an equilibrium measure that is equal to the market value of fund divided
by the book value of fund; TSR reflects some adjustments overtime. Descriptive results in
Chapter 5 also reflect that there is no correlation between TSR and Tobin's Q.
In Table 6.2, firm performance coefficient is positive and significant in the
shareholder return model (TSR) and accounting rate of return model (RaCE), while it is
insignificant in other performance models. By taking first difference, Arellano Bond GMM
results indicate that change in firm performance (measured in TSR and ROCE) is positively
correlated to change in executive pay. This result confirms the positive relationship between
shareholder returns, RaCE and level of executive compensation found in the OLS fixed
effects regressions (Table 6.1).
The economic importance of these determinants, however, is relatively low. The
significant coefficient of 0.132 (for TSR) and 0.0242 (for ROCE) means that holding other
variables constant, for every 10% increase in shareholder return or accounting return
(RaCE), total executive pay increases only 1.32%14 and 0.24%15 respectively. This result is
much smaller than that reported in Buck et al (2003), where the shareholder return
coefficient was 1.546 suggesting 10% increase in shareholder returns resulted in a 15.5%
increase in total pay. The low economic significance of the pay-performance relationship,
however, is consistent with the findings of Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Conyon and
Murphy (2000).
The coefficient of lagged performance also depends on the performance measure
used; the coefficient is positive and significant for shareholder return (TSR) and accounting
14 ~ P a a = l,l32 - 1=0.141
IS ~ P a a = eO,0242 - 1= 0.025
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ratio performance (ROCE) models. The market-based measure of performance (Tobin's Q)
and the absolute accounting-based measure of performance (EPS) have negative coefficients
with only the EPs coefficient being significant. Again, the pay-performance relationship is
sensitive to performance measures. The empirical results presented in Table 6.2 also imply
that prior year pay levels strongly determine the current year executive pay levels. The
average coefficient on the lagged performance variable is 0.44. In economic terms, this
implies that prior-year compensation explains about 44% of the variation in the current-year
pay of executive directors. In sum, both current year and prior year shareholder return (TSR)
and accounting return (ROCE) are determinants of the level of executive compensation. This
finding supports hypothesis HI and the notion of agency theory for the positive relationship
between level of executive pay and firm performance.
In all performance equations, finn size (measured by the log of market value of the
finn), executive tenure and CEO dummy are the explanatory variables that are significantly
associated with the level of total compensation for executive directors. The coefficient of
finn size is positive and significant in all performance models. The finding, hence, supports
hypothesis H3 for a positive relationship between pay components level and finn size. The
coefficient of firm size measures the elasticity of executive compensation with respect to
firm size, that is, the percentage change in executive pay for a given percentage change in
firm size. In the shareholder return (TSR) performance equation, for example, the size
coefficient is significant at 0.1486 meaning that a 10% change in the market value of the
firm, ceteris paribus, yields an increase of 1.5% in total executive pay. This result is
consistent with the study of Buck et al (2003) who report the log of sales coefficient at 0.137
in log of total pay model. The size coefficient is higher in other regressions (Tobin's Q,
ROCE and EPS) at 0.3068,0.2354 and 0.2628 respectively suggesting the size elasticity of
executive pay is approximately from 0.24 to 0.31. The result is consistent with prior findings
(Ciscel and Carroll, 1980; Cosh and Hughes, 1997; Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970; McGuire,
et al., 1962) for significant pay determination of firm size.
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In addition to OLS regression results, Arellano-Bond GMM regression results in
Table 6.2 also suggest a positive and significant relationship between level of executive pay
and firm size. This indicates that executives earn more money when firm gets bigger. An
average coefficient of 0.18 suggests that 10% increase in firm size yields executives 1.8%
increase in total pay not for any incremental contributions.
Executive tenure is also positive and significant in all performance equations. The
coefficient of executive tenure in all models is around 0.06 (as in Table 6.1), which means
that for every one extra year in tenure, executive pay is approximately 6% higher, holding
other variables constant. Arellano-Bond regression results as presented in Table 6.2 suggest
a positive and significant relationship between executive pay and tenure in the job, with
coefficient of around 11 %. Hence, total executive pay is higher when executives stay longer
in his position. This result supports hypothesis H5, which suggests a positive correlation
between level of executive pay and executive tenure.
Table 6.1 also shows a consistently positive and significant coefficient for the CEO
dummy variable in all performance models. With the significant value of 0.73 in all four
models, the coefficient implies that when an executive becomes chief executive officer
(CEO), his/her total compensation increases by 73%16. This big difference in compensation
for the CEO and other executives hints that the position in the organizational hierarchy
might outweigh the importance of marginal performance as a main determinant of executive
pay, as suggested by tournament theory. Detailed tests of toumament theory will be
presented in Chapter 7.
16 dLnPayldCEOdummy = 0.73 then l1Pay/Pay = 0.73 ~ ( C E O d u m m y y
If ~ ( C E O d u m m y y = I or executive becomes CEO, l1PaY/PaY'" 0.73 or 73%
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An interesting result from Table 6.2 is the positive and significant coefficient of
board size (logarithm of number of board members). The positive and significant coefficient
is in all performance models consistently at around 0.40, which means that a 10% increase in
board size results in an increase of 4% in total compensation for executives. With an average
board size of 10.87 in the sample companies, an additional member to the board of directors
yields an increase of roughly 4% in executive pay. This result supports hypothesis H6 for a
positive relationship between executive pay and board size. It indicates that larger board
tends to be less effective in monitoring management, which is consistent with the managerial
power perspective.
With regard to the effect of other individual contingencies, the executive share
ownership and executive age variables are not significant in any of the regressions. The
insignificant result of the coefficient of executive shareholding variable neither supports
agency theory (for a negative relationship with executive pay) nor the managerial power
theory (for a positive relationship with executive pay). Also, the monitoring function of the
board of directors, which is measured by board size and the percentage of non-executive
directors, has no significant association with all four performance measures. The
institutional shareholdings coefficient indicates a negative effect on executive pay, which is
supported by both agency theory and the managerial power theory. However this coefficient
is not statistically significant in all four performance regressions, which means that there is
not enough evidence for a negative relationship between institutional shareholdings and
executive pay, at least in these four models.
Overall, the results of this analysis indicate that firm size, executive tenure and
holding a CEO position are important determinants of executive compensation. Finn
performance (both current year perfonnance and prior year perfonnance) measured in both
shareholder return (TSR) and accounting return (ROCE) is positively and significantly
correlated with level of executive compensation. The economic significance of this
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relationship, however, is also relatively low. Other individual and governance variables
(executive shareholding, age, size of board of directors, balance of non-executive directors
and institutional shareholding) are not significantly associated with the level of executive
compensation, at least in these models using the cost of compensation to company as the
dependent variable. The overall fit of the models range from a minimum of 0.2679 in TSR
model to maximum of 0.3950 in Tobin's Q model, which means that the models explain
about 27% to 40% of the variance in total executive compensation.
The results presented in Table 6.1 and 6.2 above use the cost-to-company level of
executive pay as the dependent variable. According to the argument described in Chapter 4
(Hypothesis H2), the use of cost of pay to the company and the value of pay to executive
may affect differently the pay-performance relationship. To examine the differential effects
of using the cost of pay to the company and the value of pay to the executive as dependent
variable, Tables 6.3 presents the empirical results of OLS regressions using executive's
value of pay as the dependent variable. Arellano-Bond GMM regression on total executive
pay value faces over-identifying restriction and hence is not valid (refer to Appendix 3 for
details).
According to the results presented in Table 6.3, the main determinants of executive
pay value are; firm size, executive tenure, being a CEO and firm performance (for
shareholder return and ROCE performance models only), which is consistent with the results
using the cost of pay dependent variable as presented in Table 6.1. A comparison of the OLS
regression results between cost model (Table 6.1) and value model (Table 6.3) is presented
in Table 6.4. According to the results presented in Table 6.4, there is no statistically
significant difference between the detennination of cost and value of executive pay, except
for executive ownership variable.
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Table 6-3: Determinants of Total Executive Pay - Value to executi e
(OLS Regression)
Performance ariable
Dependent Variable:
Total Pa y (Value to Exes)
TSR
Coefficient
(I-statistic)
TobinQ
Coefficient
(I-statistic)
ROCE
Coefficient
(I-statistic)
EPS
Coeffic ient
(I-statistic)
(8.57)(8.48)(8.60)(8.72)
I CEO Dummy
NEDs
~ Institutional harcholdings
I
~ ------...-.-..---------1---- ... --·---·--i-------+------
I Performance .220S·" -.0175· .0191·· .0008
I
I (5.79) (-1.74) (2.35) (1.59)
I Lag Performance .I957· " -.0081 .0047· " -.00))"
~ (5.98) (-1.62) (2.79) (-2.46)
ILogof Firm's Market Valuation -.0278 .I 749·" .1234·" .1320" ·(-0.63) (4.23) (3.22) (3.18)
I- Ex-e-cu-t-iv-e-O-w-n·-e-rs-hi-p- - - - l- --=-2-.0--:64· -1.8855 -2.10-1 - -'1- -2.109- - -
I (-1.38) (-1.24) (-1.37) (-1.38)
I" ----- ------1----. --. - - - - .-
Executive Tenure .0493· " .057S· " I .060S· " .0611· "
(4.15) (4.81) (5.05) (5.06)
- ------_·_----+---·--1 - - - -
I Executive Age .0083 .0114.01576 1 .0140
L (0.73) (0.99) (1.36) (1.21)__
I Log of Board Size .0400 -.1039 .0175 -.0281
~ ] 7 )__ . _ i i 0 . 9 ~ ~ -- ~ ~ . 1 6 6 I (-0.25) --1'
.2627 ' .1275 1 .12 19 1 .1291
(1.241 __ J ~ ~ 2 ) _t (0.56) (0.59)
-.2671· -.297S· 1-.1776 ., -.1994
___+_.._(_-1_.7_6)_ _ (-1.90) J::.1.14) (-1.28)
.6432·" .6463"· .641I·" .6490"· 1
Fi ed
1137
Fi. ed
1137
9.435" · 9.453" ·
(10.43) (9.87)
- - ~ ) ; : : ~ . . ~ ~ ~ ~ ; ~ : : : ; ; ~
73.83"· 72.81·"
Fixed
1137
S.9401 " ·
(9.45)
1137
Fixed
12.973· " 1
(12.64)
Const
F test 28.68·" 24.88·"IR2 ----.......- ..- ...--- '---.0-48-4-----.-2623--
-----1----- - ---
Hausman Test I 19.61" · 70.46·"
Fixed or Random
Observations ( )
" " . "': Statistically significant at 10%. 5% & 1% level respectively
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Table 6-4: Comparison results between cost mod els and value models
Variables TR TobinQ RO
(z-value) (z-value) (z-value)
Performance -0.0 13 -0.004 0.001 0.000
Lag Performance -0.011 0.002 0.000 0.000
Log of Firm's MV 0.056 0.0 16 0.0 17 0.0 19
Executive Ownership 1.895* 2.042** 1.915* 1.916*
Executive Tenure 0.001 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 1
Executive Age -0 .003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004
Log of Board Size 0.074 0.104 0.099 0.157
NEDs -0.058 0.002 -0.022 -0 .053
Institutional Shareholdings 0.034 0.023 0.033 0.038
CEO Dummy 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
•. ••: Statistically significant at 10%, 5% level respectively
As presented in Table 6.3, the coefficient of firm size (log of market valuation) is
positive and significant in all performance models except for hareholder return (T R)
regression. This result, together with the result in Table 6.1, sugge ts that firm ize
determines both the cost of pay to the company and the value of pay to the executive director.
The degree of determination, however, is different between the cost and value of
compensation. The coefficient on the firm size variable using Tobin' Q, RO E and P
models are 0.1 749, 0.1 234, and 0.1 320 respectively for the value of pay to the executive
measure (Table 6.3), which are lower than those of cost pay measure (Table 6.1) and are
0.3068, 0.2354, and 0.2628 respectively. This result implies that \ hile firm size i trongly
correlated with the cost of executive pay to company, it is less influential in determining the
value of that compensation package to executive directors. The Z-value of the firm ize
coefficient, however, is not statistically significant suggesting that there' s not enough
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evidence that firm size hasdifferent effect on executive pay at cost to company and in value
to executives.
The relationship between firm performance and the value of executive compensation,
being consistent with the cost-pay models, is dependent on performance measures. The firm
performance coefficient is positive and significant in the shareholder return (TSR) and
accounting rate of return (ROCE) models. The shareholder returns significant coefficient of
0.2208 suggests that an increase of 10% in shareholder return yields an increase of 2.21 % in
total executive pay. This coefficient is nearly double the shareholder return coefficient in the
cost-pay model suggesting that shareholder return is more strongly related to the value of
executive pay than it is with the cost of pay to the company. However, Z-value is less than
1.65 and hence there is not significant difference between the two models (cost pay and pay
value). Although the result again supports a positive and significant relationship between
executive pay and firm performance, the economic significance of the relationship is quite
low. With an annual increase of 14.1% in shareholder return for the sample firms (see Table
5-7 in Chapter 5 for details), the level of executive pay value increases by only 3.12%17
(1.86% for cost of pay). The coefficient of the accounting rate of return (ROCE) is even
smaller (0.0191 or 0.19% change in pay value for every 10% change in ROCE) and further
confirms the economic insignificance of the pay-performance relationship. Lagged
performance also has a positive and significant coefficient in shareholder return (TSR)
model and accounting return ROCE model, but is negative inTobin's Q and EPS models.
Consistent with the cost-pay results presented in Table 6.1, the executive tenure
coefficient is positive and significant in all four performance models. The result implies a
positive relationship between executives' pay value and their tenure on the job, i.e, the
longer executives stays in their position, the higher the value of the compensation to be
received by the executive. The tenure coefficient of 0.05 to 0.06 means that an extra year in
17 2.21% x 14.1110 =3.12%(1.32%x 14.1110 =1.86%)
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tenure yields approximately 5% to 6% higher compensation for the executive. This result is
not different from the cost-pay model and again supports hypothesis H5 for a positive
relationship between executive pay and tenure. Furthermore, the CEO dummy coefficient is
positive and significant in all performance regressions, consistent with the results in the cost-
pay model, suggesting that there is significant difference between CEO's pay and other
executives' pay. The coefficient, however, is slightly lower at 0.64 compared to the cost-pay
model (0.73 as presented in Table 6.1). A significant coefficient of 0.64 in all performance
models means that when an executive director becomes a CEO (change in the value of the
dummy variable from zero to one), his/her net compensation value increases by 64%
(compared to the nominal value increase of73% in the cost-pay model).
Another result from Table 6.3 is the negative and significant (at 10% level)
coefficient of institutional shareholdings (for market-based performance: TSR and TobinQ
models), which is not present in the cost-pay models. The result suggests that institutional
shareholders did play some role in determining the value of pay received by executive
directors. In other words, the greater the concentration of institutional share ownership, the
lower the value of compensation to executives. The significant coefficient, however, is only
present in market-based performance models (TSR, TobinQ), while it is insignificant in
accounting-based performance (ROCE, EPS) models. This result implies that institutional
shareholders, whilst did not show an influential role in granting executive pay (i.e. the cost
of granting compensation to company), they did play an active role in determining the value
of executive pay. Specifically, the value of executive pay is lower and more closely related
to market-based firm performance than accounting-based firm performance when the share
ownership by institutional shareholders is higher.
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With regard to the effect of other individual and governance variables on level of
executive pay, the variables executive share ownership, executive age, size of the board and
proportion of non-executive directors are not significant in any of the regressions. This result,
again, shows that there is not enough evidence for a contribution of these variables in
determining the compensation for executive directors.
A summary note for the determinants of total level of executive pay is that firm
performance (depending on the performance measure used) did show a positive and
significant relationship with the level of compensation, both in term of the cost of pay to
company and the value of pay to executives. The economic significance of the relationship,
however, is quite low, which is consistent with the findings of Jensen & Murphy (1990) and
Conyon & Murphy (2000). As discussed, firm size is a significant determinant of executive
pay with the size elasticity of pay ranging from 0.15 to 0,31. The other consistent
determinants of executive pay level are executive tenure and being in a CEO position. The
longer executives stay in their position, the more compensation they receive. For one
additional year in the position, the executive is paid approximately 6% more. Moreover.
when an executive becomes a CEO, hislher compensation is 73% higher in the cost of pay
(to the company) and 64% higher in net value to the executive. When controlling for the
time variation by first difference, board size is positively and significantly correlated with
the current compensation level (both in cost-pay and pay-value models). The other board
monitoring proxy, proportion of non-executive directors on the board, however. shows no
consistent sign and is not significantly related to total executive pay. Also. there is no
evidence of a difference between cost model and value model of detennining total executive
pay. These findings fail to support hypothesis H2 for a different effect of using cost pay and
pay value as dependent variables.
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6.1.2 Determinants of Cash Compensation
This section presents the empirical results of the determinants of cash compensation
(sum of salary, bonuses and othershort-term benefits). The results are presented in Table 6.5
using OLS estimator. As Table 6.5 indicates, the relationship between cash compensation
and firm performance is dependent on the performance measures. The coefficient is positive
and significant with shareholder return (TSR) and absolute accounting return (EPS), while it
is negative and insignificant with Tobin's Q ratio (TobinQ) and accounting rate of return
(ROCE). The significance of the relationship, consistent with the total pay determinants
result, is very low. Shareholder return coefficient of 0.1242 means that for every 10%
increase in shareholder return, holding other variables constant, the level of cash
compensation for executive directors increases by only 1.24%. The EPS coefficient is even
smaller at 0.00I0, which means that ten pence increase in EPS yields a I% increase in cash
compensation, controlling for cash compensation variable being in logarithm and ceteris
paribus. Lagged firm performance is only positively and significantly associated with
executive cash compensation in shareholder return (TSR) model, whilst the coefficient is
negative and insignificant in all other performance models. In contrast, the relationship
between firm size and cash compensation is positive and significant in all performance
models exceptfor shareholder return (TSR) model.
With regard to executive's individual contingencies, two out of three proxies showa
significant relationship with level of cash compensation. While executive tenure is still a
positive and significant determinant of cash payas found in total pay models, the significant
and positive relationship between executive age and executive compensation is only, so far,
found in cash pay models. This result supports hypothesis HS, derived from both agency
theory and the managerial power perspective, which argues for a positive relationship
between executive tenure, age and executive compensation. The otherexecutive's individual
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proxy, executive shareholding, has a positive coefficient and statistically insignificant in all
performance models. Hence there is no evidence that the level of executive compensation i
affected by the level (percentage) of executive share ownership.
Table 6-5: Determinants of Cash ompen ation
(O LS Regression)
Performance Variables
Variables TSR TobinQ ROCE EPS
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
((-statistic) ((-statistic) ((-statistic) ((-statistic)
I I If----- - .- - --- ._-- -
Performance .1242· " -.0018 -.0032 .0010· · ·
I (4.62) (-0.26) (-0.55) (2.79)
-
_..- -- _._--_.._-
._-----._--
-r - - -- - i- -- - -Lag Performance .146S· · · -.00 1\ -.00 \2 -.0004
--- .- j-
(-1.47)
.IOIS· · ·
(3.47)
04 \ 00
(0.38)
.0449" ·
(5.29)
.0303· "
(3.71)
.0004
(0.01)
.2439
(1.59)
-.1595
(-1.46)
.5243" ·
(9.86)
S.906" ·
( 13.23)
(-0.98)
.1250·· •
(4.62)
.4698
(0.43)
.0449· · ·
(5.27)
.0309· "
(3.78)
-.0199
(-0.25)
.1956
(1.28)
- ---- -
-.1648
(- 1.49)
.5276· "
(9.87)
S.451· "
(13.2 1)
(-0.32)
.12SI · · •
(4.35)
.4855
(0.45)
(6.36)
.0215
(0.69)
.4425
(0.42)
Logof Board ize
Const
Executive Tenure
Log of Firm's Market Valuation
1--- - -- -----
Executive Ownership - i
I
I
r . 0 3 3 0 " · - " ~ 4 4 ~ · ·
(4.54) I (5.24)
: Executiv; A A ~ - ----It .02W" - .030S· · ·
(3.33) (3.75)
---------
.0170 -.0217
(0.22) (-0.27)
.3003" .2022
(2.00) (1.32)
-. IS24· R .166-4 - -
(-1.70) (-1.49)
_
[ .5239· " - . 5 2 6 3 ~ - ; ; · -
(10.07) (9.85)
10.761*" ! S.402· · ·
(14.87) ( 12.49)
Fl: ed
11 37
42.10"·
.2234
11 3.46· "
~
41.03·"
0.2428
103.91" ·
ixed
1137
40.96"·
11 37
F test
R2
I 47.55· "
___+0. 1354_- _ -1-1 ~ 2 4 _ 8 9
Hausman Test -' ~ 1 . . 4 4 ' ' 88.89" ·
Fixed or Random Fixed Fixed
Observations ( ) 11 37
•.••.•••: Stausti ally signtfi cant at 10%. 5% & 1% level respectively
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The group variables represented the monitoring function of the board of directors do
not show a significant relationship with the level of cash compensation, except for the
shareholder return (TSR) performance model. For the shareholder return (TSR) regression,
there is evidence of a positive relationship between executive's cash compensation and the
percentage of non-executive directors in the board; and a negative relationship between cash
compensation and ownership concentration by institutional shareholders. The positive and
significant between the percentage of non-executive directors and cash compensation
supports the managerial power theory that non-executive directors does not monitor
executives effectively to lower their compensation (as suggested by agency theory). The role
of institutional shareholders, however, helps to increase the monitoring function with a
negative relationship between percentage of institutional shareholdings and executive cash
compensation. Board size coefficient is not statistically significant in any of performance
equations, which means that there is no evidence of a relationship between board size and
executive cash compensation.
Consistently with total pay determination models, cash compensation for the CEO
position is significantly higher than that for other executive positions. The coefficient for
CEO dummy variable is positive and significant in all performance models. However, the
differentiation between CEO and other executives is smaller in cash compensation than in
total compensation. CEO coefficient of 0.52 means that when executive director becomes
CEO, his cash compensation (salary and bonus) is increased by 52% in comparison to an
increase of 73% in total cost payor 62% in total pay value.
Overall, the results of the determinants of executives' cash compensation suggest
that shareholder return (TSR) has a significant effect on determining executive cash
compensation, while other performance measures does not have an effect except for the EPS
model with very low coefficient. Finn size is also a significant determinant of cash
compensation for executive directors. The firm size coefficient is positive and significant in
J5J
all performance regressions except shareholder return model. Executive's individual
contingencies measured inexecutive tenure and age have significant and positive correlation
with the level of cash compensation, supporting both agency theory and the managerial
power perspective. There is also a negative relationship between institutional shareholdings
and cash compensation, suggesting the role of institutional shareholders in monitoring
function. However, this relationship is only significant at 10% level in shareholder return
models, while it is insignificant in all otherperformance regressions.
6.1.3 Determinants ofLong·term Incentive Pay
Having examined the determinants of both total executive compensation and cash
compensation, the analysis moves on to examine the determinants of long-term incentive
compensation elements. With the same structure as in previous analyses, this section
presents the empirical results on the determinants of long-term incentive paywith both OLS
estimator and Arellano-Bond dynamic GMM estimator, differentiating the cost of long-term
incentives to company and their value to executive directors. Details of these results are
presented in the following Table 6.6 to Table 6.9.
Table 6.6 presents the results of the analysis to determine the level of long-term
incentive pay granted by the hostcompany. Onceagain, firm size is the primary detenninant
of the long-term incentive pay, with the logof finn valuation being positively related to the
log of incentive pay. Moreover, the log of finn valuation is significant in all four
performance regressions. In economic terms, the coefficient on finn size, in shareholder
return (TSR) model for example, is 0.3975 meaning that a 1% increase in finn's market
valuation yields an increase of 3.98% in executive's long-term incentive pay. This is also
known as the size elasticity of long-term incentive pay. Unlike in total pay and cash pay
models, the relationship between the costof incentive pay to executive andfinn performance
152
is inconsistent among performance measures. While there is still a positive and significant
relationship between incentive payand accounting rateof return (ROCE), otherperformance
measures is negatively and insignificantly related to executive's incentive pay except for
Tobin's Q measure. Moreover, the relationship between executive's incentive pay and
lagged firm performance also has conflict results between performance measures. Again
lagged ROCE coefficient is positive and significant, while TSR and EPS have negative and
significant coefficient, TobinQ coefficient is positive but insignificant. This result suggests
that except for accounting rate of return (ROCE), firm performance does not have a
significant effect on the level of long-term incentive paygranted to executives.
Table 6.6 also indicates the significant role of executive's individual contingencies
measured by executive tenure and age in shaping the level of long-term incentive pay. Both
tenure and executive age have positive and significant coefficients in all performance
equations. The result implies that with the more years spending on the position and the older
age, executive director tends to be paid higher level of long-term incentive pay. This
supports the agency theory's argument that by the time (older and long tenure) executive
becomes healthier and more risk-neutral to accept the riskier compensation in term of long-
term incentive pay for an expecting higher return. Executive shareholding, the other
individual contingency, doesnot havea significant effect on the level of incentive pay.
Among variables representing the monitoring function, the proportion of non-
executive directors in the board is the only variable to exhibit any significance in the four
regressions. A positive and significant coefficient on the proportion of non-executive
directors in the board variable implies that the presence and dominance of non-executive
directors in the board do not helpto reduce the levelof incentives paid to executives. This is
conflicting to the result found earlier for a negative relationship between the proportion of
non-executive directors and level of cashcompensation for executives. It, however, suggests
that the presence of non-executive directors helpsto influence the compensation package for
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executive directors in the way (lower cash pay component and increase performance-based
pay component) to protect shareholders' interests. This result hence does not follow agency
argument for a direct monitoring function of non-executive director (i.e. increase monitoring
to reduce the use of incentive contract). Rather, it is likely that non-executive directors use
an indirect way, through influencing components of compensation package, to align the
interests of executives with those of shareholders. However, as presented in Section 6.1.1,
the dominance of non-executive directors does not have a significant effect on the level of
total compensation for executives.
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Table 6-6: Determinants of Incentive Pay - Cost to company
(OLS regression)
Performance Variables
Dependent Variable:
Incentive Pay (Cost to Co.)
TSR
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
TobinQ ROCE
Coefficient Coefficient
(t-statistic) (t-statistic)
EP
Coefficient
(I-statistic)
-.001 -
(-1.87)
-.0007
(-0.75)
--
-0.441 · .0661---
(- 1.89) (2.73)
.. ..-
.0065 .0157- - -
(0.6\ ) (3.57)
-
.3975- · -
r Perfonnan" -.0864
(-1.15)
_ .._-_._---_.__ . _ . _ . ~ ~ __._.-+-------
I Lag Performance -.1503_.
(-2.30)
I Log of Firm's Market Valuation
I Executive Ownership
rExecutiveTenure
(4.73)
.8025
(0.18)
r--
Institutional Shareholdings
ICEO Dummy
Const
I -
Fixed or Random I FIxed
IObservations-(N) ---i---go5- FIxed- ~ ~905 _1_ F I ~ e eT 905
.8599· ·
(2.03)
-
.2676
(0.90) j
.4303--
-J(2.52)1.722
(0.95)
----
14.53- - ·
0,4 101
37.31--·
Fixed
905
' . • •. ' . ' : Statistically signifi cant at 10%. 5% & 1% level respectively
Other significant determinant of long-term incentive pay. a found can istently in all
other models, is the CEO position, i.e. whether executive i a C 0 or not. A positive and
significant coefficient of C ' 0 dummy variable, in all performance regression , mean that
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there is significant difference between long-term incentives granted to the CEO and to other
executive directors.
The coming section presents the empirical results examining the determinants of
long-term incentives value from executive's perspective and also to test the hypothesis on
the difference in determining long-term incentive cost and its value to executive. As
presented in Table 6.7, the significance of the performance variables is dependent on the
measure of performance used. The shareholder return (TSR) and accounting return (ROCE)
is positive and significant, while the TobinQ and earning per share (EPS) measures are
negative and insignificant. The finding that shareholder return and ROCE measure are
significant is consistent with the results in total pay model and cash pay model. Comparing
the performance coefficient in cost-of-incentive model (Table 6.6) and incentive value
model (Table 6.7), shareholder return has no significant effect on the level of incentives
granted to executives; it, however, is a significant determinant of the value of incentives to
be received by executives. According to the results presented in Table 6.9, the relationship
between shareholder return and incentive pay is not statistically different between the use of
incentive cost to company and incentive value to executive. The same result also noted for
other performance measures.
Furthermore, the relationship between lagged performance and incentive value also
conflicts between performance measures used. The coefficient on performance variable is
positive and significant when performance is measured in ROCE suggesting that lagged
accounting rate of return (ROCE) has a significant effect on the level of executive's
incentive value. However, the coefficient of absolute accounting performance (EPS) is
negative and significant. The market-based performance measures (TSR, TobinQ) do not
have any effect on the value of incentive pay to executive directors.
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Table 6-7: Determinants of Incentive Pay - Value to executives
(OLS Regression)
Performance Variables
Dependent Variable: TSR TobinQ ROCE EPS
Incentive Pay (Value to Exes) Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(I-statistic) (I-statistic) (I-statistic) (I-statistic)
-_._---_._-_.._.__ . _ - ~ _ . _ - - - _ _ _.__ . _ . ~ . _ . ~ - - - _ _ 1---._.__._-----_.. __..___n ~ ~ .__~ ~ ~ __·....
._-----_..
Performance .1866* -.02 16 .0628** -.00 14
(1.92) (-0.77) (2.15) (- 1.18)
----_.._.............._...__ ..._.__.........._., ........-...._--_.._... _._...........__.._-_._. ...._-_..._--.........__....._......_.... .__......_.._-_.__..._.....- ....__...._-_._--_.
Lag Performance .0365 -.0089 .0156*** -.0019·
(0.44) (-0.71) (2.94) (-1.93)
-_._....__._.._-_..._.....__ ..._---_......__.._-_..__......_...- ..__....-.-_._-_._._..._.1-...._ .._-_._....__ ..._.__.._....__...._....._.._...-.- .....__._--_._-
Log of Firm's Market Valuation .0409 .1499 .1156 .2418 **
(0.38) ( 1.56) ( 1.29) (2.4 1)
._-_ ..._......__..._._..._....,----_ ...................,......._....__....._.... ' _......_,.._..............,-...._.__....._. _............_.._._._............, f--.--.-......-..--.-..---- --_..__.__._-
Executive Ownership 67.53 74.129 70.458 70.264
( 1.17) ( 1.28) ( 1.22) ( 1.22)
__ . _ ~ _ _ ___•._ ••_._.....,.M••_._.._H.....__._._...__._.__._.......... ...._-_..__..._...._......._--- .._--_._--1----...._-....__..._._-_...._.... -"....__...
Executive Tenure .0278 .0325 .0374 .0352
( 1.00) ( 1.18) (1.36) ( 1.28)f--.------..---..- ..---- .__._ - - _ ......_.._----1--._.._-------
Executive Age .0203 .0202 .0247 .0202
(0.81) (0.80) (0.99) (0.8 1)
f----------......-.--............--..-.-....-...- ..-...- .__.__...-_._._-_. ----.. -----_.._- ..__........__._--
Log of Board Size .2315 .1953 .34 16 .0958
(0.85) (0.71) ( 1.24) (0.35)
r····--··-··---··--···------····---··-· -_._-_.._--_.._- ----_._-- ._---_.._-- .._---_._.
NEDs .7131 .56 16 .8142 .508 1
I ( 1.28) ( 1.01) ( 1.47) (0.92)
-_.__...__.._-_........_._.._.._._._--1--._...._._---_. ---.__._....._...._---
---.--_.- ..._----_.._----_.
Institutional Shareholdings -.3368 -.3926 -.1729 -.2 118
(-0.89) (-1.03) (-0.46) (-0.56)
_._---_.__._-_._.__.._-_..._._..- ..__.._---_.- . .._-_..-_.•.-
CEO Dummy .354 1 .37 13 .3547 .3881 •
( 1.56) ( 1.63) ( 1.57) ( 1.71)
--_.....--_..__._...._---------- -----_._- ---_._.-
Const 8.996 · " 6.867· " 6.745" · 5.109 "
(3.57) (3.04) (3. 14) (2.23)
r---....- ...-..- ......--....- ...--.----..--..- ......-.f----......-..---.- ._._._---1---.
--
f------.-.---.-.-.-...-.--.--.--..- ....-. . . _ . . f----....---1-._._--- ._-
F test 3.47*** 3.24*** 3.94**· 3.90***f-----.---.-------.-...-..---.. ._----_._---- -_.._-_._-------_.._.
R2 0.0007 0.0023 0.0022 0.0068f-----.----.--.-...-.-...---..........- ....-.-.-...-....--.- ... ---._.__._--- ._-_._-'---' ---_.... __ ......----
Hausman Test 40.99"· 27.94·" 4 1.53*** 18.17">-----r--'----..1--.__.__...- -_..Fixed or Random Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixedf-----..- .......-..--..- ...--.-.. --.. · --· ··------l·· ·---····-·· ·--- 1----- -
'1Observa tions (N) 778 778 778 778
•.• •. •• •: Statistically significant at 10%, 5% & 1% level respectively
Table 6.7 al so indicates that the coe ffic ient on firm size variable is insignificant a ll
performan ce regressions, exc ept for the ab solute accounting mea sure EP . This result is
incon si stent w ith the findings in earlie r empirica l mod el s, wh er e firm size always has a
s ignifica nt effec t on the level of executive compe nsation (both cost and va lue of total
/5 7
compensation, cash compensation and cost of incentives). The insignificant coefficient on
size variable suggests that firm size, as measured in logof market valuation of company, has
no effect on the level of net incentive payto executives.
Moreover, even the coefficient on CEO dummy variable is also insignificant, except
for the EPS models, suggesting that there is no evidence of a difference in the level of
incentive value to be received by CEO and other executive directors. However, the
conclusions which may be drawn from these findings are somewhat limited. Firstly, the data
sample size has dropped dramatically with the exclusion of observation where net incentive
value is equal to zero. This exclusion bring the sample size from 1137 observations in total
pay model and 905 observations in cost-of-incentive model to 778observations in incentive-
value model. The exclusion of theseobservations may causethe problem of biased estimates
of the determinants of executive compensation. Secondly, the overall fit of the models is
very low compared to the results presented earlier in this chapter. The overall fit of the
model (R2) is less than 1% in all four regressions. Although the F test is significant,
suggesting the models are still significant, F statistic has declined sharply from over 40 in
cash paymodel and over 20 in total paymodel to just 3.5 in incentive valuemodel.
Controlling for possible autocorrelation and time varying incentive pay, the
Arellano-Bond regression results (Table 6.8) confirm the finding in OLS model that there is
no evidence of a difference between the value of incentive pay to the CEO and other
executives. According to Arellano-Bond estimator, there is no autocorrelation (second order
Arellano-Bond test statistic is insignificant) in the model and the instrumental variables arc
valid (Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is insignificant). Table 6.8 also indicates
that firm performance does not have a significant effect on the value of incentive pay.
However, there is evidence that firm size is a significant determinant of incentive pay value,
except for shareholder return (TSR)model. Other significant effecton the value of incentive
pay is the age of executive, however the 95% confidence interval of the coefficient includes
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zero in all four regression, suggesting that the coefficient on executive age is not statistically
different from zero. All other executive's individual variables (shareholding and tenure) and
monitoring function variables (Board size, NEDs, and institutional shareholding) are
insignificant.
Ta ble 6-8: Determinants of Incenti ve Pay - Va lue to Executives
(Arellano-Bond GMM Estimator)
Performance Variables
Dependent Variable:
Incentive Pay (Value to Exes)
TSR
Coefficient
((-statistic)
TobinQ ROCE
Coefficient Coefficient
((-statistic) (t-statistic)
EPS
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
--_._.__...._.._.._.._- ......_._..._.._--_...._.._.- --_._..---_.._-- _.._-_...__.._ ..._... --_.._------ ._------
Lag Dependent Variable .4320*** .4113*** .4153*** .3946***
----f--=--....-:...--
Const
Log of Board Size
Executive Age
Executive Tenure
Performance
t - - -
f--- - - ----..--.--- (3.08) (2 .. 91) (2.97) (2.7 1)
.1294 -.0216 .0896 -.00 14
(1.13) (-0.36) (0.93) (-0.57)
---- --_.._-- - - _._.-------..- -_. - --
.2696 I .3823** I .3554** .3987**
(1.56) ! ~ ~ 2 2 __ I.. J..2.,: 1! ) _ c-2.34)
-143.68 I -105.30 I -103.87 -101. 19
(-0.81) (-0.60) I (-0.59) I (-0.58)
1----- --------+---.-00-5-6--+---.-0-060- --1 -.0079 - -.0038
(-0.06) (-0.06) (·0.08) (-0.04)
.2352* .2345* .2374* .2277*
(1.70) (1.70) (1.72) (1.66)
-. 1566 -.1163 -.0986 -.1380
_ .. +--__(_-0:38._)_ . _ ~ - 0 . 2 8 ) . ~ ~ ( : : . .0 . 2 4 ) . (_0_.3_3_ --1
NEDs -1.277 -1.2 18 -1.284 - 1.1 40
(-1.26) (-1.21) (-1.27) (-1.12)
,....-'_.._-_.........__...._..__...._-_._.._...._.. _..-..- -- _... --- - -
Institutional Shareholdings .3624 .3892 .3888 .3830
(0.53) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57)
C EO- D-u';:;my-- - .. - ..·---·---1--..;....6514---i- Ji304.... -.627 9- - .6288
1-- t__( I _ . 5 5_ _ _ - - I _ _ 1 . . 8 ~ - r (1.47) - t ~ ~ ) ) ~
-.2970** I -.3013** -.2979** -.2912**
I(-2.14) (-2.18) I (-2.15) (2.10)
- - ---"-'- --
ILog of Firm's Market Valuation
I ..
I Executive Ownership
i 4.375.50
--_._-~ - ----
Sargan Test 4.44 5.00
r .... --------+-- --.--r----1 Arellano-Bond order I -5.19*** -5.13*** -5.17*** -5.03·"
I
r-"A-re- II-an-o-. B- ond order 2 0.10 1 0 . 2 2 _= -2f8'7131 O
2'8
270
I Observations (N) 287 I 287 --r
•.••.•••: Statistically significantat 10%, 5% & I% level respectively
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Table 6-9: Comparison results between cost models and value models
Variables TSR TobinQ ROCE Ell
(z-value) (z-value) (z-value) (z-value)
Performance -0.122 -0.206 0.001 0.001
Lag Performance -0.080 0.016 0.000 0.000
Log of Firm's MY 0.075 0.043 0.042 0.026
Executive Ownership -56.37"* -57.18"*
-57.22*" -55.79*"
Executive Tenure 0.013 0.010 0.009 0.010
Executive Age 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.008
Log of Board Size -0.150 -0.136 -0. 106
-0.288
NEDs 0.033 0.145 0.084 0.158
Institutional Shareholdings 0.481 0.481 0.413 0.452
CEO Dummy 0.023 0.015 0.014 0.014
•• •: Statistically significant at 1% level
Overall, the level of incentives granted to executive director is significantly
determined by the firm size (market valuation), executive tenure and age, proportion of non-
executive directors in the board, and the CEO position (C -0 dummy variable). These
variables, however, do not have a significant effect on the value of those incentives to
executives, except for firm size variable in Arellano-Bond models. With regard to firm
performance variable, only accounting return measured in ROCE has signifi cant and positive
coefficient with the cost of incentives, while both TSR and ROCE has significant effect on
the value of those incentives to executives. The conclusion that might be drawn from the e i
limited due to the drop of variables and very low level of fitness of the model .
160
Summary of empirical tests of the presented hypotheses on the determinants of
executive pay components is recapped in the following table.
Table 6-10: Summary ofhypotheses and empirical results
Hyp otheses Description Cash Pay Incentives Total Pay
Model Pay Model Model
I Executive pay components Supported Varies, upportedI HI
I and executive pay structure weaklyare positively related to firm
performance supported
f-.---.._- --. .__...-.--....__.•._.__._----_.- ---_.,-_.-_._---
1-12 The relationship between firm Not Mostly no Mostly no
performance and executive
applicable evidence evidencecompensation is affected by
the use of cost payor pay
value as measures of
executive pay
- - ---.-- -
I \-1 3 Executive pay components Supported Supported upported
I and pay structure are
I positively related to firm size
, I
- -
!
-
-- - --1--
\-14a I Executive pay components o evidence o evidence ' 0 evidence
I and pay structure are
Inegatively related withexecutive shareholdings
H4b Executive pay components o evidence o evidence o evidence
1and pay structure is positivelyrelated with executive
shareholdings
r------. - - _. ._ - - -- -
I
1-15 Executive pay components Supported Supported Supported
and pay structure are
positively related to executive
tenure and executive age
---- - - •
\-16 Executive pay components Varies, Mo tly no Mo tly no
and pay structure are
mostly no evidence evidencenegatively related to the level
monitoring and the evidence
_L_effectiveness of the board
-- --
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6.2 Determinants of the Proportion of Incentive Pay in Total Compensation
This section presents empirical results testing hypotheses on the determinants of the
ratio of long-term incentive pay to total compensation for executive directors. As discussed
in Chapter 4, the set of hypotheses on the determinants of incentive pay ratio (pay structure)
is recapped as follows.
HI: Executive pay components and executive pay structure are positively related tofirm
performance
H3: Executive pay components andpay structure arepositivelyrelatedtofirm size
l!1!!: Executive pay components and pay structure are negatively related with executive
shareholdings
llJ.k: Executive pay components and pay structure is positively related with executive
shareholdings
!:!1l. Executive pay components and pay structure are positively related to executive
tenure and executive age
H6: Executive pay components and pay structure are negatively related to the level
monitoring and the effectiveness ofthe board
The empirical results on the determinants of long-term incentive pay ratio are
presented in Table 6.11 to Table6.13. The incentive payratio is determined for bothcost-to-
company and value-to-executive measures using OLS estimator and Arellano-Bond GMM
estimator. As presented inTable 6.11,which shows the results on the determinants ofcostof
incentive pay ratiousingOLS estimator, the ratio of long-term incentive pay ratio at cost is
strongly determined by firm size (measured in natural logarithm of firm's market valuation),
executive tenure and age, and the CEO position (CEO dummy variable) in all performance
regressions. A strong correlation between firm size and the ratio of long-term incentive pay
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means that in bigger finn, executive directors tend to be granted larger proportion of long-
term incentives in the compensation package. This result supports the managerial power
argument that in larger finn, executives try to 'camouflage' their extraction of 'rent' through
the greater used of long-term incentives rather than observable cash pay in order to avoid the
'outrage'. It is also consistent with the notion that large firm, who pay their executives much
higher than small finn, tries to ease public criticism by reducing the level of cash pay and
increasing long-term incentives for the same total (high) compensation paid to executives.
The effect of executive tenure and age on the ratio of long-term incentive pay,
however, has opposite sign. The coefficient on executive tenure variable is positive and
significant in all performance regressions, while the coefficient on executive age is negative
and significant. The positive coefficient on executive tenure variable suggests that the longer
tenure in the position, the larger proportion of long-term incentive pay to be granted to
executives. This result is consistent with agency theory argument (hypothesis HS) for a
positive relationship between executive tenure and the proportion of incentive components.
However, the effect of executive age on the proportion of incentive pay is in opposite way, a
negative and significant relationship. This is inconsistent with the notion that by the time
(age), executives become more risk-neutral and willing to accept a highly incentive
compensation contract. Furthermore, the significant effect of CEO position (CEO dummy
variable) on the proportion of incentive pay indicates that when an executive becomes CEO,
he/she is paid not only significant higher total pay (as found earlier) but also higher
proportion of long-term incentive pay.
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Table 6-11: Determinants of Incentive Pay Ratio- Cost to company
(OLS regression)
.0890.0667g
Dependent Variable:
Performance Variables
TSR TobinQ ROCE EPSPercentage of Incentive Pay
(Cost to company) Coeffic ient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(I-statistic) (I-statist ic) (t-statistic) (I-statistic)
Performance .003 1 -.0201·" .0177"· -.000 1
0.16 (-4.16) (4.S7) (-0.24) j_______• • •__._ ~ _ _ R _ ..
- -
Lag Performance -.008 1 .0002 .0042 " · -.0005"
I (-O .SO) (0.10) (S.28) (-2.3S)
-
. -- -
._-- .,-- -
- - - - -
Lo of Firm' s Market Valuation .0758·" .1135"· I ••• •••
3.43 (S.69) (3.64) (4.41 )
> - - - ----- ----- --- - - -- - .
Executive Ownership -.0 174 .0897 -.OS37 -.0188 I
(-0.02) (0.12) (-0.07) (-0.03) I
--_.---_...•.__.._.._........._._._- -_._.__..- ._._.._---
---- ---
-_._--_.
Executive Tenure .0137" .0128 " .0 141" .0143 "
(2 .31) (2.20) (2.44) (2.44)
,....---
- -
- - ---
I Executive Age -.0111· -.0136" -.0105· -.0 112" I
~ - - - - - - _ .._ ..- i-. (-1.9S) (-2.4S) (-1.89) (-1.99)
Log of Board Size .070 1 .0214 .0968· .OS08
( 1.29) (0.40) ( 1.82) (0.94)
-- - -
NEDs -. 1486 -.1112 -.1283 -. IS64
(- 1.40) (-1.07) (-1.24) (- 1.48)
---
Institutional Shareholdings -.0170 -.0472 .0 14 1 -.0039
I (-0.22) (-0.63) (0.19) (-O .OS)I
,
-- -
- --
-- - -ICEO Dummy .1251 · " .1219 · " .1189·" .1275· "
(3.39) (3.37) (3.29) (3.47)
.------------------
-_... ._-
Const -.9114· -1.437·" -.8295· -1.130"
I (-1.7 8) (-3. IS) (-1.92) (-2.43)
>-- - - -- - --- -- - --- - -
,..-- ---- ---- ------- - ------
I F test 4.16"· 7.3S"· 7.79·" 4.8S·"
~ -_._..._...............__.._...._...__.•. _ ~ ~ .. _ ........_·......••__·_· _._.- .-.-,.
- ---
_•..
-
--_..
R2 0.1200 0.I S22 0.1280 0.\ 3881- -._- ._.-.-....-'_-'_--. _._- _.- ----- _. f--
-
I Hausman Test \ 7.S0· 38.48"· 21.39" 38.S9"· I
----I-- -- ..
I Fixed or Random Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed I
IObservations (N)
1
1137
- -
- .
-
\ 137 1\ 37 11 37
' . " . "': Ssatisticalty significant at 10%. 5% & 1% level respectively
The sign and significance of the relationship betv een firm performance and
incentive pay ratio is dependent on the performance measures used. The coefficient of
accounting return variable ROCE is positive and significant, suggesting that accounting
return (ROCE) has ignificant role in determining the percentage of incentive pay in total
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executive pay. However, the coefficient of market-based performance variable Tobin's Q is
negative and significant suggesting a negative relationship between Tobin'Q and incentive
pay ratio. Other performance measures (TSR and EPS) do not have an effect on the ratio of
incentive pay of executive directors. When considering the effect of lagged performance,
lagged accounting return RaCE is positively and significantly related to incentive pay ratio,
while lagged TobinQ and TSR coefficients are insignificant, lagged EPS coefficient is
negative and significant. In sum, the effect of firm performance on incentive pay ratio is
only significant consistently when performance is measured in RaCE; other performance
measures have conflict or insignificant coefficients.
With regard to the effect of the monitoring function (the role of the board and
institutional shareholder) in shaping the components ofcompensation package for executives,
all three variables representing the monitoring function have insignificant coefficients. The
coefficient on non-executive director variable (NEDs) and institutional shareholding variable
is negative suggesting that the dominance of non-executive directors in the board and
institutional shareholders help to increase the level of monitoring executives to effectively
reduce the proportion of pay relating to firm performance, according to agency theory. This
effect, however, is not statistically significant in all performance regressions.
The overall fit of the model is roughly 13% suggesting that linear OLS regression
model explains about 13% of the variation in executive incentive compensation ratios. While
not too low, this R2 points to the need for further investigation to explain this phenomenon
more fully. By using lags of levels and first-differences of independent variables as
instruments to control for time varying incentive pay ratio, Arellano-Bond estimator not only
removes unobserved firm-specific effects but also time-invariant explanatory variables. As
presented in Table 6.12, Arellano-Bond GMM regression results confirm that firm size is a
primary determinant of incentive pay ratio, except for shareholder return (TSR) equation.
The effect of firm performance on incentive pay ratio is only significant in ROCE model,
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which is consistent with the conclusion made in OLS model that the relationship between
firm performance and incentive pay ratio is only positive and significant when performance
is measured in ROCE. Table 6.12 also indicates that executive tenure is positively and
significant ly related to incentive pay ratio, while the coefficient on executive age is negative
and insignificant. This result once again suggests that longer tenure is connected with higher
proportion of incentive pay granted to executives.
Table 6-12: Determinants of Incentive Pay Ratio- Cost to Company
(Arellano-Bond GMM Estimator)
Performance Variables
Dependent Variable:
TSR TobinQ ROCE EPSProportion of Incentive Pay
(Cost to Co.) Coeffic ient Coefficient Coeffic ient Coeffic ient
(I-statistic) (I-statistic) (I-statistic) (I-statistic)
~ - - - - - ._...__..•_._----,-_._-_._- ._-_..- -.- _... _- --Lag Dependent Variable .2466 *** .2343*** .2802*** .2335 ***
(3.26) (3.12) (3.62) (3.10)
. . --
-
I Performance .032 \ .0022 .0209 *** .000 1
I (1.50) (0.23) (4.77) (0.14) I
- _._-
I
-
f..-- -
- -i Log of Firm 's Market Valuation .0487 .0790** .0719** .0811***
l (1.47) (2.49) (2.40) (2.57)---" ----
Executive Ownership 1.958 1.952 1.966 --1 1.949 I( 1.38) ( 1.38) _ ~ (1.38)
~ - - - ._-
Executive Tenure .0535*** .0537*** .0530 *** .0536 ***
(3.9 1) (3.94) (3.93) (3.93)
- ---_._--
-------
Executive Age -.0204 -.0207 -.0 196 -.0203
(-0.66) (-0.67) (-0.64) (-0.66)f-----.-.........- ..--.------------.. --...----.----_...._-----------_._--- ,--_...-
Log of Board Size .1996 *** .1953** .1940*** .1946***
(2.68) (2.60) (2.66) (2.6 1)
r--- - - .----.- ... - ...- .-.-... _ ......... _.--..-
------r-- _ . ~ ~ ..__.._---- f--- ----NEDs .0220 .0092 .0467 .0094(0.16) (0.06) (0.27) (0.06)
1---_._.- .- - - --.----- ~ - - - _ _ _. -_._- ._-" ----I--- -
! Institutional Shareholdings .0894 .0877 .0360 .0906
(0.76) (0.74) (0.31) (0.77)I -_._--
--- -
CEO Dummy .1786*** .1773*** .1648*** .1770***
(3.57) (3.56) (3.34) (3.55)
--
Const -.0435 -.045 1 -.0458 -.0458 I
(-1.40) (- 1.46) (-1.49) (-1.47)
r- - ----- - - --I I
r- -- - ---
---_.
-- - ----
-
- -
1I Sargan Test 7.36 6.33 7.85 6.33
[Arell; r:o-Bond order I -.
- -6..:63 **_*_ ! ~ 2 2 2 ~ __
_ -6:46: :*_ +--6.69:;;- ~
-- - - ._----_ ..
~ Arellano-Bond order2 1 1 7 3 ~ 1.74' 0.87 I.n*
- - ---_. -"-- --._--- ----- _._-
....-s-i"4---i-51 4 -- -
1 Observations (N) 514 514
*, .....*,'Statistically significant aI JO%, 5% & J% level respectively
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Another important result from Arellano-Bond regression is the positive and
significant relationship between the size of the board and the proportion of incentive pay
granted to executive directors. This result indicates that larger number of board members is
associated with higher use of long-term incentives to pay executive directors. Hence it
supports the agency argument that when the size of the board is getting large, the monitoring
function is diminishing and incentive contract is needed to align the interests of executives
with those of shareholders. The other two monitoring variables (dominance of non-executive
directors and institutional shareholding) do not have any effect on the determinants of
incentive pay ratio. Once again the CEO position (CEO dummy) has significant effect on the
ratio of the cost of incentive pay. Overall, Arellano-Bond estimator produces the same
results as OLS fixed effects estimator except for the significant effect of board size
coefficient. The Sargan test statistic is insignificant in any regressions suggests that there is
no evidence of overidentifying restrictions or the GMM estimation is consistent. The
Arellano-Bond order 2 test statistic is significant at 10% level suggesting that there is
autocorrelation in the model. However, the problem of autocorrelation is not serious at 5%
level of significance in all 4 performance equations. Hence the instruments are still valid at
5% significance level and the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation is unbiased.
To examine the difference between the cost of long-term incentive pay and its actual
value to executives in the determination of incentive pay ratio, the following Table 6.13
presents empirical results on the determinants of the ratios of incentive value. Unlike the
cost-of-incentive model, firm size does not have any significant effect on the ratio of
incentive pay, except for the Tobin Q regression. On the other hand, both current and lagged
shareholder return and accounting return in ROCE are positively and significantly correlated
with incentive pay ratio. This result indicates that the ratio of incentive pay in value is
strongly determined by both current year performance and prior year performance. This is
consistent with the fact that the value of long-term incentive pay is partly determined based
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on current firm performance. The normal vesting period of long-term incentives (options and
LTIPs) is three years start from the beginning of the granting year (i.e. the first assessment
year is current year performance). Hence higher finn performance (TSR and ROCE) is
associated with higher value of incentives and higher proportion of incentive pay in total
executive compensation, ceteris paribus. However, the coefficient on Tobin Q variable is
negative and significant indicating that higher Tobin's Q is related with lower ratio of
incentive pay value. Finn performance measured in EPS has no significant effect on the ratio
of incentive pay value.
Also indicated in Table 6.13, executive's individual contingencies have a significant
effect on the ratio of incentive value to executives. Consistent with cost-of-incentive ratio
model, executive tenure is positively and significantly correlated with the ratio of incentive
value indicating that longer tenure on the position helps executives gain more long-term
incentive pay. The coefficient on executive age variable also negative and significant as in
cost incentive ratio model suggesting that older executive tends to earn less long-term
incentives in total compensation. Moreover, there is strong evidence that executive share
ownership is negatively related to the ratio of incentive pay value. The coefficient on
executive ownership variable is negative and significant in all four performance regressions;
indicating that when executive directors hold more shares in the company, they tend to
receive less long-term incentives in their total compensation. The result is consistent with
agency argument (hypothesis H4a) that higher existing shareholding prevents executives
from accepting further risk bearing by higher performance-related compensation contract.
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Table 6-13: Determinants of Inc entive Pay Ratio - Valu e to executives
(OLS Regression)
Performance Variables
Dependent Variable:
TSR TobinQ ROCE EPSProportion of Incentive Pay
(Value to Exes) Coeffic ient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic)
~ . _ - - - _ . _ - _ . _ - _ . _ .._..__._. ---_._--_.- _._._----- ._----- _.
Performance .0542*** -.0123*** .0167*** .0000
(2.98) (-2.64) (4.50) (0.06)
._--_.".-._-_._.._-_..._... ...._.. __ ..._,_...._..--_ ...... _~~ .....__..- -....__...._-_._..,_.._.__.--_.__._-_..._-..... .__.__..........._--_._._.._- ._......_---
Lag Performance .0356** -.0026 .0042*** -.0004**
(2.28) (-1.13) (5.50) (- 1.96)
Log of Firm 's Market Valuation -.0233 .0387** .0042 .02 13
(-1.11) (2.02) (0.24) ( 1.10)
f--.---..-.--......----.--.--.--.-.--..------... _....._.__._- - _._....._- ._-_._........._......----...._- :........_--_._--------_. .._-_._-_.-
Executive Ownership -1.924*** -1.834*** -1.961*** -1.932***
(-2.70) (-2.60) (-2.80) (-2.70)
[ Executive Tenure .0084 .0097* .0113** .0114 ** I
(1.49) (1.75) (2.06) (2.02)
----_._.....__._._.._._----_.._-_._...... ....__......-_.__......_........- --_.._-_.._._...._--_.__... ._--
I
Executive Age -.0)) 0** -.0)) 6** -.0089* -.0098*
(-2.04) (-2.17) (-1.69) (-1.8 1)
r
_.-_._---------- ._-_._-----------f----
-- -----
Logof Board Size .0207 -.0386 .0355 -.006 1
l.----.------..-.-.--..-------- (0.40) (-0.74) (0.70) (-0.12)._----- -_._----... __...
NEDs -.0449 -.0607 -.0628 -.085 1
(-0.44) (-0.61) (-0.63) (-0.84)
._.._-_._----_ ..._-
._-_..__._-
-- I I ~ --Institutional Shareholdings -.0507 -.0748 -.0057 -.0273
(-0.70) (-1.03) (-0.08) (-0.38)F --·-- ------ ._- - - - l l - - - -CEO Dummy .0825** .0822** .0778** .0853**
(2.35) (2.36) (2.25) (2.42)r----..-·-..··--....--..-·-·-·--·---..---· -- .. .- ..._.._----- .-
Const 1.227** .1169 .4844 .2843
(2.51) (0.27) (1.1 7) (0.64)
------------_._.
----_.__.
-
F test 2.74*** 4.05*** 5.46*** 2.18**
~ R 2 - - - · - - ..---..--·-------..·------ ··--0·:0058·..-·--- ...... ._.._......_ ...._..._._........_..... -------
0.0529 0.0318 0.043 1
H a a ~ ~ a a Test · - - - - - - - - - - ! - · - - - 2 4 4 8 6 ; * .-- ----- ---34.56*** 16.08* 20.23**
.--------_.- - - - --
.._-
---
I Fixed or Random Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
----
--_..__.__.. _._--_.__.
....._.._-_.._--------_._---
-
_._. --- _.-
- --- -
I Observations (N) 1137 11 37 I 11 37 11 37
I
*. **. ***: Statistica lly significant at 10%. 5% & 1% level respectively
The relationship between the board monitoring function, institutional shareholding
and the proportion of incentive value in total executive pay is not confirmed. The coefficient
on board size, non-executive director and institutional shareholding variables is statistically
insignificant in all performance regressions. However, once again the CEO po ition ha a
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significant effect on the ratio of incentive value for executive directors. The CEO dummy
coefficient is positive and significant in all regressions suggesting that there is evidence of a
difference in the structure of compensation for the CEO and other executives. In economic
term, the coefficient of approximately 0.08 means that when an executive become CEO,
he/she receives a compensation package with 8% higher in the proportion of long-term
incentive pay components.
Table 6-14: Comparison results between cost models and va lue models
Variables T R TobinQ RO E P
(z-value) (z-value) (z-value) (z-value)
Performance -0.0 17 -0.002 0.000 0.000
Lag Performance -0.0 19 0.002 0.000 0.000
Log of Firm's MV 0.027 0.012 0.017 0.015
Executive Ownership 0.706 0.739 0.68 1 0.709
Executive Tenure 0.002 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 \
Executive Age 0.000 -0.00 1 -0.00 1 -0.00 1
Log of Board Size 0.037 0.07 1 0.03 1 0.060
NEDs -0.07 1 -0.04 1 -0.047 -0.042
Institutional Shareholdings 0.046 0.023 0.096 0.061
CEO Dummy 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
The comparison between cost model and value model of the determinants of
incentive pay ratio is presented in Table 6.1 4. According to the empirical results in Table
6.14, there is no evidence of a difference between using cost model and value model in
determining executi e pay structure. Again, there' s no e idence to support Hypothesi H2.
urnmary of empirical tests of the presented hypotheses on the determinant of
executive pay structure (incentive pay ratios) is recapped in the following table.
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Hypotheses
I HI
1-12
1-13
Table 6-15: Summary ofhypotheses and empirical results
Description
I Executive pay components and executive pay structure
i are positively related to firm performance
IThe relationship between firm performance and
executive compensation is affected by the use of cost
payor pay value as measures of executive pay
Executive pay components and pay structure are
positively related to firm size
Incentive Pay
Ratios Motlel
I
I
, H4a Executive pay components and pay structure arc
negatively related with executive shareholdings
. - - ---- ------ .._-- -
H4b Executive pay components and pay structure is
positively related with executive shareholdings
- ----
L_-- _-L- ---
I
I
H5
1-16
Executive pay components and pay structure are
positively related to executive tenure and executive age
Executive pay components and pay structure are
negatively related to the level monitoring and the
effectiveness of the board
upported I
Mostly no I
evidence I
I
-- --
J
Overall, the empirical analyses of the determinants of long-term incentive pay ratio
suggest that firm' s market valuation has a po itive and significant effect on the ratio of
incentive pay granted to executive directors. This relationship, however, is stati tically
insignificant when the ratio of incentive value is used as dependent variable. The result
suggests that whilst the size of the firm shapes the balance between component of executive
pay, in which there is higher proportion of incentive pay components for a larger firm; there
is no evidence of such effect on the ratio of actual value of incenti e in total executi e
compensation. The relationship between firm performance and the ratio of incentive pay i
dependent on the performance measures u ed. The cost of incenti e ratio is ignif antly
determined by accounting return in RaCE, while the ratio of net incenti e value is
determined by both shareholder return (T R) and accounting return (RaCE). With r gard to
executive's individual variables, executive tenure still has significant effect on both ratio of
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cost and value of long-term incentive pay suggesting that executive with longer tenure tend
to accept higher proportion of incentive pay components in their total compensation contract.
Executive age also has significant effect on incentive pay ratio but with opposite sign and
the relationship is only presented in OLS fixed effects regressions. Executive share
ownership variable is negatively and significantly related to the ratio of incentive value,
indicating that higher existing shareholding will prevent executives from accepting further
incentive components in their compensation package.
The monitoring function of the board and institutional shareholders do not have any
effect on the ratio of long-term incentives in total executive pay, except for the coefficient on
board size variable, which is positive and significant when controlling for lagged incentive
pay ratio using Arellano-Bond estimator. The CEO position. on the other hand, is strongly
correlated with the ratio of incentive pay. The results implying that when an executive
director becomes CEO, he/she is not only paid higher compensation but also higher
proportion of long-term incentives in their total pay. The overall fit of the model, however, is
quite modest with only 12% explanation in the cost model and less than 5% explanation in
the value model.
6.3 Conclusion
This chapter has empirical1y examined the detenninants of executive pay
Components and the ratio of incentive pay to total executive compensation. A number of
findings have emerged from the analysis. Firstly, the effect of finn perfonnance on the level
of pay components as wel1 as the incentive pay ratio is dependent on the perfonnancc
measures used. Shareholder return (TSR) has a significant effect on both the level of cash
pay and total executive pay; its coefficient, however, is insignificant in the incentive pay
model. In the pay ratio model, shareholder returns have no effect on the ratio of the incentive
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pay's cost, but does play an important role in determining the ratio of the value of incentive
pay to total compensation. The finding is inconsistent with agency theory and supports the
managerial power argument for higher levels of cash pay and total pay rather than risky
long-term incentive pay. On the other hand, accounting returns measured in ROCE is
strongly related to pay components, except for the cash pay model, and incentive pay ratio
model. This result suggests that accounting performance (ROCE) is a significant determinant
of the incentive pay level and ratio, supporting agency theory for a higher level of
performance-related pay components. Other performance measures (TobinQ and EPS) are
mostly insignificant and conflicts in sign of the relationship with executive pay. Although
there is evidence of significant relationship between firm performance (shareholder return
and ROCE) and pay components as well as incentive pay ratio; the economic significance of
the relationship is small, which is consistent with the findings of Jensen and Murphy (1990).
Lagged performance, again in shareholder return and accounting return ROCE, is a
determinant of total pay and incentive pay ratio but not cash payor incentive pay
components. In sum, the pay-performance relationship seems sensitive to performance
measures used. As already noted, this may be due to the difference in nature of performance
measures (TSR and Tobin's Q). This finding indicates that choice of measurement has an
impact on pay-performance sensitivity.
Secondly, firm size as measured by the natural logarithm of market valuation has a
significant effect on the level of pay components (cash pay, incentive pay and total pay) in
most regressions. The result is consistent with the notion that larger firm tends to have larger
compensation packages for their executives. The coefficient on the firm size variable is also
positive and significant in the incentive-cost-ratio model, however, it is insignificant in
incentive-value-ratio model. The finding indicates that although firm size determines the
level of pay components, it fails to determine the proportion of incentive value in total
executive pay.
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With regard to the individual contingencies of executive directors, tenure is found to
have a consistently strong effect on the determinants of both pay components and pay ratio.
A positive and significant coefficient of executive tenure implies that with longer tenure,
executives tend to be granted higher compensation with a larger proportion of pay including
incentive components. The finding of a positive relationship between tenure and the level of
pay components is consistent with the managerial power theory, which argues that long
tenure is associated with higher power to extract 'rent' to the detriment of shareholder
interests. The positive tenure coefficient in the incentive pay ratio model. however. is
consistent with agency theory which suggests that executives with longer tenure tend to be
more risk-neutral and accept a higher proportion of pay in long-term incentives for a higher
return. The other individual variable. executive shareholdings, does not have any significant
effect on pay component except for the value of total pay when controlling for lagged pay in
the model. However, executive shareholding strongly and negatively determines the ratio of
incentive pay value indicating that higher existing shareholding will prevent executives from
accepting further incentive components in their compensation package.
Among variables representing the monitoring function. board size has a positive
effect on the level of total pay (cost model) and is positively related with the proportion of
long-term incentives to total executive pay. This finding is consistent with agency arguments
that larger boards diminish the monitoring function and thus incentive contracts. a substitute
mechanism. are preferred to align executive-shareholder interests. The presence and
dominance of non-executive directors on the board is found to be negatively related to cash
pay but positively related to incentive pay. Although this result does not support agency
arguments that the presence of non-executive directors helps to increase monitoring, it is
consistent with the notion that the dominance of non-executive directors helps to reduce the
level of cash pay and increase the level of incentive pay, i.e. enhances the use of incentive
contracts. Hence. non-executive directors may prefer to use alternative means, rather than
the enforcement of monitoring. to align the interest of executives with those of shareholders.
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The role of institutional shareholders is not clear in determining the level of pay components
and incentive pay ratio.
Moreover, the analysis also indicates that while there is a difference in the
determination coefficients in empirical models using cost pay and pay value as dependent
variables, the difference is not statistically significant according to Z-values. Another
important finding in this chapter is the significant and positive relationship between CEO
position (CEO dummy) with both the level of pay components as well as the ratio of
incentive pay. In economic terms, when an executive director becomes a CEO, his I her
compensation increases by 73% in total cost pay and 64% in total pay value. The significant
difference between CEO compensation and other executives' is consistent with toumament
theory, which suggests that the position in the organisational hierarchy may out-weigh the
importance of the marginal performance as the main determinant of executive pay. The
empirical results on the testing oftoumament theory are presented in the following chapter.
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Chapter 7
EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF TESTING TOURNAMENT THEORY ON
THE DETERMINANTS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
7.0 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 6, it is likely that the position of the executive director plays
an important role in determining the level of executive compensation. Specifically, the CEO
position has a significant effect on all measures of executive compensation level, suggesting
that the CEO pay is significantly higher than other executives' pay. Theoretically,
tournament theory suggests that the rank-order in organisational hierarchy is a main
determinant of executive pay (Lazear and Rosen, 198Ia). In addition, tournament theory
predicts that the pay difference increases as one moves up in the organisational hierarchy.
The convexity of the relationship between the shape of executive compensation and
organisational level is a key prediction of the tournament models implying the operation of
tournaments based on relative performance. The second aspect of tournament theory is the
effect of the number of contestants competing in the tournament on the size of tournament
prize. The efficiency of the tournament pay structure is also an important aspect indicating
the effect of pay dispersion on firm performance and on average executive pay. The purpose
of this chapter is to present an empirical analysis ofthese predictions of tournament theory.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.1 provides some details of the
samples and empirical models (in addition to those reported in Chapter 5) to be used in
examining the predictions of the tournament theory. Section 7.2 presents a univariate
analysis of the variables used in the analysis. Section 7.3 discusses the empirical analyses of
the hypotheses derived from tournament theory. In particular, the empirical results
examining the convex relationship between executive pay and organisational level are
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presented in subsection 7.3.1. Subsection 7.3.2 presents the empirical test of the relationship
between tournament prize and the number of contestants. The effect of pay dispersion on
firm performance and average pay is examined in subsection 7.3.3 and 7.3.4, respectively.
Finally, section 7.4 presents a discussion and conclusions.
7.1 Sample and Empirical Models
There are two samples to be used in the analyses presented in this chapter. The first
sample is as described in Chapter 5 and consists of 345 executive directors collected from 50
companies in five years 2001-2005 (unbalanced sample). This sample is used to test the first
prediction of the tournament theory (Hypothesis 7) that there is a convex relationship
between executive compensation and organisational level.
H7: There is convex relationship between executive compensation and organisational
level.
The model for testing this relationship takes the following form:
Ln (Pay) = a + p,RankI +P2Rank2 + P3Sharehoider Return + "Control
(Model 7.1)
where Rankl is a dummy coded 1 if an executive is CEO (Levell), 0 otherwise; Rank2 is a
dummy coded 1 if an executive's position is in Level 2 and 0 otherwise. In the data set,
executive directors are allocated to three distinct organisational levels based on their job
title/role provided in the annual reports and accounts. Level 1 - CEO (Rankl) is the chief
executive with highest authority in the company. Level 2 - higher executive (Rank2) is an
executive with highest authority within a division. This includes managing directors of
major divisions or business units, executive chairman, chief operating officer (COO), chief
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finance officer (CFO). Level 3 - other executives (which is the reference category and
omitted in the model) includes executive directors with mainly functional duties such as
human resource director, legal director, personnel director, development director, marketing
director, etc. This classification is consistent with Conyon et at (200 I) and Lambert et at
(1993). Executive pay, shareholder returns and control variables are as defined in Chapter 5.
Control variables include firm size, executive tenure, age, percentage of non-executive
directors and institutional shareholdings. These control variables are those reported in
Chapter 6 to have strong or partly effect on the level of executive pay.
The second sample to be used to test the tournament theory consists of 50 UK
quoted companies in five years (balanced sample), which results in a total of 250
observations. For each observation, the pay gap between the CEO and other executive
directors and the dispersion of pay within the executive team are examined, considering the
relationship between pay gap and the number of contestants; and the effect of pay dispersion
on firm performance; and average pay. This sample is used to test these three other
predictions of the tournament theory. The empirical models to be used to examine these
predictions are described as follows.
As discussed in Chapter 4, tournament theory predicts that the tournament prize (or
pay gap) is positively related to the number of contestants (Hypothesis 8).
lll.i. The tournament prize (the gap between compensation levels) is positivelyrelated to
the numberofcontestants (number ofexecutives on the board)
Hence, the second model has the form:
Pay Gap =a + /h Ln(Number ofcontestants) + {32 Ln(Size)
(Model 7.2)
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where Pay Gap is the log of CEO pay minus the log of average pay received by non-CEO
(i.e. Level 2) executive team. This procedure is consistent with O'Reilly et al (1988), Main
et al (1993), Eriksson (1999), and Conyon et al (2001). Three measures of pay gap are
calculated for cash pay, long-term incentive pay, and total pay. Tournament prize (pay gap)
is also calculated for the cost of pay to company and the value of pay to executives, which
results in five different measures of pay gap. The number of contestants is the group of
candidates that compete for the CEO position and is identified as the number of non-CEO
(i.e. Level 2) executive directors. This measure is consistent with that used by Conyon et al
(2001).
The third aspect of the tournament theory discussed in Chapter 4 (Hypothesis 9)
relates to the effect of pay dispersion of executive team on firm performance.
H9: Pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance
This model has the form:
Firm Performance = a + PI Pay Dispersion + P2 Ln(Average Executive Pay) + PJ Ln(Size)
(Model 7.3)
Firm performance has four different measures: total shareholder return (TSR), Tobin's Q,
return on capital employed (ROCE), and earning per share (EPS) as described in Chapter S.
The pay dispersion variable is constructed as the coefficient of variation of total pay for the
executive team. This is the general procedure used by Main et al (1993), Eriksson (1999),
and Conyon et al (2001). Average total pay of the executive team is also included in the
model to control for the effect of average pay on firm performance, which is in line with
Main et al (1993) and Eriksson (1999).
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The fourth model tests the effect of pay dispersion on average pay of executive team
and has the following form:
HI0: Average pay level ofexecutive team is positively related to pay dispersion.
Model: Ln(Average Pay) = a + PI Pay Dispersion + fJJ Ln/Size)
(Model 7.4)
where average pay is the average of total pay received by the executive team; and pay
dispersion has two alternative measures: the coefficient of variation of total pay (as defined
in Model 7.3) and CEO-contestants differential (as defined in Model 7.2). This is consistent
with the procedure used by Main et al (1993) and Eriksson (1999).
These models are tested using a series of OLS fixed effects regressions of the
dependent variables on the independent variables and control variables. In terms of
executive pay, both cost of pay and pay value are used to measure pay and both results of the
empirical analysis using cost pay and pay value are presented to examine the effect of using
different pay measures on the relationships predicted by tournament theory.
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7.2 Descriptive Analysis ofVariables
The structure of compensation data with various components of compensation for
executives in different organisational levels is presented in Table 7.1. As Table 7.1 illustrates,
executive director in higher organisational position does receive higher average total pay and
also higher levels of each component of pay. These figures are shown as averages over the
period 2001-2005. This increasing pattern also exists with the median of executive pay. This
preliminary result suggests a positive relationship between executive pay and organisational
level.
Table 7-1: Summary of Executive Compensation by Organizational Levels
Mea" Media"
Variables CEO Level 2 Level 3 CEO Level 2 Level 3
Executive Executive Executive Executive
Salary (£'000) 545.64 326.99 239.68 500.00 300.00 217 .71
Bonus (£'000) 393.21 202.17 106.03 238.00 11'6.5 59.00
Cash Pay (£ '000) 999.83 562.60 367.76 771.00 464 .00 301.00
Cost of Options (£'000) 392.93 204.89 94.85 113.24 69.26 0.00
Cost of LTIPs (£'000) 597.6 1 235.19 23 1.32 264.90 130.58 73.32
Cost of Incentives (£'000) 990.54 440 .09 326. 17 448 .73 246 .61 155.74
Total Cost Pay (£'000) 1,990.37 1,002.69 693 .94 1,209.90 717 .38 508.03
Option s Value (£'000) 306.94 140.9 1 77.66 20.85 13.92 0.00
LTIPs Value (£'000) 313 .35 127.56 97.56 47.86 0.00 0.00
Incentive Value (£'000) 620 .29 268.46 175.23 2 15.93 118.66 65.62
Total Pay Value (£'000) 1,620.12 831.07 542.99 967.09 600.49 391.03
Observation s 250 682 205 250 682 205
IBI
Moreover, the results contained in Table 7.1 offer supports for the tournament
theory prediction that there is a convex relationship between executive pay and
organisational level. In other words, the pay difference increases as one moves up the
organisational hierarchy. For each of pay components, the percentage change from Level-2
executive's pay to Level-I executive' s (CEO's) pay is higher than the percentage change
from Level 3 executive's pay to Level 2 executive's pay. For example, Table 7.1 illustrates
that moving from a Level-2 executive position to the CEO position increases the average of
total pay (value) by 95% (i.e. from £831 ,070 to £1,620,120), whilst moving from Level 3
category (lower executive) to Level 2 (higher executive) results in an increase in average
total pay (value) of 53% (i.e. from £542,990 to £831 ,070).
This pattern of results is repeated across each of the components of pay and for both
mean and median pay. For a summary of the pattern of results, the percentage change in
executive pay (selected components of pay) across organisational levels, see Table 7.2 below.
The results in Table 7.2 illustrate that the premium for moving from Level 2 to Level I
(CEO) is in the range 61-131 percent, while the premium for mo ing from Level 3 to Level
2 is always lower and in the range 35-81 percent. This mean that the extra compensation i
always higher in more senior positions. The results are consistent with those reported by
Conyon et at (200 I) and suggest a convex relationship between executive pay and
organisational level.
Table 7-2: Percentage change of compensation between executive positions
Mea" Median
Variables From Level21 From Level3 From Level2\ From Level3
10 CEO 10 Level 2 10 CEO 10 Level 2
Cash pay 78% 53% 66% 54%
Cost of Incentives 125% 35% 82% 58%
Total cost pay 99% 44% 69% 41%
Incentives Value 131 % 53% 82% 81 %
Total Pay value 95% 53% 61% 54%
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Table 7.3 presents the univariate statistics for the variables used in the forthcoming
analysis, while the description of variables is presented in Table 7.4. Tab le 7.3 and Table 7.4
only describe those variables that have not been described earlier in Chapter 5. The summary
statistics for log of pay (all pay components in cost and value) variables, performance
variables and control variables have already been described in Chapter 5. As illustrated in
Table 7.3, the coefficient of variation of executive team compensation is 0.4470 (for cost of
pay) and 0.4398 (for value of pay), which indicates that the variation of pay in the executive
team is around 44% of it average value or pay dispersion within executive directors is about
44%. The median dispersion of executive pay is approximately 42%. The average number of
contestants, i.e. average number of non-CEO executive directors in the board, is 3.24, while
the median of contestants is 3.
Ta ble 7-3: Summary statistics of Variables
Variables Meall SD Median Mill Max
Al.ncasbpay 0.6142 0.2780 0.6018 -0.0947 1.4345 250
~ L n l n c t c o o t 0.7312 0.5427 0.6370 -1.4165 2.7608 203
~ L n T o t t l l o o t 0.6304 0.3537 0.6299 -1.0093 2.4886 250
~ L n l n n t v a a 0.7610 0.5654 0.6658 -1.4165 2.4162 174
~ L n T o t t l v v l 0.6400 0.3197 0.6228 -0.1 708 2.0048 250
CYcost 0.4470 0.1959 0.4197 0.001 2 1.4683 250
CYvaluc 0.4398 0.1870 0.4146 0.001 2 1.2331 250
Lnaverpayc 13.6863 0.71 25 13 .631 7 11.9867 16.3091 250
Lnaverpayv 13.5249 0.6770 13.4164 11 .9867 15.8847 250
Contestants 3.24 1.52 3.00 1.00 7.00 250
Lncontcstants 1.0451 0.5460 1.0986 0.00 1.9459 250
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Variables
Al.ncasbpay
~ ~ n l n n t c o o t
~ ~ n T T t a l c o s s
Al.nlnctval
Al.n'Totalval
CYcost
CYvalue
Lnaverpayc
Lnaverpayv
Contestants
Lncontcstants
Table 7-4: Description of Variables
Description
= Ln(CEOcash pay) - Ln(mean of non-CEO executive cash pay)
= Ln(CEO incentives cost) - Ln(mean of non-CEO executives' incentives cost)
= Ln(CEO total cost pay) - Ln(mean of non-CEO executives' total cost pay)
= Ln(CEO incentives value) - Ln(mean of non-CEO executives' incentives value)
= Ln(CEO total cost pay) - Ln(mean of non-CEO executives' total cost pay)
= Coefficient of variation of executive team's total cost pay (=SE/Mean)
= Coefficient of variation of executive team's total pay value
= Ln(Average total cost pay of executive team)
= Ln(Average total pay value of executive team)
= Number of non-CEO executive directors in the board of directors
= Ln(Number or non-CEO executives)
7.3 Empirical Analyses
In this section, the results of the empirical analyses examining the hypotheses
derived from tournament theory are presented. Each group of hypotheses is examined using
the relevant model described in section 7.)
7.3.1 Hypotheses 7: A convex relationship between executive pay and organisational
level
The first hypothesis examines the relationship between executive pay and
organisational level. Specifically, tournament theory predicts a convex relationship between
the level of executive pay and organisational level. As previously noted in Chapter 4, Lazear
and Rosen (198)) suggest that the higher position in the management hierarchy is as ociated
with the higher level of compensation. The empirical results presented in Chapter 6 have
already provided evidence supporting this prediction. The coefficient on CEO dummy
variables is positive and significant in all pay determination models suggesting that the CEO
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position has significant effect on the level of compensation. Specifically, when an executive
director becomes CEO hislher compensation increases by approximately 70%. In the model
7.1 above, the term Ih is the average change in log compensation between Level-3 executive
and Level-2 executive (Level-3 executive is the excluded category). The average change in
log compensation between Level-2 executive and CEO (Level I) is calculated as (fJI - P2);
because the term PI is the average change in log compensation between Level-3 executive
and CEO. Hence, to be consistent with the tournament prediction that higher organisational
position is associated with higher level of pay, we should observe PI ~ O O P 2 ~ 0 0 and (fJI - P2)
~ O O
Furthermore, the tournament theory predicts that there will be increasing
compensation gap as individual moves up the hierarchical ladder (Conyon, et al., 2001;
Lambert, et al., 1993; Main, et al., 1993; Rosen, 1986). It means a convex relationship
between executive pay and organisational level. The univariate analysis, as presented in
section 7.2, provides supports for this prediction since extra compensation weight is placed
on the most senior executive position. In the model 7.1, for this function to be convex, we
should further expect (fJ1 - P2) ~ P2 (or PI ~ 2p2J implying that the average change in log
compensation (pay gap) between the Level-2 executive and the CEO is higher than the
average change in log pay (pay gap) between the Level-3 executive and the Level-2
executive. This test procedure is outlined in Lambert et at (1993) and Conyon et at (2001).
The results of the empirical analysis of hypothesis 7, for a convex relationship
between executive's cost of pay and organisational level, are presented in Table 7.5. This
table presents the results of the analysis using three alternative measures of pay: Lncashpay
(log of cash pay), Lninctcost (log of cost of incentive pay), and Lntpaycost (log of total pay
at cost). As expected, the coefficients on the Level 1 (CEO) variable and Level 2 (higher
executive) variable are positive and statistically significant in all compensation equations,
except for the coefficients in the incentive pay regression. For the cash compensation
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measure, the test confirms the convexity of pay-organisational level relationship. The
difference between the coefficient on the Level I (CEO) and Level 2 (higher executive) is
0.4945 (i.e. /3J - /h= 0.8491 - 0.3546), which is higher than the coefficient on the Level 2 at
0.3546 (i.e. /32), It means that the gap of cash pay between CEO and higher executive (Level
2) is higher than the gap of cash pay between higher executive (Level 2) and lower executive
(Level 3). Or in other words, extra cash compensation weight is placed on the most senior
executive position (CEO position). Similarly, the results presented in Table 7.5 confirm
convexity in the case of total pay measure. The coefficients on the Level I (CEO) and the
Level 2 (Higher executive) are both positive and statistically significant. In addition, the
coefficient on the Levell (at 1.014) is higher than two times the coefficient on the Level 2
(2 x 0.3453 =0.6906). The result suggests that the relationship between total cost of pay and
organisational position is convex and the pay gap is increasing with the organisational level.
In the incentive pay model, however, the test of the convexity of pay-organisational
level relationship has failed. The coefficient on the Level I (CEO) is positive and
insignificant, while the coefficient on the Level 2 (higher executive) is negative and
insignificant. The result implies that there is no evidence of a difference in the cost of
incentive pay between executive positions. This result is inconsistent with the OLS
regression results presented in Chapter 6 (Table 6.6), which suggests that being in the CEO
position has a significant effect on the cost of incentive compensation. Hence, although
higher-level executive does receive an incentive pay premium (according to the univariate
analysis), the relationship between incentive pay and organisational level in this data set is
not convex. This result is consistent with Conyon's et al (2001) findings that there is no
convex relationship between incentive pay and organisational level.
Overall, the empirical results broadly support Hypothesis 7 for a convex relationship
between executive pay and organisational level. The convexity of the pay-organisational
level relationship is confinned in both cash pay and total pay models. This result is
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consistent with prior research (Conyon et al, 2001; Eriksson, 1999; Lambert et al, 1993;
Main et al, 1993). Particularly, Conyon et al (2001) also found that the convexity of the pay
- organisational level relationship exists in cash pay and total pay measures, while incentive
pay measure is not convexly related to executive positions/levels. Hence, the tournament
theory's prediction of a convex relationship between executive pay and organisational level
is partially confirmed by the test results presented in Table 7.5. The test results are
established by controlling for other firm characteristics (firm performance, firm size),
individual contingencies (executive tenure, age), and the monitoring function contingencies
(percentage of non-executive directors in the board, institutional ownership).
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Table 7-5: Determinants of Executive Compensation - Cost to company
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---- _._- ..
Level 2: Higherexecutives .3546· " -.3022 .3453" ·
(5.20) (-1.42) (3.29)
I- -----
Shareholder Return .0405· .0018 .0597·
(1.72) (0.03) ( 1.65)1 ----Log (Market Valuation) .1097· ·· .3189· " .2301·"
(3.92) (4.28) (5.35)
1-..--•.•......-- .........--.... - .....- . -.- -.-.. - .• -- ...... - ._._..__ ._......__._.._.__..._..._..._............- ..... -- _.... _...--.._._--_.-
Executive Tenure .0450· " .0657" · .0632"·
(5.40) (2.91)
1
(4.93)
I Executive Age .0286"· .0358· .0068
I (3.58) (I.72) (0.55)
-
---- -------- ---
..
---
Note: • p<O.IO; •• p<O.05; ••• p<O.O I
With regard to the effect of firm characteristics on e. ecutive pay. the re ult hov a
weak relationship between firm performance and executive pay. The coefficient on
shareholder returns variable is positive in all compensation models; however, it ignificance
is only presented in cash pay and total pay measures at 10% level. It mean that at 95%
confidence level, the pay-performance relationship is not tatistically ignificant. On the
other hand, firm size still has a significant effect on executive pay level. The coefficient on
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finn size is positive and significant in all compensation measures. The elasticity of executive
compensation with respect to finn size is 0.23 (in total compensation model), which is
higher than that reported in Chapter 6 (Table 6.1) at 0.15. This elasticity of pay on size
implies that a I% change in the market value of the finn, ceteris paribus, yields an increase
of 0.23% in total executive pay (at cost).
In sum, the empirical results presented in Table 7.5 confirm the existence of a
convex relationship between executive pay and organisational level, while control variables
have similar effect on the level of executive pay as reported in Chapter 6. The forthcoming
empirical analysis testing the effect of using cost of pay to company and value of pay to
executive on the convex relationship between pay and organisational level is presented in
Table 7.6. The natural logarithm of incentive pay value and total pay value are used as
dependent variables. The results on cash pay measure presented in Table 7.6 are brought
forward from Table 7.5 (because the value of cash pay is equal to its cost) for a comparison
with the incentive value and the total pay value measures.
The empirical results presented in Table 7.6 also suggest a convex relationship
between organisational level and executive total compensation value, while the incentive pay
value measure is not convexly related to executive position. The convexity of cash pay-
organisational level relationship is already confirmed in the previous section and carried
forward. In the total pay value model, the coefficients on both the Level I (CEO) and Level
2 (higher executive) variable are positive and significant. In addition, the difference between
the coefficient on the Level I and Level 2 is higher than the coefficient on the Level 2 alone
(i.e. fIJI - P2]= [0.9888 - 0.3824] = 0.6064 > 0.3824 = P2). This result suggests a convex
relationship between the value of total compensation and executive position with the highest
pay premium concentrates on the top organisational level (i.e. CEO position). In the
incentive pay value model, the coefficient on the Level I (CEO) variable is positive and
significant suggesting a difference in incentive pay value between the Level 3 (lower
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executive) and the CEO. The coefficient on the Level 2 (higher executive) variable, however,
is not significant implying that the incentive pay value received by a higher executive (Level
2) is not statistical1y different from that received by a lower executive (Level 3). Hence the
test of a convex relationship between incentive pay value and organisational level fails. So,
although the univariate analysis suggests that the CEO does receive an incentive pay
premium, the relationship is not convex.
To examine the difference between using cost of pay and pay value as dependent
variable, the Z-test is used. The Z-test is designed to test the difference between coefficients
on the same variable in two regressions using two alternative measures of dependent
variable. Clogg et al (1995) suggest the use of z-statistic to check the significance of the
difference between coefficients in two regressions. Z is calculated as fol1ows.
where Pi! and Pi] are coefficients of the same explanatory variable in two regressions; SE(jJi/)
and SE(jJd are standard errors. The critical value is 1.96 meaning that if z-value is greater
than 1.96 or smal1er than -1.96, the difference between coefficients in two regressions is
statistical1y significant at 5% level.
190
Table 7-6: Determinants of Executive Compensation - Value to Executives
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables Ln(Cash Ln Z-value Ln(Total Z-valuPay) (Incentive) (between Pay) (between
Coefficient Coeffic ient cost & value Coefficient cost & value
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) models) (t-statistic) models)
_ _ .•_ .••_._........_ ••_ •.•._ ...._,,_••.,,__ N'~~ __ ~ •.•HM_'_.....H••· _.M·"_"___...____M' ----_._...__._._.._.......__._._.__. ._._-............_-_.. ~
--- ._-_.-
I
Level I: CEO position .8491....* .7428.... -1.35 .9888 ....* 0. 15
(10.59) (2.16) (8.63)
- ---
Level 2: Higher executives .3546*.... .3820 -1.93* .3824**· -0.26
(5.20) ( 1.34) (3.92)
Shareholder Return .0405* I .1608.... -1.55 .1100··· -1.02I (1.72) (1.98) (3.26)I
- --- --------
f-.----
--- ----- - ---
-: ~ : : 1Log (Market Valuation) .1097*** .0859 1.94* .0898··(3.92) (0.9 1) (2.25)------'-'---"'--"'-""""-'-"------_._..- -----_.Executive Tenure .0450 *** .0298 1.01 .0581 **.
(5.40) ( 1.09) (4.88)
-- --
Executive Age .0286·** .0187 0.52 .0 110 -0.25
(J.58) (0.75) (0.96)
-----
Percentage ofNEDs .1803 .6094 0.42 .1452 I -0.22
I(1.21) (1.1 1) (0.68) I
Institutional Shareholdings t-.1762' -.3483 1.14 -.2609· I 0.35
l (- 1.64) (-0.93) (-1.70) I-_._....._-_. - --- ._- -- --IConst 8.578**· 8.742**· 10.13**·
( 13.15) (4.01) (10.87)
I- ----... - .., -"--'-- -- .._---
_.
- - -- .-- - -
- --- --
_.----
- - - -
Fstatistic 58.74··· 4.39··· I 33.28**·
--- "-- -- ---,.
I Overall R2 0.2995 0.2 157 I 0.2128 j
-- - I --. -
Hausman Test 79.26··· 30.95··· I 85.36··· - -I Fixed or Random ----Fixed Fixed I Fixed I
--_._---
--1-1137--j jIObservations (N) 1137 778 I
Note:· p <O.IO:·· p<O.05: ••• p <O.OI
The empirical results presented in Table 7.6 is consistent \ ith the finding in cost
pay model and further support hypothesis 7 for a convex relationship between e. ecutive pay
and organisational level. The convexity of the relationship seems to have greater magnitude
in the cost-pay model. While the coefficient on the Level 2 (higher executive) i
approx imately the same in both cost-pay and pay-value model (82[cost-pay] = 0.3546;
.82[pay-value]= 0.3824); the difference between the coefficients on the Levell ( EO) and
Level 2 (higher executive) in the cost-pay model (81 - .82[cost-pay] = 1.014 - 0.3453 = 0.6687)
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is slightly higher than that in the pay-value model (fJ/- p2[pay-value] = 0.6064). However,
the magnitude of the convexity of the pay-position relationship is not statistically different
between cost-pay and pay-value models. The z-value for both coefficients on the Level I
(CEO) and the Level 2 (higher executive) is not smaller than -1.96 or higher than 1.96;
suggesting that the difference between the coefficients on the Level-I and Level-2 variables
in cost-pay model and pay-value model is not statistically significant at 5% level. Although
the coefficient on the Level I (CEO) variable is positive and significant in incentive-value
model, while it is insignificant in the cost-pay model; the z-value show there is no different
effect of cost payor pay value on the convexity of incentive pay-organisational level
relationship. A significant z-value on the firm size coefficient in total pay value model
suggests that the size elasticity of executive total pay is significantly higher when measured
in cost (size elasticity of cost pay is 0.23) than when pay is measured in value (size elasticity
of pay value is 0.09). Other coefficients' z-values are not statistically significant at 5% level.
In sum, the empirical results presented in Table 7.5 & Table 7.6 broadly support the
tournament theory and hypothesis 7 for a convex relationship between executive pay and
organisational level. The convexity of the pay-position relationship is confirmed in both cash
pay model and total pay model (which is true for both cost of total pay and total pay value);
while the incentive pay element is not convexly related to organisational level. The results,
however, do not support hypothesis H2 for a different effect of cost-pay measure and pay-
value measure on the convex relationship between executive pay and organisational level.
7.3.2 Hypotheses 8: The positive relationship between pay gap and the number of
contestants
The second hypothesis to be examined considers the effect of the number of
contestants (competitors) on the tournament prize (pay gap). According to the tournament
theory, the larger number of candidates competing for the CEO position; the greater
disparity in pay (i.e. pay gap) between the CEO and other executives(Conyon, et al., 2001;
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Eriksson, 1999; Lambert, et aI. , 1993; Main, et aI., 1993; O'Reilly, et aI., 1988). The results
of the empirical analysis of hypothesis 9a that the tournament prize is affected by the
number of contestants are presented in Table 7.7. As described in section 7.1, the tournament
prize or pay gap is defined as the difference between CEO total pay and mean of other
executives' total pay in natural logarithm form. There are three measures of the tournament
prize: the log of CEO cash pay minus the log of mean cash pay of non-CEO executive team;
the log of CEO incentive pay minus the log of mean incentive pay of non-CEO executive
team; and the log of CEO total pay minus the log of mean total pay of non-CEO executive
team. The number of contestants is defined as the number of non-CEO executive directors in
the board, also in natural logarithm form. The log of firm size is used as control variable in
the model.
Table 7-7: The effect of tournament contestants on the tournament prize
(Fixed-effects estimation results)
Dependent ariable
Ln( EO Ln(CEO Incenti es) Ln( o total pa )
Cash Pay) minus Ln(Mean of minu Ln( ean of
minu other executive other executi e total
Independent Variables Ln(Mean of incentive pay) pay)
other
executive Cost Pay Pa alue o t Pay Pay alue
cash pay)
Coefficient Coefficient Coeffi cient Coefficient Coeffic ient
(I-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (I-statistic) (I-statistic)
1--------.--.
----- ~ - - ILn (Number of directors in
.0787* -.0469 .0 136 -.052 1 -.0 153the executive team) ( 1.8 1)
_ (-0.34) . ( O . ~ ~ __ r- ~ O O 77) _ (-0.29) _ I
__w,_,__"
Ln (Market valuation)
.0 163
-. 10 3 3 ~ l _ - ' 1 1 9 0 , -.0576 -.0524 1I (0.46) (-0.99) _ ( ~ ~ _ ~ ~ 1 1 0 ~ ~ - 1 1 2 2 ) IIr:--- -- I
3.006 3.75 1 I 1.620 1.780* IConst . 1826 II
. _( 1.32) I ~ ~ 5 8 ) ~ __ ( ~ (1.93)(0.24) J
... -----
- -- --- -t---. ---+- - --- I
Overall R2 I - - ~ . ~ 0 8 4 j
r- - - - - - -- - - -- _.IObservations (N) t 250
F statistic 6.85*** 2.54***
0.0577
203
3.01***
0.0625
174
3.1 1***
0.0392
250
5.40***
0.0581
250
Note: • p<O. IO; •• p<O.05; ••• p<O.O I
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The empirical results contained in Table 7.7 suggest that at 95% confidence level,
there is no evidence of a relationship between the tournament prize (pay gap) and the
number of contestants. In cash pay model, the coefficient on the log of executive numbers is
positive and significant at 10% level supporting the tournament theory for a positive
relationship between the numbers of executives and the disparity of cash compensation. This
coefficient, however, is not statistically different from zero at 5% significance level. In all
other models (except for incentive pay value model), the coefficient on the log of executive
numbers is negative suggesting that the greater the number of executives competing for the
CEO position, the smaller the difference between CEO pay (incentive pay and total pay) and
that of other executives. However, this negative relationship is again insignificant
statistically. The coefficient on the control variable (log of market valuation) is also
insignificant in all models suggesting that although firm size plays an important role in
determining the level of executive pay, it has no effect on the disparity of pay between
executive positions.
Overall, the results of the empirical analysis presented in Table 7.7 do not support
hypothesis 8 for a significant effect of the number of contestants on the tournament prize (or
pay gap). The z-value for the variable of contestants numbers (which is -0.26 in the incentive
pay model and -0.49 in the total pay model) also rejects hypothesis 2, although this test is
meaningless provided that there is no significant effect of the number of contestants on pay
gap. The overall R2 is also very low in all regressions, suggesting that the independent
variables (number of contestants and firm size) aggregately explain very small variation in
the size of the tournament prize (specifically, it is I% in cash pay model, 6% in incentive
pay model, and about 4.5 % in total pay model). The rejection of hypothesis 8 is inconsistent
with prior studies(Conyon, et aI., 2001; Eriksson, 1999; Main, et aI., 1993), who found
evidence of a positive relationship between the size of the prize and the number of
contestants.
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The lack of a significant relationship between the tournament prize and the number
of contestants does not imply the inconsistency with the tournament theory, as the measure
of variable on contestants' number seems to be biased. The number of contestants is defined
(in this analysis) as the number of non-CEO executive directors. This measure is consistent
with prior research(Conyon, et al., 2001; Eriksson, 1999; Main, et al., 1993); which assumes
that all the candidates competing for the CEO position are from inside the company (i.e. the
executive team members). In practice, however, there is a pronounced trend toward filling
the CEO position through external hires rather than through internal promotions. Murphy
and Zabojnik (2004) summarize that while in the 1970's outside hires accounted for 15% of
all CEO replacements, in the 1980's it was 17%, and in the 1990's more than 26% ofCEOs
were hired from the outside. It suggests that being a member of the executive team is
becoming less important in being chosen for the CEO position. Hence the use of internal
executive team to measure the number of contestants may undervalue the actual number of
candidates competing for the CEO position. The inclusion of external candidates in the
number of contestants, however, requires further investigations in the future.
7.3.3 Hypotheses 9: The positive relationship between pay dispersion and firm
performance
The third hypothesis examines the economic efficiency of the tournament pay
structure, particularly the effect of executive pay dispersion on firm performance. As
discussed in Chapter 4, the tournament prize (i.e. pay gap or pay dispersion) is required to
induce higher effort by executives (candidates), which should be reflected in higher
subsequent outputs and firm performance. The results of the empirical analysis examining
the effect of pay dispersion on firm performance are presented below in Table 7.8 (for cost
of pay) and Table 7.9 (for value of pay). These tables present the results of the analysis using
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four alternative measures of firm performance: shareholder returns (TSR), the Tobin's Q
ratio (TobinQ), return on capital employed (ROCE) and earning per share (EPS).
Table 7-8: Tests of Effects of Pay Dispersion on Firm Performance -
Cost to company (Fi ed-effects e timation re uIts)
Dependent Variables
Independent Variable hareholder
Returns
Tobin's Q RO E p
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
..---------.-.-----I------j----.- -----11---- - - I
Ln (Market valuation) .3906*"
(5.14)
1.982*"
0.008
--j---
I 250
F statistic I 1.84"* 1 ~ 8 " * _ 1.3-7-*---;--6-.86" * - ~
Overall R
2
-j 0.004 I 0 . 0 0 : ! . . . ~ t- 0 ? 0 ~ ~
r O - - - s e r v v t ~ o n n 250 250 _50
Note:· p<O.IO ;·· p<O.05; ••• p<O.OI
The empirical results presented in Table 7.8 indicate that executive pay dispersion
(in cost) do not have any effect on firm performance. The coefficient of variation of
executive pay is positively related to firm performance except for the shareholder return
measure, where the coefficient is negative. This result suggests that the di per ion of
executive pay seems to improve performance of the firm measured in Tobin's Q, return on
capital employed, and earning per share; while it seems to reduce hareholder return. The
coefficient on pay dispersion variable, however, is not stati tically different from zero in all
performance regressions meaning that there is no evidence of uch relation hip betv een
executive pay dispersion and firm performance. Hence the empirical te t ha rejected
hypothesis 9 for an effect of pay dispersion on firm performance.
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The sign and significance of the average pay variable, however, depend on the
measures of performance used. The average pay of the executive team is positively and
significantly related to the shareholder return (TSR); while it is negatively and significantly
related to the Tobin's Q value. This result is consistent with that reported in Chapter 6 for
the opposite effect of shareholder return and Tobin's Q on the level of executive pay. The
average pay of executive team, however, has no significant effect on accounting
performance of the firm, which is measured in ROCE and EPS.
With regard to the effect of firm size on performance, the coefficient on the firm size
variable is positive and significant in all performance regressions except for the ROCE
measure. The result suggests that the larger firm tends to have better performance. It may
due to the fact that the size is measured in market valuation, a function of share price, and
the share price is the market reflection of firm performance. Although all regressions are
significant (F-test is significant); the overall fit of the models (overall R2) , however, is small
suggesting that all these independent variables aggregately explain very little variation of the
firm performance.
Table 7.9 presents the results of the empirical analysis examining the effect of pay
dispersion (in value) on firm performance. Again, the results suggest that there is no
evidence of a positive relationship between executive pay dispersion (in value) and
performance of the firm. The coefficient on the pay dispersion variable (coefficient of
variation of executive pay) is positive in three measures of performance (TSR, Tobin's Q,
and ROCE), however, it is not statistically different from zero. The effect of average pay
value on firm performance again depends on the measures of performance variable. The
average pay value is positively and significantly related to shareholder returns, while it is
negatively and significantly related to Tobin's Q. The average pay value, however, does not
have significant effect on accounting performance (measured in ROCE and EPS). In line
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with the results in cost pay model, firm size is a significant determinant of firm performance
(except for ROCE measures). The overall fit of the models, however, are still very low.
Table 7-9: Tes t of ffects of Pay Dispersion on Firm Perform ance -
Value to E. ecutives (Fixed-effects estimation res ults)
Depend ent Va r ia bles
Independ ent Variables ha reholder
Returns
Tobin's Q RO E EP
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(I-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) ((-statistic)
~ o e f f f c i e n t ~ ~ - V V r i i n c c E x e e u t ~ I _ - .0354 .7723 .7337 II -::-7.281 ~
Team's Pay (0.18) (0.88) ( 1.00) (-0.48)
..__.__ _.- _ _.._.._._- _-_..__.- .._._.._ _- -_.__._ _ ---'- t- - ---
Ln (Average Total Pay of .2609" · -.9976" · .2358 I 5.626
Executive directors) (3.30) (-2.75) (0.78) (0.91)
Ln (Market valuation) .3952. " 1.807" · .1261 ~ ; 8 . 5 0 . ; ; ;
f---- __ ( 5 . ~ ~ ~ ( ~ 4 7 7 _ .__ i °.46) -J J J 5 . 0 ~ )
I Const -11.85"· -23.22·" -6. 15 1 -662.8"·
I (-7.55) (-3.22) (-1.03) (-5.37) ~
1---...•...•......_•..._._..- ...•..._.••...••_ ..•._._....•.•......_.- ,-_ . ,- _ •..•.--.- .• ..--.-.--- --r- _-= _ ~ - _
F statistic 1.99· " 8.52· · · 1.33· 6.95· "
I-- , -_.- -
Overall R" 0.003 0.009 0.000 0.008
I-- - - --- -- -1'-- - -I
I Observations (N) 250 250 I 250 250 I
Note: • p<0.10: •• p<0.05; ••• p<O.O 1
To test hypothesis 2 for the effect of the measurement of executive pay (at cost to
company and value to executive) on the pay dispersion-performance relation hip, the z-
values for the coefficients are calculated and presented in Table 7.10. As illu trated in Table
7.10, the z-values for all coefficients in all performance models are not statisti ally
significant implying that there is no difference between the coefficients 1I ing co t pay or pay
value as the measure of executive compensation. In other words, the u e of cost pay or pay
value does not change the insignificant effect of executive pa di per ion on firm
performance. Hence, hypothesis 2 for an effect of pay measure on the relation hip betv een
pay dispersion and firm performance is rejected.
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Table 7-10: Tests of the difference between coefficients in
cost pay and total pay models
Z-Values for difference between cocfficients
Sha reholder Tobin's Q ROCE EPS
Returns
.__..._-_..
---_._---_. _.-
_.
Coefficient of Variance Executive -0. 14 -0.17 0019 0.35
Team's Pay
. , , _ ~ ~ . .__.._____R._..._
._-----
Ln (Average Total Pay of -0.59 -0.44 0.40 -0.71
Executive directors)
--_._-_.. .-
Ln (Market valuation) -0.04 0037 -0023 0.25
--_...__._----_._..__._ - - - -
---'--"-'-
._--_.-
Overall, the results of the examination of the effect of executive pay dispersion on
firm performance presented in Table 7.8 and Table 7.9 suggest that there is no relationship
between pay dispersion and firm performance. The coefficient on the pay dispersion variable
is positive in most performance regressions implying that higher executive pay dispersion
tends to induce more effort from executives and subsequently improve fi rm performance.
This coefficient, however, is not statistically significant at 5% level indicating that executive
pay dispersion does not have significant effect on firm performance. The empirical results
also suggest that the use of cost payor pay value does not alter the insignificant effect of pay
dispersion on firm performance. The lack of a significa nt relationship between executive pay
dispersion and firm performance is consistent with the results reported by Conyon et al
(200 I). Hence, the results offer little empirical support for the tournament theory' s view of
the economic efficiency of the tournament pay structures.
The lack of a significant relationship between pay dispersion and firm performance
might indicate other tournament's view, which is discussed by Lazear (1995; 1989) that
there may be incentive motives for firm to adopt a more compressed pay structure. In order
to attract candidates to participate in a tournament, the spread (i.e. dispersion) of pay cannot
be "too big"(Eriksson, 1999; Lazear, 1989). In addition, if the cooperation of the executi es
is essential for the success of the firm , rewarding them according 10 their individual
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achievements may not be appropriate. Hence, the positive relationship between pay
dispersion and firm performance may only exist in those firms for which the cooperation of
executive team is less important, "hawkish" firms, in Lazear's terminology. Main et al (1993)
and Eriksson (1999) did test the effect of wage compression using the measure of executive
interdependence and its interaction with the pay dispersion variable. They, however, found
little support for Lazear's view of the rationale for executive pay compression. In this
analysis, the data on executive interdependence is not available and thus the effect of pay
compression cannot be examined.
7.3.4 Hypotheses 10: Average pay and dispersion of pay among executive team
The fourth prediction of the tournament theory from Lazear (1989) is that the
average pay of executive directors will be lower in company where there is reduced variance
in compensation within executive team (i.e. a compressed pay structures).
Table 7-11: Tests of the Effect s of Pay Dispersion on Average Executive Pa y
(Fi. ed effects estimation re ult )
Ln (Average Total
ost Pay of Executive
directors)
Ln (Average Total Pay
Value of ' . ecutive
directors)
z- alue
__.._J .._ ._
-0.55
Coefficient
(I-statistic)
Coefficient
(I-statistic)
.5604*" .6849*"
(3.59) (4.14)
- -·-:.....-4-----1- - --
Observations (N)
~ - - - - -
LF tes.!.. _
I Overall R2
Icoeffici - ~ ~ to f V~ ; i ~ nee ---1·---·..--........---·--·+..---·-·--..--··-..-..---1---·-----.---- _... - ..- .-
Executive Team's Pay
lLn(CEO pay) J ~ i n u u .2695*" ~ 3 ;55*; :----- f-Ln(mean of other -0.36executives' pay) (3.47) (3.08)
l-L-n-(M_ arket valu_at_i_O_n_)_ -+_.3_8_9_9_*_*.. .3863*" .2942*** .2812*..- - - I. 121 1.22 I(6.49) I (6.43) (4.80) (4.52), - - -
lcons_t _ __ _ __ 5.085*" 5.243*" 6.923" * I 7.301*** I_ _ J ~ ~ - - ~ 6 ) --+- ( ~ . . ~ I (5.45) __ 1
_-+__2 _ _ _ . . _ _ ~ ~ - - . . - - 5 ~ * ~ ~ 18,:-03*-;* I 13.86***- -
~ ---1- ~ ; : 0 3 3 ~ 5 ~ . 6 6 l ~ : : 6 6 --, ~ : : ~
Note: ' p<O. IO; · · p<O.05; • •• p<O.OI
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The results of the empirical analysis of hypothesis HIO are presented in Table 7.11.
This table presents the results of the analysis using two alternative measures of pay
dispersion as described in section 7.1; the coefficient of variation of executive team's
compensation, and the difference between CEO total pay and mean of other executives' total
pay. Total pay is measured both as its cost to company and its value to executives, which
results in two measures of the dependent variable. As expected, both measures of executive
pay dispersion are significantly and positively related to average pay of executive team. This
result indicates that firms with higher variance in compensation will tend to pay their
executives higher than firm with less pay variance. Or consistent with Lazear's prediction,
the average pay of top executives would be lower in firms that have more compressed pay
structures (i.e. executive pay is less dispersed). The significant relationship between pay
dispersion and average result is also consistent with the findings reported by Main et al
(1993) and Eriksson (1999). In economic term, the coefficient on the coefficient of variation
variable is 0.56 and 0.68 in cost pay and pay value model respectively indicating that the
empirical effect of a I SE (standard error) increase in the pay dispersion variable is of the
magnitude 56% and 68% in average cost pay and average pay value, respectively. Overall,
the results offer empirical supports for hypothesis 10 for a positive relationship between pay
dispersion and average executive pay.
With regard to the control variable, the coefficient on the log of market valuation is
positive and significant in all models again suggesting that firm size is a significant
determinant of executive pay. The coefficient on the size variable is approximately 0.39 in
cost pay model and 0.29 in pay value model, which also means that the elasticity of
executive pay in cost and value with respect to firm size is 0.39 and 0.29 respectively. In
economic term, 1% change in the market value of the firm, ceteris paribus, yields an
increase of 0.39% in average total cost pay and 0.29% in average total pay value of
executive directors.
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The empirical results presented in Table 7.11, however, suggests that there is no
difference between cost of pay to company and pay value to executive measures in
examining the relationship between pay compression structure and average executive pay.
As illustrated in Table 7.11, z-values for the difference between the pay dispersion
coefficient in cost pay model and that in pay value model are not statistically significant for
both measures of pay dispersion. Hence, hypothesis HID for a different effect of cost pay
and pay value measure on the relationship between compressed pay structure and average
executive pay is rejected.
Generally, the results of the empirical analysis presented in this section support the
tournament theory and Lazear's (1989) prediction that lower mean levels of executive pay
are associated with reduced variance in compensation within the top executive team.
Specifically, the coefficients on pay dispersion variables are positively and significantly
related to the average pay of executive team for both cost pay and pay value models. The
results, however, offer little support for the different effect of using cost payor pay value on
the relationship between compressed pay structure and average executive pay.
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter has empirically examined the tournament theory on shape of executive
compensation level and other tournament predictions than the pay-organisational level
relationship. A number of key findings have emerged from the analyses. Firstly, the key
prediction of tournament models that the tournament prize (or pay gap) widens through the
corporate hierarchy is verified. The level of executive pay is found to be positively and
convexly related the organisational level in both total executive pay and cash pay models.
Although the more senior executives do received higher incentive pay, the relationship
between incentive pay and organisational level is not convex. The empirical results suggest
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that moving from Level 2 executives to the CEO position is associated with approximately a
99% increase in cost of total pay and 95% increase in total pay value. This "tournament
ratio" is higher than that reported by Conyon et al (200 I), who suggest that along with pay
level, the tournament ratio is also different between the UK and the US. Specifically,
Conyon et al (200 I) reported a 60% increase in total pay from Level-2 executive to CEO
with data in the UK, while Main et al (1993) reported 140% higher pay for the CEOs in the
US.
Hence, the empirical results provide some confirmatory evidence of a convex
relationship between executive compensation and organisational level. This result is
consistent with prior research(Conyon, et al., 2001; Eriksson, 1999; Lambert, et aI., 1993;
Main, et al., 1993). The convexity of the relationship between pay and levels in hierarchy
implies the operation of tournaments based on relative performance. It may well be that
executive pay is not likely to equal marginal product, the fact that executive pay is largely
attached to job levels and relative performance. Eriksson (1999) argues that executive pay
has little to do with the absolute performance of the CEO or other executives and that instead
the increasing pay differences act as an incentive to provide greater effort and subsequently
increase individual and organisational performance. This efficiency of the tournament
models, however, is not confirmed in our subsequent test.
Secondly, the number of non-CEO executive directors, which represents the
tournament contestants, appears to have no relationship with the tournament prize (or pay
gap). This contrasts with the findings of Conyon et al (2001), Eriksson (1999), and Main et
al (1993) who found the number of contestants to have a positive and significant effect on
the size of the tournament prize. However, the lack of a significant effect of the number of
contestants on the tournament prize may due to the biased measure of variable. As in line
with prior research (Conyon, et al., 2001; Eriksson, 1999; Main, et al., 1993). this analysis
employs the number of internal candidates (i.e. non-CEO executives) as the measure of
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candidates for the CEO position. There, however, is growing trend to fill the CEO position
through external hires rather than through internal promotions (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004).
Hence, using internal candidates only to measure the number of the tournament contestants
may incorrectly reflect the relationship with the tournament prize. A possible future research
is to account for the external candidates in examining the effect of the number of contestants
on the tournament prize.
Thirdly, although increasing tournament prize (pay differences) is found to act as an
incentive to provide greater effort from contestants (i.e. executives) and subsequently
increase individual and organisational performance; the efficiency of the tournament pay
structures that a wider pay dispersion enhances firm performance is not supported. In most
performance measures, the coefficient on pay dispersion variable is positive suggesting that
wider pay distributions imply higher equilibrium levels of effort and consequently higher
firm performance. This coefficient, however, is not statistically different from zero
indicating no such significant effect. This is consistent with the results reported by Conyon
et al (200 I), who also found an insignificant relationship between executive pay dispersion
and performance of tOO leading UK companies. This result, however, contrasts with Main et
al (1993) and Eriksson (t999) who reported a positive effect of pay variation on firm
performance in the US and Denmark, respectively. The lack of a significant effect of pay
variation on firm performance may suggest the opposite view that wider pay dispersion
encourages non-cooperative behaviour in the executive team and decreases finn
performance. Lazear (1989) argues that a comparatively compressed pay structure is more
efficient since it reduces sabotage and promotes cooperation and teamwork. However, data
on executive interdependence are not available to measure the cooperation of executive team
and to examine Lazear's view of the rationale for executive pay compression. This might be
a focus for future research.
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Fourthly, an examination of the effect of pay dispersion on average executive pay
found evidence consistent with the tournament theory that lower mean levels of executive
pay are associated with reduced variance in compensation within the top executive team
(Lazear, 1989). The coefficients on both pay dispersion variables (i.e. coefficient of variance
of executive pay and the difference between CEO pay and other executive pay) is positively
and significantly related to average total payof executive team. The evidence of a significant
association between pay dispersion and average executive pay is consistent with the results
reported by Eriksson (1999) and Main et al (1993). Hence, the empirical results support the
tournament theory's prediction that the average executive pay is lower in firms that have
morecompressed pay structures.
In addition, the analysis also examines the effect of using different measures of pay
(i.e. between the cost of executive pay to company and its value to executive) on the
empirical results testingthe tournament predictions. The results are disappointing as there is
no evidence of a difference between using cost payor pay value to examine the predictions
of the tournament theory. Hence, although the cost of executive pay is much higher than the
its value to executive (as discussed in Chapter 5), the difference has no significant effect on
the relationship between executive pay and organisational level or other predictions
suggested by the tournament theory.
In sum, the empirical results in this chapter are largely support the implication of
consistent with tournament theory in explaining the shape of executive compensation. The
results suggest that pay is not likely to equal marginal product, it is largely attached to the
organisational levels and the relative performance. The empirical results supportLazear and
Rosen's (1981) comment that, even thoughthe compensation of the top executives maywell
exceed all measures of their marginal product, it can still be economically efficient. The
results also imply the significant effect of compressed pay structure on average executive
pay, although the efficiency of the tournament pay structure is not supported.
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Chapter 8
CONCLUSION
8.0 Introduction
As stated in Chapter 1, the purpose of this thesis was to review and empirically
analyze the determination of executive pay components, incentive pay ratio, and tournament
pay structures. This final chapter summarizes the research's main contributions and presents
conclusions to be drawn from the theoretical review and empirical analysis of the
determinants of executive pay components, incentive pay ratios, and the implication of
tournament pay structures. As well as summarizing the conclusions of the previous chapters,
this chapter assesses the implication of research findings to practice and policy. This chapter
also highlights the limitations of the study and opportunities for future research on executive
compensation.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.1 presents an overview and
restatement of the research contribution to academic and practical knowledge. Section 8.2
outlines the conclusions derived from the meta-analysis on pay-performance relationship and
review of literature on other determinants of executive compensation. Section 8.3 evaluates
the findings of the empirical analysis of the determinants of executive pay components and
long-term incentive pay ratios. Section 8.4 assesses the implications of tournament theory in
the context of executive compensation. Recommendations for practice and policy are
presented in section 8.5, whilst limitations and possible future research are presented in
section 8.6.
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8.1 Research and Conceptual Contribution
This section reflects conceptual contributions of this research. This study has
provided a systematic review of pay-performance literature using meta-analysis. The results
suggest a true association between executive compensation and finn performance is positive.
The economic significance of the relationship, however, is low with less than one percent of
executive's pay rise is directly attributable to the improvement of finn performance. To
answer the research question set out in Chapter 1 regarding the main determinants of
executive pay components and incentive pay ratio in the UK, empirical tests have been
carried out using a sample of 50 UK listed companies comprised in FTSE-350 index. The
empirical results, as provided in Chapter 6, indicated that shareholder return significantly
determines level of cash pay and total executive pay but not the level of incentive pay. This
finding supports the managerial power argument for higher levels of cash pay and total pay
rather than risky long-term incentive pay. The empirical results also suggest that shareholder
return played an important role in determining the ratio of pay value to total executive pay.
Other than finn performance, firm size, executive tenure and executive position as
CEO strongly determined the levels of executive pay components. Finn size has a significant
effect on the level of pay components (cash pay, incentive pay and total pay) in most
regressions. The result is consistent with the notion that larger firm tends to have larger
compensation packages for their executives. This also supports the fact that the larger the
finn, the more likely that a remuneration consultant is employed for consultancy on
executive compensation package, and the more likely of an increase in pay package. The
coefficient on the finn size variable is also positive and significant in the incentive-cost-ratio
model, however, it is insignificant in incentive-value-ratio model. The finding indicates that
although firm size determines both the level of pay components and the structure of cost pay
(i.e. incentive pay ratios). It, however, fails to detennine the value of pay components and
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proportion of incentive value in total executive pay value. This indicates that although larger
firms do grant their executives lager incentive pay and total compensation package, the
actual value of such incentive and compensation package does not dependent on finn size.
Another contribution of this research is the comprehensive measurement of
executive pay variables. Long-term incentives components including share options and long-
term incentive plans are firstly estimated their cost to company using Black-Scholes
valuation model. The value of such long-term incentives is then controlled for the estimation
of allowable vesting percentage following performance conditions attached to the options
and/or LTIPs. The descriptive analyses in Chapter 5 shows that the actual value of share
options of the sample firms is approximately 80% of the cost of option using Black-Scholes
valuation model. The value of long-term incentive plans is about 54% of its nominal value
on the grant date. The ratio of LTIP's value over their cost of 54%, however, is much higher
than the simple estimation by Conyon and Murphy (2000) and Conyon et al (2001) for a
20% of their face value.
A positive and significant coefficient of executive tenure implies that with longer
tenure, executives tend to be granted higher compensation with a larger proportion of pay
including incentive components. The average coefficient of 0.06 implies that for every extra
year in tenure, executive directors are get paid approximately 6% higher, holding other
variables constant. This is consistent with the managerial power theory, which argues that
long tenure is associated with higher power to extract 'rent' to the detriment of shareholder
interests. Executive tenure also positively determines the structure of executive pay (i.e.
incentive pay ratio), which is consistent with the agency theory suggesting that executives
with longer tenure tend to be more risk-neutral and accept a higher proportion of pay in
long-term incentives for a higher return. The other individual variable, executive
shareholdings strongly and negatively determines the ratio of incentive pay value indicating
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that higher existing shareholding will prevent executives from accepting further incentive
components in their compensation package.
Among variables representing the monitoring function, board size has a positive
effect on the level of total pay (cost model) and is positively related with the proportion of
long-term incentives to total executive pay. This finding is consistent with agency arguments
that larger boards diminish the monitoring function and thus incentive contracts, a substitute
mechanism, are preferred to align executive-shareholder interests. The presence and
dominance of non-executive directors on the board is found to be negatively related to cash
pay but positively related to incentive pay. Although this result does not support agency
arguments that the presence of non-executive directors helps to increase monitoring, it is
consistent with the notion that the dominance of non-executive directors helps to reduce the
level of cash pay and increase the level of incentive pay, i.e, enhances the use of incentive
contracts. Hence, non-executive directors may prefer to use alternative means, rather than
the enforcement of monitoring, to align the interest of executives with those of shareholders.
In addition, the empirical results testing the implication of tournament theory
suggest that executive pay is not likely to equal marginal product, rather it is largely attached
to the organisational levels and the relative performance. The empirical results support
Lazear and Rosen's (1981) comment that, even though the compensation of the top
executives may well exceed all measures of their marginal product, it can still be
economically efficient. The results also imply the significant effect of compressed pay
structure on average executive pay, although the efficiency of the tournament pay structure
is not supported.
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8.2 Review of Meta-analysis of the pay-performance relationship
This study (as presented in Chapter 3) conducts a meta-analysis of the pay-
performance relationship from prior empirical results to provide a systematic review of
literature and determine the true relationship between executive pay and firm performance.
From43 prior empirical studies, whichreported 68 pay-performance correlation coefficients,
the meta-analytic result indicates that the true association between executive compensation
and firm performance is positive (which is consistent with agency theory's argument).
However, the correlation coefficient between executive pay and firm performance is low, at
0.07 meaning that less than one percent of executive's pay rise is directly attributable to the
improvement in firm performance. This result indicates that the economic significance of the
pay-performance relationship is very small, which is consistent with the findings reported by
Jensen and Murphy (1990)and Conyon and Murphy (2000).
In addition, the meta-analytic results suggest that the pay-performance relationship
is stronger (i.e, higher correlation coefficient) when executive compensation is measure in
total compensation rather than cash compensation. It means that the inclusion of long-term
incentive pay helps to increase the strength of the pay-performance relationship, which is
consistent with agency theory's view. Specifically, the correlation coefficient between total
executive pay and firm performance is 0.117, which is much higher than 0.055 correlation
coefficient of the cash pay-performance relationship. This view, however, is not supported
by the empirical results presented in Chapter6 that performance does not strongly determine
incentive pay components. Although performance does not strongly determine incentive
components, it does have significant influence on the incentive pay ratioor pay structure.
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Also reported in the meta-analysis, there is strong correlation between executive pay
and firm size. The pay-size relationship is positive and statistically significant with the
correlation coefficient of 0.22. It means that the pay-size elasticity is 0.22 or a 10% increase
in firm size results in 2.2% increase in executive pay. This result is consistent with prior
research, for example Baker et al (1988) document that the elasticity of executive pay with
respect to firm size is about 0.30. The result suggests that firm size is still a significant
determinant of the level of executive compensation despite the explanatory power of firm
size has declined over time (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). The strong pay-size correlation and
a weak relationship between executive pay and firm performance reported earlier suggest
that agency theory alone might not fully explain the determination of executive
compensation.
As reviewed in Chapter 3, there are many theoretical perspectives, other than agency
theory, that try to explain the determinants of the level of executive compensation. The
managerial power perspective argues that executives use their power to extract rents and
shape their own compensation package (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Toumament theory, on
the other hand, suggests that the relative performance and rank order in the organizational
hierarchy are main determinants of executive pay level (Lazear and Rosen, 1981a). As
discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, a combination of these three main perspectives:
agency theory, the managerial power theory and toumament theory provide a better
explanation of executive pay determination. A summary of results of the empirical analyses
examining (1) the determination of executive pay components and incentive pay ratio from
the view of agency theory and the managerial power theory (Chapter 6); and (2) the
implication oftoumament pay structures (Chapter 7) are presented in the next sections.
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8.3 Review of the Empirical Analyses of the Determinants of Executive Pay
Components and Incentive Pay ratios.
Chapter 6 has empirically examined the determination of executive pay components
(total compensation, cash compensation, and long-term incentives) and the determination of
incentive pay ratios. A number of key findings have emerged from these analyses and are
summarized below.
8.3.1 Determinants ofthe level ofexecutive pay components
First, there is evidence of a statistically significant relationship between firm
performance and the level of executive compensation and its components. The sign and
significance of the relationship, however, are dependent on the performance measures. When
shareholder return is used, the pay-performance relationship is positive and significant
suggesting that shareholder returns variable is a significant determinant of the level of
executive pay (cash pay and total pay). Shareholder returns also positively determine the
actual value of long-term incentives paid to executive directors, although it has no effect on
the cost of those incentives to the company. Firm performance in Tobin's Q, other market-
based measure, however, is negatively associated with the level of executive pay (long-term
incentives and total pay). This conflict result between using shareholder returns and Tobin's
Q as alternative measures of market performance may due to the nature of measurement.
Tobin's Q is an equilibrium measure (i.e. market value of fund divided by book value of
fund), whereas TSR reflects adjustment over time, especially to new performance-relevant
information; hence it is unsurprising that empirical work using them as alternative measures
may appear to give inconsistent results. Between the two measures, shareholder returns
measure is more informative and more significant economically. The average coefficient of
TSR variables is about 0.20 meaning that a 10% increase in total shareholder returns, ceteris
paribus, results in 2% increase in the value of executive compensation; whilst the average
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coefficient of Tobin's Q variable is (-0.02), ten times smaller than that of TSR variables.
Moreover, when taking the first difference (i.e, in GMM models), there is no evidence of a
relationship between Tobin's Q variable and executive pay level. It may be because of the
fact that the Tobin's Q measure suffers from skewness in the data set due to the inclusion of
growth firms (which expectvery high Tobin's Q ratio).
The empirical results in Chapter 6 also indicate that accounting firm performance
measured in ROCE (return on capital employed) is positively related to the level of
executive pay, although the magnitude of the relationship (i.e, the economic significance) is
relatively small (0.3%, increase in executive's total pay and 0.6% increase in incentive pay
for every 10% increase in ROCE). This is consistent with the findings of Jensen and Murphy
(1990) and Conyon and Murphy (2000) for a low economic significance of the pay-
performance relationship. Whilst accounting rate of return measured in ROCE relates to
incentive pay component and total pay, absolute accounting performance measured in EPS
only affects the level of cash compensation. The sensitivity of the results between
performance measures suggests that the pay-performance relationship should be interpreted
with care basingon the performance measures used.
Generally, the empirical results provide supports for the agency theory and a
positive relationship between pay level and firm performance. The positive and significant
relationship between executive pay and shareholder returns (performance measure that best
represents shareholders' interests in all four measures) indicates the effectiveness of an
incentive contract and alignment of shareholders' and executives' interests according to the
agency theory. Although both shareholder returns (TSR) and accounting return (ROCE)
significantly determines the value of incentives paid to executive directors. the cost of
incentives granted is only determined by accounting performance (ROCE), not market
performance (shareholder return). This result supports hypothesis H2 derived from the
managerial power theory that incentive pay is positively related to accounting performance
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rather than market performance. It suggests that powerful executives are likely to extract
'rents' and 'camouflage' their extractions of rents through the adoption of inefficient
compensation structures that the incentive pay component tends to subject to easy and more
controllable performance hurdles (such as accounting performance rather than volatile
shareholder returns). The implication of the managerial power theory, however, only holds
in term of cost of incentives granted by company; whilst the value of incentives is still
determined by both shareholder return and ROCE as suggested by agency theory.
Secondly, there is strong evidence of a significant effect of firm size on the level of
executive compensation and pay components, which is consistent with the notion of the
managerial power theory. Firm size, which is measured in log form of market valuation, is a
significant determinant of the level of executive pay with the size elasticity of executive pay
ranging from the low of 0.15 in cash pay models to 0.40 in cost-of-incentive models. This
result suggests that larger firms tend to grant their executives higher compensation than do
smaller firms (with higher level of cash pay and even higher level of long-term incentive
pay). The strong pay-size relationship results are consistent with prior empirical studies (see
Cosh and Hughes, 1997; Ciscel and Carroll, 1980; Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970; McGuire,
1968; etc.) for significant pay determination of firm size. The empirical results, however,
suggest that although firm size is a significant determinant of the cost of incentives granted,
the actual value of incentive pay received by executives is not determined by firm size. This
again indicates that the implication of the managerial power theory for a significant pay
determination offirm size is more likely to the cost of pay rather than the value of pay.
Thirdly, with regard to the effect of individual contingencies (share ownership,
tenure, and age) on level of pay, executive tenure is found to have positive and consistently
strong effect on the level of executive pay and pay components. Specifically, for every extra
year in tenure, executives are paid approximately 6% higher compensation. ceteris paribus.
This result supports the notion of the managerial power theory that longer tenure increases
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executives' power and allow them to extract greater 'rents'. Despite the same derivation
from the managerial power theory, executive age only determines the level of cash pay while
there is no connection between executives' age and level of incentive payor total pay. The
empirical results presented in Chapter 6 also suggest that executive share ownership, another
individual contingency, has no effect on the level of executive pay and pay components. It
neither supports the agency theory for a negative relationship between executive
shareholdings and level of pay components nor the managerial power theory for a positive
relationship.
Fourthly, the empirical tests examining the monitoring function of the board and the
effect of institutional shareholders indicate weak results. Although there is evidence of a
weak monitoring role of institutional shareholder, the board of directors plays no direct role
in monitoring the level of executive compensation. The level of shareholdings of
institutional shareholders is found to have a negative effect on the level of cash pay and the
value of total executive pay, which supports with both the agency theory and the managerial
power theory for a direct monitoring function of institutional shareholders. Institutional
shareholders, however, have no monitoring effect on the level of incentive pay. The
empirical results in Chapter 6 also indicate that board of directors does not have direct
monitoring on the level of executive pay (i.e. a negative relationship between board
monitoring proxies and level of executive pay). The empirical results, however, show that
the proportion of non-executive directors on the board is positively related to the level of
incentive pay, which means that the presence and dominance of non-executive directors in
the board does not help to reduce the level of executive pay but rather increase the use of
incentive contract. The results reject the hypothesis derived from the agency theory for a
direct monitoring function of the board; and support the managerial power theory for an
invisible connection between independent directors and powerful executives to influence
inefficiently executives' pay package.
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Finally, evidence was also found to suggest that the position of executive directors
in the management team plays an important role in determining the level of executive pay
and pay components. Specifically, the results indicate that when an executive director
becomes chief executive officer (CEO), hislher total compensation increases by 73%. This
result is consistent with the prediction of tournament theory that rank-order in the
organizational hierarchy is the main determinant of the level of executive compensation.
Further examinations of the tournament theory's predictions were presented in Chapter 7 and
will be summarized in later section.
Hence, the results of the analysis carried out in Chapter 6 suggest that the main
determinants of the level of executive pay and pay components are firm performance, firm
size, executive tenure and the CEO position. The significance of the pay-performance
relationship, however, depends on performance measures used; and consistent with prior
research, the economic significance of the relationship is quite low. Whilst firm size,
executive tenure and the CEO position dummy have consistently significant effect on the
level of executive pay and pay components. The results support predictions of different
theoretical perspectives: agency theory, the managerial power theory, and tournament
theory. The overall fit of the empirical models is approximately 30%, implying that the
combined models from different perspectives explain about 30% of the variance in the level
of executive pay and its components.
8.3.2 Determinants of Incentive pay ratios
The empirical tests examining the determinants of incentive pay ratios firstly
indicates that firm performance is also a determinant of the ratio of long-term incentive payt
although the sign and significance of the relationship are, again, sensitive to performance
measures used. Shareholder returns and ROCE are positively and significantly related to the
incentive pay ratios supporting hypothesis 83, which follows the predictions of both agency
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theory and the managerial power theory for a positive relationship between incentive pay
ratio and firm performance. It means that following good performance, executives are
rewarded higher pay in term of long-term incentives, rather than cash pay. The empirical
evidence suggests that a 10% increase in shareholder returns results in 0.5% increase in
incentive pay ratio. Firm performance measured in Tobin's Q, however, indicates a negative
association with incentive pay ratio, although its economic significance is relatively small.
Whilst absolute accounting performance, EPS, has no correlation with the ratio of long-term
incentive pay. The sensitivity of the results to performance measures used, again, suggests
that the pay-performance relationship should be interpreted carefully with different measure
of firm performance.
Secondly, firm size is a significant determinant of the incentive pay ratio in cost to
company suggesting that in bigger firms, executive directors tend to be granted larger
proportion of long-term incentives in their compensation package. It supports the managerial
power's argument that in larger firm, executives try to 'camouflage' their extraction of rents
through using more long-term incentives rather than observable pay in order to avoid the
'outrage'. It is also consistent with the notion that large firms, who pay their executives
much higher than small firms, try to ease public criticism by reducing the level of cash pay
and increasing long-term incentives for the same (high) total compensation paid to
executives. However, the connection between firm size and incentive pay ratios only holds
when incentives are measured at cost to company; the ratio of net incentives received by
executive directors have no significant correlations with firm size. This result supports the
argument of agency theory that the proportion of long-term incentives in total pay is not
expected to rise in line with firm size.
Thirdly, executive tenure is again a significant determinant of the incentive pay
ratios. The positive and significant relationship between tenure and incentive pay ratios
suggests that the longer tenure in the position, executives receive the larger proportion of
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their pay in long-term incentives. This is consistent with agency theory's argument for a
positive relationship between executive tenure and incentive pay ratios. In economic term,
one extra year in tenure, ceteris paribus, executives' incentive pay ratio increases by 1.3% on
average. Despite having the same derivation, executive age is negatively and weakly related
to the proportion of long-term incentives, which is not consistent with the notion that by
time (age), executives become more risk-neutral and willing to accept a highly incentive
compensation contract.
Fourthly, there is the negative and significant relationship between the level of
executives' current shareholdings and the incentive pay ratios. This result indicates that the
more company's shares owned by the executives, the less likely they accept pay package
with higher proportion of long-term incentives (mostly in term of share options or
conditional shares). This is consistent with agency argument (Hypothesis H9a) that higher
existing shareholdings prevent executives from accepting further risk bearing by highly
incentive pay contract. The empirical results also indicate that there is a positive and
significant association between board size and incentive pay ratio implying that the larger
the number of members on the board of directors, the higher use of incentive contract
offered to executives. This is in line with agency theory, which argues that when the size of
the board is getting large, the monitoring function is diminishing and incentive contract is
necessary to align the interests of executives with those of shareholders.
In sum, the empirical tests examining the determinants of the level of executive pay
components and incentive pay ratios have suggested different determinants and support both
agency theory and the managerial power theory. Broadly, the main detenninants of
executive pay components are firm performance, firm size, executive tenure and the CEO
position; whilst incentive pay ratios are mainly determined by performance, size, tenure,
executive ownership and the CEO position. Provided the contrast between agency theory
and the managerial power theory in determining pay level and pay ratios, the empirical
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results do not strongly support one particular theory. It looks like that the combination of the
two theories, in line with tournament theory, gives clearer determinants of executive pay
components and incentive payratios. The empirical results in Chapter 6 also indicate that the
CEO position is positively and significantly related with both pay components and incentive
pay ratios. This implies that the organisational levels play an important role in determining
the level of executive pay and incentive pay ratios as predicted by tournament theory. An
examination of the tournament theory's predictions was presented in Chapter 7 and is
summarized in the following section.
8.4 Review of the Empirical Analyses of the Implication ofTournament Pay
Structures.
As previously discussed, the CEO position strongly determines the level executive
pay components and incentive payratios. The descriptive analysis in Chapter 7 illustrates the
pattern and percentage change in executive pay across organisational positions and suggests
that the level of pay is clearly different between executive positions. Moreover, the
descriptive analysis indicates a convex relationship between executive pay and
organisational levels with the pay difference increases as one moves up the organisational
hierarchy. Specifically, moving from Level 3 executive position to Level 2 position results
in an increase of 53% in total pay; whilst moving from Level 2 executive position to the
CEO position increases the average of total pay by 95%. The subsequent empirical tests
confirm the convex and positive relationship between executive pay and organisational level;
implying that extra compensation weight is placed on the most senior executive position.
The convexity of the pay-position relationship is confirmed for both cash pay and total pay;
whilst incentive pay is notconvexly related to executive position.
The empirical evidence of a convex relationship between the level of executive pay
and organisational level is consistent with prior research by Conyon et al (2001), Eriksson
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(1999), Lambert et al (1993), and Main et al (1993). Particularly, Conyon et al (2001) using
UK data also found that the convexity of the pay-position relationship exists in cash pay and
total pay measures, whilst incentive pay measure is not convexly related to organisational
levels. The pay gap in this study (95% higher CEO's pay than the next level's), however, is
higher than that reported by Conyon et al (2001), which used 1997 financial year data (60%
between CEO's pay and level 2 position's pay). Despite the sampling differences, this result
broadly indicates that the pay gap in the UK companies between 2001 and 2005 has
increased sharply comparing to the pay gap in 1997. In other words, the convexity between
executive pay and organisational level becomes steeper over time. The pay-gap reported in
this study, however, is much lower than that reported by Main et al (1993) for the US data
(140% higher CEO's pay than the next level's). This means that the magnitude of the
convexity of the pay-position relationship in the UK is smaller than that in the US. This is
because the US executives are sometimes paid very highly. Conyon and Murphy (2000)
provide a comparison of differences in CEO pay and incentives in the US and the UK for the
fiscal year 1997 and show that CEOs in the US earn 46% higher cash compensation and
190% higher total compensation, after controlling for size, sector and other firm and
executive characteristics.
The second prediction of tournament theory considers the effect of the number of
contestants on the tournament prize (pay gap). The empirical results in Chapter 7, however,
suggest that there is not enough evidence of such effect. This result is inconsistent with prior
tournament testing conducted by Conyon et al (2001), Eriksson (l999), and Main et al (l993)
who found evidence of a positive and significant effect of the number of contestants on the
size of the tournament prize. However, the lack of a significant effect of the number of
contestants on the tournament prize may due to the biased measure of this variable. In line
with prior research (Conyon, et al., 2001; Eriksson, 1999; Main, et al., 1993), this analysis
employs the number of internal candidates (i.e. non-CEO executives) as the measure of
candidates for the CEO position. There, however, is growing trend to fill the CEO position
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through external hires rather than through internal promotions (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004).
Hence, using internal candidates only to measure the number of the tournament contestants
may incorrectly reflect the relationship with the tournament prize. In this study, it is unable
to collect data accounting for the external candidates to properly examine the effect of the
number of contestants on the tournament prize.
Thirdly, tournament theory's prediction about the efficiency of the tournament pay
structures that increasing tournament prize (pay dispersion) enhances firm performance is
not supported by the empirical results. In most performance measures, the coefficient on pay
dispersion variable is positive suggesting that wider pay distribution implies higher
equilibrium level of effort and consequently higher firm performance. This coefficient,
however, is not statistically different from zero indicating no such significant effect. This
result is consistent with that reported by Conyon et al (2001), who also found an
insignificant relationship between executive pay dispersion and performance of 100 leading
UK companies. This result, however, contrasts with Main et al (1993) and Eriksson (1999)
who reported a positive effect of pay variation on firm performance in the US and Denmark,
respectively. The lack of a significant effect of pay variation on firm performance may
suggest the opposite view that wider pay dispersion encourages non-cooperative behaviour
in the executive team and decreases firm performance. Lazear (1989) argues that a
comparatively compressed pay structure is more efficient since it reduces sabotage and
promotes cooperation and teamwork. However, data on executive interdependence are not
available to measure the cooperation of executive team and to examine Lazear's view of the
rationale for executive pay compression. This might be a focus for future research.
Fourthly, an examination of the effect of pay dispersion on average executive pay
found evidence consistent with the tournament theory that lower mean levels of executive
pay are associated with reduced variance in compensation within the top executive team
(Lazear, 1989). The coefficients on both pay dispersion variables (i.e,coefficient of variance
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of executive pay and the difference between CEO pay and other executive pay) are
positively and significantly related to the average total pay of executive team. The evidence
of a significant effect of pay dispersion on average executive pay is consistent with the
results reported by Eriksson (1999) and Main et al (1993). Hence, the empirical results
support tournament theory's prediction that the average executive pay is lower in firms that
have more compressed pay structures.
In sum, the empirical tests examining the predictions of tournament theory broadly
support a tournament pay structure in the UK companies. The key prediction of tournament
theory that the tournament prize widens through the corporate hierarchy is verified. The
empirical results also suggest that pay gap between organisational levels is increasing over
time (convexity of the pay-position relationship becomes steeper). In term of other
tournament's predictions, only the effect of pay dispersion on average pay is confirmed by
the empirical results, whilst predictions about the effect of the number of contestants and the
efficiency of the tournament pay structure are not verified.
8.5 Implications and Recommendations toPractice and Policy
The level and determinants of executive compensation has been a major topic of
public concerns and addressed in a number of governance reports. The main concerns are
highly pay level and the board captured by executives in the matter of pay setting (Bebchuk
and Fried, 2004). This study has found evidence of a positive relationship between the level
of pay (and its components) and performance (shareholder returns and ROCE) in support of
agency theory. There is evidence that powerful executives are likely to extract rents and
'camouflage' their extraction of rents through adoption of inefficient pay structures. This
implication of the managerial power theory, however, only holds in term of cost of incentive
pay granted by company, whilst the actual value of pay received by executives is strongly
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determined by performance. Therefore, shareholders and other stakeholders may be satisfied
that executive pay has indeed been earned through firm performance. This result contradicts
the claim that executive compensation contracts are widely inefficient due to the lack of
association between pay and performance.
However, the economic significance of the pay-performance relationship is found to
be relatively low, which is consistent with the findings of Jensen and Murphy (1990),
Conyon (1995), and Murphy (2000). This weak association may provide some entrenched
executives with opportunities to exploit the pay-performance relationship; and hence
performance-related pay schemes may not deliver expected results. In order to prevent this
potential abuse, it is recommended that current and future pay schemes (especially long-term
incentives) are continually monitored and revised in the light of this possibility. The
evidence of rent extraction by powerful executives by adopting inefficient pay structures
suggests that incentive pay schemes should be monitored to ensure they are conditional to
shareholder-value-based performance measures rather than those easily manipulated by
executives. In effect, it helps to reduce the cost of company in granting such inefficient
incentive pay schemes and align the interests of executives with those of shareholders.
The empirical results in this study suggest that the pay-performance relationship is
sensitive to performance measures used. While shareholder returns measure strongly
determines the level of executive pay, other measures including Tobin's Q, ROCE and EPS
are weakly related to pay level. It is then recommended that executive incentive pay schemes
should be made conditional to market-based measures rather than accounting based
measures. Specifically, there is no evidence of an association between pay level and EPS;
hence companies should reconsider when granting long-term incentives conditional on EPS
as found in the sample data.
223
This study found that executive tenure is a strong determinant of both level of
executive pay and incentive pay ratio. This supports the notion of the managerial power
theory that longer tenure increases executive's power and allow them to extract greater rents.
Despite the fact that tenure results in additional human capital, experience, etc.; an increase
of approximately 6% in pay for every extra year in tenure seems overpaying for such
additional human capitals. Hence, it is recommended that shareholders, institutional
investors and regulators should pay more attention to tenure issues and have proper control
procedures to ensure executives do not gain such power through tenure to extract rents at the
cost of shareholders.
The monitoring function of the board and the effect of institutional shareholders
have been found mostly insignificant in this study. Hence, it could be concluded that the
effort of regulators, institutional investors and shareholders in strengthening corporate
governance in companies to monitor executive directors and the pay-setting processes may
not be fruitful. The monitoring function of the board and institutional shareholders has
mostly no effect on the level of executive payor incentive pay ratio. However, the
application of strong corporate governance may at least influence the pay-setting process and
strengthening the monitoring function as one way to limit the power of executives.
This study also suggests that executive pay in UK companies highly follows
tournament pay structure with a strong connection between executive pay and organizational
level. Although there is evidence of increasing 'tournament ratio' over time, the efficiency
of these tournament pay structures is not verified by this empirical study. Hence, it is
suggested that the adoption of tournament pay process might not help to lower levels of pay
and 'tournament ratios'. Its efficiency is also questionable.
224
8.6 Limitations and Suggestions for future research
While the empirical analysis of the determinants of executive pay components,
incentive pay ratios, and the implication of tournament pay structure has produced some
informative results, it is clear that there is a number of potential limitations and a great deal
of research to be carried out on these issues. In this sub-section, a number of the most
important issues are outlined.
Firstly, due to time-consuming manual data collection, this study did empirical tests
on a sample of 50 UK companies in 5-yeartime frame. Although the sample is proved to be
representative, it would be more accurate in the results if sample size can be expanded.
Hence, it is recommended that future research extends the sample size to full FTSE 350
companies (excluding financial sector) and expands the panel to, say, 10years.
Also relating to the data and research design, this thesis focuses on executive
compensation package with definition of total remuneration package excludes pension
schemes. According to a survey", pension schemes now account for about 10% of actual
total remuneration package of FTSE 100 CEO. Hence, missing out pension schemes in
examining the determination of executive pay might mislead the results. The pension
schemes, however, are very complicated and difficultto accountfor accrately
Thirdly, consistent with much of the research on executive pay, access to main
board executive directors is difficult if not impossible. Nevertheless, a valuable contribution
to executive remuneration would be to examine how executives perceive themselves to be
motivated through remuneration. This may be achieved through interviews or
II Source: PWC's"Executive compensation review of theyear 2009"
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psychological/motivational surveys. Again, access will be the single most important factor
that will hamper this research endeavour.
Fourthly, although this study does, to some extent, compare UK findings with
American data, another valuable area for comparison is with Europe e.g. Germany or across
regions. The institutional, cultural and regulatory norms surrounding executive remuneration
are very different across the economic triad: Europe, America, and Austral-Asia. American
executives and American companies tended to have significantly higher bonus payments,
which suggest country variations exist. Therefore, direct international comparisons may
create opportunities for countries to learn from the successes and/or failures of alternative
remuneration practices and policies. Equally, it may create a better understanding of the role
the institution and company play in constructing remuneration packages, the cultural
differences, and international effects.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Meta-analysis Sample and related statistics
Sample Compensation Average
Stud» Size Measure Performance/size measure ICorrelations
McQuire, Chiu & Elbing 45 Total Comp Sales, Profit 0.580
(1962) 45 t!i Total Comp t!iSales, t!i Profit 0.305
Lewellen ( 1968) 45 Cash Camp Sales, Total Assets, 0.569
45 Total Camp Market Valuation, Profit 0.493
45 t!i Total Comp t!iSales, Profit 0.362
Ciscel (1974) 210 Cash Camp Sales, Total As ets, Profit 0.364
Miller (1985) 5312 t!i Cash Comp Sales 0.020
Gomez-Mejia, Tosi & 71 Salary Sales, Market Valuation, 0.270
I-Iinkin (1987) 71 Bonus Profit, Shareholder return 0.210
71 Long-term Income 0.308
71 t!i Salary Profit 0.183
71 t!i Bonus Shareholder return 0.223
71 t!i Long-term t!iProfit 0.210
income
Miller (1988) 5312 t!i Cash Camp Profit, ROE 0.020
O'Reilly, Main & Crystal 105 Cash Camp Sales, Total A sets, ROE 0.367
(1988)
Finkelstein & Hambrick 110 Log (Cash Camp) Log(total asset ), ROE 0.395
(1989)
Fizel, Louie& Mentzer 136 Cash Comp Sales 0.550
(1990)
Rajagopalan & Prescott 226 Cash Camp Total Assets, ROE 0.305
(1990)
Winfrey(1990) 2 15 Cash Comp Sales, t!iSales, 0.343
Total Assets, RO .
Kerr & Kren (1992) 63 t:,. Cash Comp Shareholder return 0.230
63 t:,. Total Comp hareholder return 0.100
Belkauoi & Pavlik (1993) 216 Cash Comp Total Asset 0.264
Belkauoi & Picur (1993) 247 Cash Camp Market Valuation, Profit 0.1 21
Mangel & Singh (1993) 79 Log(Cash Comp) Log (Sale ), ROE 0.320
Boyd (1994) 193 Log(Total Camp) Log (Sales), ROE 0.407
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Appendix J: Meta-analysi Sample and related statistics (Continu ed)
Stlltl.!' , s a " " P l e e___
Slze:_'l u z"r
Wener & Tosi (1995) 300 Cash Camp Sales, Total Assets, 0.367
ROA, ROE
238 Ii Cash Camp liSales 0.019
Henderson & 189 Cash Camp Sales 0.220
Fredrickson(1996)
189 Total Comp Sales 0.190
Bilimoria (1997) 262 Log (Total Camp) Log (Sales) 0.367
Gray & Cannella (1997) 750 Total Camp Log (Sales) 0.170
Kren & Kerr (1997) 268 Cash Camp Market Valuation 0.256
215 Total Camp RO - 0.229
Wade, Porac & Pollack 266 Log (Salary) ROE 0.100
(1997)
266 Log (Bonus) ROE 0.210
266 Log (Long-term ROE 0.070
Income)
David, Kochhar & 200 Total Camp Total Assets, 0.115
Levitas (1998) ROA
Finkelstein & Boyd 600 Log (Cash Camp) Log (Sales), 0.465
( 1998) Log (Total Assets)
Sanders & Carpenter 258 Log (Total Camp) Log (Sales), 0.250
( 1998) ROA
Buck, Bruce, Main & 287 Log (Total Camp) Log (Sales), 0.263
Udueni (2003) Shareholder return
Canyon & Peck (1998) 94 Total Camp Total Employees, 0.065
(without ESO) Shareholder return
Cordeiro & Veliyath 222 Log (Total Camp) Log (Sales), ROA 0.\50
(2003) 222 Log ( Cash Camp) hareholder return 0.150
Hambrick & Finkelstein 752 6.Total Comp 6.Sales, liROE, 0.090
(1995) Shareholder return
Canyon, Peck and Sadler 249 Cash Comp Shareholder return -0.015
(2000)
Gomez-Mejia el at 253 Total Comp Sales, ROA 0.210
(2003) Shareholder return
Gray and Benson (2003) 11 4 Cash Camp Annual budget 0.630
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Appendix I: Meta-analysis Sample and related statistic (Continued)
Study
Gunasekaragea et al. 36 Total Comp Total Assets 0.548
(2002) Tobin's Q
Duru & Iyengar 329 Salary Sales, Profit. hareholder 0.005
(2002) 329 Bonus return. ROA 0.221
329 LTIPs -0.075
329 Option granted 0.020
Coombs & Gilley 406 Salary Log(Sales) 0.\ 23
(2005) 406 Bonus Shareholder return 0.133
406 Options ROA 0.087
406 Total Comp 0.060
Hall & Liedtka 51 Cash Comp/Total Log (Market Valuation) -0.200
(2005) Comp Profit
5 ) Options/Total 0.004
Comp
Tosi et al (2004) 59 Cash Comp Log (Sales) 0.273
59 Total Comp Shareholder return, ROA 0.193
Boschen et al (2003) 30 Cash Comp Profit -0.0 12
30 Total Comp Shareholder return -0.0 10
Young & Buchholtz 216 Ii Total Comp Shareholder return 0.060
(2002)
Werner, Tosi, 407 Ii Total Comp Total Assets 0.\80
Gomez-Mejia (2004) ROA
Garvey & Milbourn 1400 Cash Comp Market Valuation, 0.081
(2003) Options Shareholder return, 0.141
Tobin's Q
Silva (2005) 257 Cash Comp Log (Total employees), 0.100
Relative financial
performance to indu try
Khan, Dharwadkar & 224 Cash Comp Sales, Tobin's Q 0.175
Brandes (2005) 224 Options Sales, Tobin's Q 0.245
224 Total Comp ales, Tobin's Q 0.27
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Appendix 2: List of Companies included in the sample data
Market
No. Code Name Yeflr End Caoltallzation Industrv
(2005 as (in E'm as at
examole) October 2006 )
1 2 Abbot Group 3 1/12/2005 699 Oil & Gas
2 7 Alliance Boots Pic 3 1/03 /2005 7,848 Consumer ervices
3 8 AMEC Pic 31/12/2005 1,239 Industrials
4 13 ARM Holdings 31/12 /2005 1,605 Technology
5 16 Associated British Foods pic 17/09/2005 6,589 Consumer Goods
6 22 AWG Pic 31/03/2005 2,27 1 Utilities
7 24 BAE Systems 3 1/ 12/2005 13,464 Industrials
8 25 Balfour Beatty 3 1/ 12/2005 1,736 Industrials
9 26 Barratt Developments Pic 30/06/2005 2,621 Consumer Goods
10 28 BBA Group 3 1/12/2005 1,300 Industrial
II 38 BP pic 31/12/2005 114,478 Oil & Ga
12 43 British Airways 31/03/2005 5,196 on umer er ice
13 44 British American Tobacco 3 1/12/2005 29,645 Consumer Goods
14 47 British Sky Broadcasting 30/06/2005 9,620 Consumer ervices
Group
15 56 Cable & Wireless 3 1/03/2005 3,420 Telecommunication
16 58 Cairn Energy 31/12/2005 2,789 Oil&Ga
17 61 Carillion 31/12/2005 1,079 Industrials
18 63 Carpetright 30/04/2005 807 Consum r ervic
19 66 Charter Pic 31/ 12/2005 1,523 Indu trials
20 76 Corus Group 01/01/200 5 4,146 Basic Material
2 1 83 Daily Mail & General Trust 30/09/2005 2,706 Consumer ervi
22 90 Diageo 30/06/2005 26,874 Con um r Good
23 94 EASYJET 30/09/2005 2,141 Consumer rvi
24 104 First Choice Holidays 31/10/2005 1,193 Con umer rvi
25 110 GKN 3 1/12/20 05 2,257 Con umer Good
243
Appendix 2: List a/Companies included in the sample data (Continued)
Market
No. Code Name Year End Capitalization l"dustrl'
(£ 'm) as at
Oct 2006
26 124 HAYS 30/06/2005 2,173 Industrials
27 125 Headlam Group 31/12/2005 468 Consumer Goods
28 148 Johnson Matthey pic 3 1/03/2005 3,151 Basic Materials
29 158 Laird Group pic 31/12/2005 7 10 Industrials
30 168 Marks & Spencer Group 31/03/2005 11,056 Consumer Services
3 1 169 Marshalls 31/12/2005 481 Industrials
32 173 MEGGITI 31/12/2005 1,448 Industrials
33 175 Millennium & Copthome 3 1/12/2005 1,56 1 Consumer Services
Hotels
34 20 1 Premier Oil 31/12/2005 1,060 Oil & Gas
35 208 RankGroup pic 3 1/ 12/2005 1,426 Consumer ervices
36 2 18 REXAM 31/ 12/2005 3,414 Indu trials
37 22 1 Rio Tinto pic 31/12/2005 30,021 Basic Materials
38 228 Sage Group pic 30/09/2005 3,072 Technology
39 229 SAINSBURY(J) 26/03/2005 7,344 Consumer ervices
40 237 Shanks Group 31/03/2005 444 Industrials
41 240 Signet Group 01/02/2005 2,073 onsumer ervice
42 242 Smith & Nephew 31/12/2005 4,807 Health Care
43 259 Taylor Nelson Sofres 31/12/2005 926 Consumer er ice
44 260 Taylor Woodrow pic 31/12 /2005 2,161 Consumer Goods
45 276 VODAFONE 31/03/2005 71,049 Telecommunications
46 277 VT Group 31/03/2005 833 Indu trial
47 282 Whitbread pic 03/03/2005 3,087 Con umer crvi c
48 284 Wilson Bowden 31/12/2005 1,659 Consumer ood
49 287 Wolseley Pic 31/07/2005 8,112 Indu trial
50 292 WPP Group Pic 31/12/2005 8,303 Consumer rvi s
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Appendix 3: Determinants of Total Executive Pay - Value to E. ecutive
(Arellano-Bond GMM stimator)
Variables EPS
Coefficient
(I-statistic)
Lag Dependent Variable .5843· · ·
Performance
Log of Firm's Market Valuation
(4.76)
.0005
(0.46)
.1348·
( 1.93)
I
- -l
(-2 .77)
J_~ 8 8 5 0 0 •••ExecutiveOwnership
L 0.08
514
-0.44
- - f- --
514
onst
- --------------
Observations (N)
____ - . - - - - ~ - . - _ t _ _
CEO Dummy
Log of Board ize
Executive Age
ExecutiveTenure .0766·· .0782· · · .0779· · · .0787··
(2.50) (2.59) (2.61) _: _ ~ ~ ~ )
.0014 -.0007 .0010 [ .0008
(0.02) (-0.0 I) (0.02) (0.0I)
-------- .- --
.2975· .2933· .2737· I .2850.
(1.81) (1.79) (1.72) I (1.75)
-------+--:...---:---1----=- - - -
-.5235 -.5409 -.4797 I -.5470
(-1.39) (- 1.46) (-1.32) (- 1.46)
__"_ __._ _ __.. ,_--\ . . - f--- .-- - - - -
Institutional Shareholdings -.0308 -.0464 -.1186 -.0268
I(-0.12) (-0.18) +(-0.47) (-0.10)
.5598··· .5580· · · .5366··· .1. .5590···
(5.03) (5.07) (4.93) (5.08)
--- -
-.0782 -.0783 -.0796 I -.0817
(-1. 12) (-1.13) (-1.17) (-1.17)~ ,_ g g _ n _ _ _ _ 1 9.70' 10.96' 11.91... . . . ~ ~ t . . 4 4 .. :-
Arellano-Bond order I -5.87·" -5.68··· -5.61•• ~ ~ 5 . 5 8 •••
_ - - - -------+------1-----'1-- --
Arellano-Bond order 2
-'--
NEDs
•.••.•••: Statisticallysignificant at 10%. 5%& 1% level respectively
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Appendi 4: Determinants of Cash Compensation
(Arellano-Bond GMM Estimator)
Performance Variables
Variables TSR TobinQ ROCE EPS
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) ((-statistic) ((-statistic)
~ - - - -
Lag Dependent variable .2266" .2386 · · .2502·· I .2532··
(2.29) (2.44)
__ ~ . . 6 _ ) __ ~ ~ ) _ __
- --- - ---
--- - - - -
- ------_.
Performance -.0309 -.0 127 -.0057 .000 1
(-1.09) (-0.98) (- 1.05) (0.17)
-_._----
._._- -_._._---_._._---
Log of Firm 's Market Valuation .0692 .0494 .0362 .0303
( 1.54) (1.15) (0.88) (0.7 1)
',N'. ._. _..._._---_ ...._..-
_ _ ___•__.M.___._.,
____·.M_MM.M___.M_M._____·
--_ ..._------- ._------ --
Executive Ownership -2.316 -2.3 11 -2.358 -2.396
(-1.26) (-1.25) (- 1.27) (- 1.28)
_ __MH"M._'_ ._M. - - _._- - -_ ..... _...._.__.._._.__.__._ ....- .._- _.._...._ .._..........., .__.•...._._.._..._._-_._ ......_. ._-------
Executive Tenure .0375 · · .0373 · · .0372 · · .0369· ·
(2.08) (2.06) (2 .04) (2.02)
I.._ .._----_....__._-_.._----_. --_.._._-----_. \ -Executive Age .0025 .0026 .0028 .0038(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09)C-.--. - - ----- - -
Log of Board Size .0492 .0394 .0527 .0547
(0.51) (0.40)
.J (0.54) (0.55)
- -
NED s -.5037·· -.4936·· -.5155·· -.5069··
(-2.25) (-2.20) (-2.2 8) (-2 .23)
I
----
Institutional Shareho1dings -. 1800 -.1708 -.1638 -. 1777
(-1.17) (-1.10 ) (- 1.06) (- 1.14)
---- - I -- -CEO Dummy .4592 · · · .4591 · · · .4637 · · · .4596· · ·
I
I (6.96) (6.92) (6.95) (6.88)
t Const
- -_ ._- _.- -- - _ .._- ---- ----_..- --_..- ---
_._-- _.._-
-
.0292 .0300 .029 \ .0277
(0.70) (0.7 1) (0.69) (0.65)
-_.._._--- -_._-_..._...-_._._._-_..._--- _..-----_._-----
-------
_._-----
-
....._.............,......-" ......._.............
-_._.._._.._-_..._......... ~ .._-_._.
. '-.......__._------. ----_.._- .....-..._----
- -
Sargan Test 18.53" · 17.44 · · · 17.13· · · 16.71· · ·
..-._._............ _....- ...._..__..,-,........__.._._--_._.._.__._.. ~ ~ ......._.._._...__...._.___ ....._............._.____.._.w._._·__
_.._------ ~ ~ ._-
Are llano-Bond order I -5.3 1"· -5.55· · · -5.68··· -5.65"·
................_ - - ..._- .. ._... .__.__.....--- -_._..__..__.._-
.. - --.- ----....----f--------- .... .. - ~ ~ _."
Are llano-Bond order 2 -0.59 -0.37 -0.18 -0.35
. - " _. .-....- - ..._- _...-.__._._---
-·--·---·--··--l----·-·----
- 514-- -\-5 14I Observations (N) 5 14 5 14 I
I I
. , •• , "': Statistically significant at 10%, 5% & 1% level respectively
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Appendix 5: Determinants of Incentive Pay - Cost to ompany
(Arellano-Bond GMM Estimator)
Performance Variables
Dependent Variable:
Inc entive Pa y ( ost to Co.)
TSR
Coefficient
(I-statistic)
TobinQ
Coeffi cient
(t-statistic)
ROCE
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
EPS
Coe fficient
(I-statistic)
---;
.5152***
(3.81)
-.1018
(-1.07)
.0744
(0.52)
1.395
(0.22)
-.0005
(-0.01)
Executive Ten ure
Executive Ownersh ip
Performance
c- ._- - - - - : - - - ~ - : - : - - - - - j - - - : : ~ : : - : - : - - : - - - t - - - - - - 1 - - - - - + - - - - - - -
Lag Dependent variab le
__________+---:..._-=--__ i _ ~ _ = _ _ __!----.:- -:..
Log of Board Size
I
NEDs
EO Dumm y
(-1.04)(-1.04)(-1.06)(-1.00)
onst
- - -
- -
- ~ - - -t--- - - -
----
__ _ _____ - 1- ___ - I
- -
_ ~ a r ~ ~ ~ T<:.:t_ _.._- 17.82" 15.09''::'''- 16.52' " 15.95' .'.:.. J
Are llano-Bond order I -5.63*** -5.76*** -5.78*** -5.76***
--
- -- 2.08" I 2.16" -1-2.11*;- - 2.13** -JAre llano-Bond order 2
- --
, -
Observ ation s (N) 363 363 I 363 363
" " , ''': Statistically significant at 10%, 5% & I% level respectively
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Appendi. 6: Determinants of Incentive Pay Ratio- Value to E ccutivcs
(Arellano-Bond GMM Estimator)
Dependent nrlable:
Performance Variables
Proportion of Incentive Pay TSR TobinQ ROC EPS
(Va lue to . c ) Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(I-statistic) (I-statistic) (I-statistic) (I-statistic)
Lag Dependent Variable
~
I
I
I
.4171*"
(4.84)
.0414*
(1.83)
.0229
(0.65)
-4.574*"
(-3.04)
Executive Tenure
Executive Age
Log of Board ize
N -Os
I Institutional hareholdings
I I
C -0 Dummy
1.3 1
514
9.70* -1'
-7.66*"
0.99
514
·7.86*"
argan Te t 10.26* 10.49*
[ Areiiano-Bond o ~ ? ? ; I ~ : - : = : = . __. : ~ : 6 7 * ~ ~ = = : : 7 . 6 9 ~ * * -
Arellano-Bond order 2 I 1.24 1.30
f.. - - -- ..------ -- _.- -- -
I Observations (N) 514 514
. , ••, •••: Statistically significant at 10%. 5% & 1% levelrespectively
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